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high-value resources such as oil and diamonds. Instead, scholars 
are now turning their attention to conflicts emerging from water 
disputes. For example, conflicts have arisen over water use in 
Central Asia, stemming from long-term overexploitation and 
mismanagement. As fresh water resources increase in scarcity, 
this new “liquid gold” only amplifies the potential for conflict.4 
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy seeks 
to facilitate the discussion and understanding of important 
developments surrounding natural resources and their relation-
ship to various types of conflicts. Our aim is to encourage further 
integration of sustainable development principles within existing 
and emerging legal and policy frameworks. The management 
and governance of natural resources exert a significant influence 
upon the fundamental survival and security of multiple stake-
holders who live near, rely on, or benefit from those resources. 
Resource development decision-making must take into account 
relevant environmental, social, and political factors if the inter-
national environmental and legal communities are to minimize 
and ultimately thwart natural resource conflicts. 
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In October 2011 the human population of our planet officially reached the high-water mark of seven billion.1 According to the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Index, the current 
rate of consumption will see demand for two planets’ worth of 
natural resources by 2030.2 With this increasing demand and the 
continued development of virtually every corner of the globe, 
the finite nature of the Earth’s resources presents a sobering real-
ity. Through human ingenuity, industry now attempts to supple-
ment scarce resources through research and development of 
synthetic and other alternatives. However, a simple, stark fact 
remains: certain resources such as water, timber, and land are 
fundamental and aboriginal as the basic elements for human 
survival. As the demand for natural resources rises in a finite 
sphere, allocation, distribution, management, and governance of 
these natural resources must be scrutinized. And at the core of 
any such critique must be the availability of the natural resources 
themselves. 
This issue on Natural Resource Conflicts examines current 
contestations arising out of the use, distribution, and governance 
of these finite resources. We survey the globe, exploring the 
causes and implications of individual and localized conflicts with 
the ultimate goal of providing viable and successful resolutions. 
Through the analysis of land-based conflicts centered upon the 
public lands of the American West, participatory and collabora-
tive management is heralded as one potentially effective method 
of resolving these disputes. Left unresolved, disputes over natu-
ral resources can escalate into public demonstrations and even 
armed conflicts. For example, where the imbalance of water 
rights distribution in Latin America favors elites and private 
corporations, neglected rural and indigenous communities have 
taken to mass protests. In the resource-rich African continent, 
natural resources, including petroleum and rare earth minerals, 
have both catalyzed and fueled violent armed conflicts.3 Only by 
carefully probing and dissecting these conflicts can we hope to 
curb such ghastly consequences.
Here at home, highly contested domestic policy debates 
center around petroleum extraction, especially in the American 
Southwest. However, the conversation is not limited to traditional 
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iNtroductory commeNts:
the Pervasive, PersisteNt, aNd ProfouNd liNks BetweeN  
coNflict aNd the eNviroNmeNt
by Carroll Muffett and Carl Bruch* 
We are pleased to introduce this special issue of Sus-tainable Development Law & Policy, which explores the diverse linkages between conflict and the envi-
ronment. For the last two and a half years, we have worked 
together co-editing (with Sandra S. Nichols) a volume on Gov-
ernance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
as part of a multi-volume series on post-conflict peacebuilding 
and natural resource management being developed jointly by the 
United Nations Environment Programme, the Environmental 
Law Institute, the University of Tokyo, and McGill University. 
The project incorporates the work of more than 230 researchers, 
several of whom are represented in this issue.
As the articles in this issue demonstrate, the linkages 
between conflict and natural resources are deep, complex, and 
often surprising. Resource dependence is recognized as an indi-
cator of conflict risk.1 Natural resources often serve as a vital 
and indispensable subsistence base for those displaced by 
conflict and for those working to rebuild their lives and com-
munities when conflict has subsided. Managed improperly, how-
ever, these same resources may provide both an incentive and 
a means to keep fighting for those who profit from insecurity.2 
Similarly, natural resources can be both the subject and an incen-
tive for crime—from petty thievery to complex timber mafias 
to corruption at every level of government, each of which, in 
turn, can erode personal security and social stability.3 And while 
well-managed resources can help fund reconstruction efforts 
and help bring order from chaos, access to high-value resources 
can reduce government accountability to people and further 
feed corruption.4 Thus, accountable and effective natural 
resource management is a critical component of peacebuilding 
in post-conflict countries.
The environment itself can also be a casualty of conflict.5 
Forests may be denuded for conflict timber, oil fields set ablaze 
as a form of scorched-earth warfare, or landmines and ordnance 
left behind to render large areas of the countryside unsafe for 
decades after a conflict ends. Still other impacts may be less 
direct, but no less significant. People displaced by conflict 
can be drawn together into informal tent cities or organized 
encampments numbering in the hundreds of thousands. These 
settlements can become major urban areas virtually overnight, 
requiring a steady supply of fresh water, sanitation facilities, 
fuel wood, building supplies, and food that far exceeds local 
resources. More subtly, but no less importantly, conflict has 
lasting and serious impacts on the infrastructure of natural 
resource governance—both in terms of physical infrastructure 
and in terms of the human capacity, political will, and the reser-
voir of civil order and trust that are needed to govern resources 
effectively.
In internecine conflicts, control of natural resources—and 
the substantial material wealth they can generate—can serve not 
only as a driver of conflict, but as fuel for warring parties and, 
ultimately, as a barrier to negotiating the peace.6 This is particu-
larly the case when high-value resources such as oil, timber, and 
precious minerals are involved.7 Clementine Burnley reflects on 
this in Natural Resources Conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo: A Question of Governance? She examines the 
contrasting theories of natural resource wealth, on the one hand, 
and environmental scarcity, on the other, as causes of conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”). The author 
then asks why large-scale violence persists in some resource-
rich parts of the country while other areas with similar resources 
and multiple ethnic groups are spared. She finds that often these 
clashes are linked to socio-economic factors at the local level.
Burnley observes that natural resource management remains 
a low priority for political actors in the DRC, and that the interest 
that does exist is too often focused on resource control as a 
means of consolidating personal power and wealth for elites. 
She discusses how the continued presence of stakeholders with a 
material interest in profiting from instability remains one of the 
most important obstacles to effective natural resource manage-
ment and good governance in the DRC.
Burnley argues that both the context in which natural 
resources are used and the way in which those resources are 
managed are key to preventing and managing conflicts at all 
levels. Because the nature and scale of these conflicts differ 
widely, however, approaches to management must differ as well. 
She outlines ways in which donor institutions have worked to 
improve resource governance in the DRC—by supporting access 
to alternate income opportunities for local people, distributing 
revenues from extractive industries more equitably, and address-
ing local conflicts over resource access and use before they 
escalate beyond control. Burnley argues that many of the most 
successful initiatives emphasized active participation of affected 
communities. She argues that what is now needed in the DRC is 
to move beyond abstract commitments to strengthen institutions 
*Carroll Muffett is President and CEO of the non-profit Center for International 
Environmental Law and has held leadership positions with several environmen-
tal non-profits. Carl Bruch is a Senior Attorney and Co-Director of International 
Programs at the Environmental Law Institute and co-chairs the IUCN Specialist 
Group on Armed Conflict and the Environment. 
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and improve rule of law to more detailed specifications of 
concrete, context-specific measures to improve natural resource 
management. Building on the structures and processes already 
in place, it will take significantly more planning, resources, 
and political will to bring the needed transparency and account-
ability to all natural resource management in the DRC.
As Burnley discusses, natural resources can serve as a 
resource not only for those who would build and secure the 
peace, but for those who seek to destroy it. On the long road from 
a fragile ceasefire to a stable peace, there are many who have 
strong incentives to reverse course, and who actively seek the 
means to foment that reversal. From gold to diamonds to conflict 
timber, natural resources have 
provided that means in promi-
nent examples, including 
Sierra Leone and Liberia.8 The 
problem of how to manage 
these peace spoilers remains 
one of the most challenging in 
post-conflict natural resource 
management. Philippe Le 
Billon explores one possible 
response to this challenge in 
Bankrupting Peace Spoilers: 
What Role for UN Peace-
keepers? Le Billon discusses 
how reducing belligerents’ access to revenues from high-value 
resources might help limit the success of peace spoilers, particu-
larly when paired with resource management reforms addressing 
broader social and environmental causes of conflict and human 
rights abuses associated with those resources. Specifically, Le 
Billon examines the potential for the United Nations to move 
beyond economic sanctions alone and empower UN peacekeep-
ers to secure control of natural resource production or transporta-
tion as a means of bankrupting prospective peace spoilers. In so 
doing, he considers not only the opportunities such an approach 
provides, but the challenges and issues associated with deploy-
ing peacekeepers to curtail access to conflict resources.
Natural resources can also be a source of hope after conflict, 
where they can be seen as a ready source of revenue for rebuild-
ing a cash-strapped economy. Handled carelessly, however, this 
can lead to the rapid liquidation of valuable resources while 
further entrenching elites and risking reversion to conflict.9 In 
both cases, natural resources come under profound pressure in 
the wake of conflict. Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, the editors 
of the first edited book in the ELI/UNEP/University of Tokyo/
McGill University series, share some of the central lessons 
from their work in High-Value Natural Resources: A Blessing 
or a Curse for Peace? Drawing on the thirty different analyses 
and case studies in their book, Lujala and Rustad highlight how 
proper management of high-value natural resources is crucial in 
the aftermath of armed conflict. They document how effective 
management of such resources can be used to support a wide 
range of peacebuilding objectives, including grassroots liveli-
hoods, large-scale economic recovery, good governance and 
inclusive processes, and a more secure and stable peace. At the 
same time, the authors caution that the risk of negative outcomes 
from post-conflict resource extraction is high.
Lujala and Rustad point out that there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to natural resource management in post-conflict set-
tings. Rather, resource management must be based on a nuanced 
understanding of the context in which the management takes 
place. This context includes the numerous and complex link-
ages—past, current, and potential—between the resources and 
conflict, international dynamics and trade patterns, institutional 
capacity, the conditions that have shaped resource management 
in the past, and the political will that will shape their manage-
ment into the future. It is only 
with close attention to these 
factors, paired with good 
governance, that the resource 
curse can be turned into a 
blessing.
In post-conflict regions, 
careful management of natu-
ral resource issues can play a 
critical role in ensuring a sus-
tainable peace not only within 
countries but also between 
them.10 In Liquid Challenges: 
Contested Water in Central 
Asia, Christine Bichsel examines competing claims to water in 
the Syr Darya river basin, which is shared by the former Soviet 
States of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan. She looks at water as a potentially contentious 
issue and assesses international efforts to mitigate the potential 
for violent escalation and degradation of the environment. She 
concludes by arguing that conflicts over water in Central Asia 
may be driven less by inter-state relations than by the particular 
interests of specific domestic actors in each country.
This use of conflict, real or perceived, as a tool to advance 
the economic interests of individual actors finds curious expres-
sion much closer to home in Natural Resource “Conflicts” in the 
U.S. Southwest: A Story of Hype over Substance by Laura Peter-
son et al. The authors examine the putative “conflict” between 
environmental protection and economic development in the 
context of the U.S. Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). As the title 
attests, the authors argue that the conflicts involved—between 
oil exploitation and agriculture on the one hand and two candi-
date endangered species on the other—owes more to perception, 
myth, and spin than to ineluctable reality. Peterson argues that 
this “fear mongering”, and the attempts it has engendered to pass 
species-specific legislation undermining the ESA, represent a 
thinly veiled and dangerous attempt to push an industry agenda 
at the expense of the public good. In this, there are faint but rec-
ognizable echoes of the high-stakes (and all too real) experience 
with the peace spoilers discussed by Burnley, Le Billon, and 
Lujala and Rustad.
Richard Sadowski explores this private influence on con-
flict dynamics from a much different vantage point in Cuban 
natural resources can serve 
as a resource not only for 
those who would build and 
secure the peace, but for 
those who seek to destroy it
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Off-Shore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the 
Framework of the United States’ Embargo. Sadowski consid-
ers how Cuba’s plans to exploit its offshore oil wealth have 
increased calls from lawmakers and the oil industry to relax the 
United States’ half-century old embargo on Cuba. Proponents 
of greater engagement rest their arguments both on the potential 
environmental risks of offshore drilling and on the prospective 
economic benefits of partnering in the exploitation. Sadowski 
argues that, despite this added pressure from the oil lobby, the 
purpose of the embargo has not yet been met and calls for a con-
tinuation of the policy.
Disputes over access to and allocation of critical natural 
resources can serve as a flashpoint for conflict at all levels of 
social organization, including at the grassroots level.11 Rutgerd 
Boelens et al. explore this phenomenon in the context of water in 
Threats to a Sustainable Future: Water Accumulation and Con-
flict in Latin America. Arguing that the concentration of rights to 
access water and participate in decision-making on water gov-
ernance is a historical problem in Latin America, they examine 
how contemporary water policies in Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru 
have tended to aggravate this problem in the face of globaliza-
tion, growing water demand, and decreasing water availability 
caused by ecosystem degradation and climate change. The 
authors argue that the context-based and locally devised water 
practices of small-holder communities and indigenous territories 
are being continually overruled by government bureaucracies, 
market-driven water policies, and top-down measures developed 
with little respect for the realities on the ground. The result is 
that water resources fundamental to survival and economic 
well-being accumulate in the hands of elites, to the detriment 
of marginalized populations, leading to a deepening of societal 
conflicts over water and mounting reactions “from below” to 
water issues.
As the articles in this issue highlight, failures of democratic 
inclusion are often a hallmark of natural resource-related con-
flict, in all its forms.12 Indeed, we have found this one of the most 
recurring lessons from our own work in the field. Good natural 
resource governance is, ultimately, just good governance—it is 
strengthened by commitments to democracy, transparency, and 
accountability.13 As a result, consulting and engaging stakehold-
ers has proven time and again to be one of the most critical tools 
for managing resources while minimizing conflict risk.14 
Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney provide three case 
studies in how to do this from the ground up in Collaboration 
and the Ecology of Democracy. Drawing from experience with 
three stakeholder-driven resource governance efforts in the 
United States, the authors highlight citizen-driven, multiparty 
collaboration as an important tool in resource management and 
as an “emerging species within the ‘ecology’ of democracy.” 
They argue that such collaborative problem-solving is a funda-
mental form of democracy in which people are working together 
to shape the very conditions under which they live.
The articles in this issue demonstrate the critical importance 
of situational awareness and conflict management when manag-
ing natural resources in the post-conflict (or peri-conflict) con-
text. Natural resource management is intimately interwoven with 
conflict management; human security; livelihoods and recovery 
at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic scales; efforts 
at demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating former combat-
ants; transitional justice; and ongoing governance. Accordingly, 
those who would preserve an existing peace or build a new one 
must take care to identify, understand, and respond to the natural 
resource dimensions relevant to their objectives. Correspond-
ingly, those concerned with managing and protecting natural 
resources in conflict-affected regions must expressly recognize 
the potential conflict dimensions of their work, however remote 
from conflict it may at first appear. Achieving this requires not 
only recognizing how the existing context has been shaped by 
conflict but how actions taken in seemingly unrelated fields can 
contribute either to ameliorating and recovering from conflict or 
to conflict reversion. 
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Natural resources coNflict iN the democratic  
rePuBlic of the coNgo:
a QuestioN of goverNaNce?
by Clementine Burnley*
InTroducTIon
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) is a frag-ile post-conflict state that is immensely rich in natural resources. Effective management of its mining, oil, and 
forestry resources is key to its future economic progress.1 How-
ever, the DRC is widely regarded as a textbook forum for natu-
ral resource-induced conflicts at both local and national levels.2 
If natural resources are the main cause of conflicts, then improv-
ing governance over those resources could reduce the likelihood 
of conflict. Academic studies on conflict causes could be usefully 
linked to research on governance to improve the management of 
natural resources in conflict-prone societies. For instance, studies 
have revealed that countries with high quality institutions dedicated 
to the management of valuable natural resources minimize poten-
tial problems faced by resource-rich and conflict-prone countries.3 
However, natural resource management can be complex 
and difficult due to incongruent political, social, economic, 
and environmental goals even in peaceful societies.4 Conflict-
prone societies such as the DRC present even more complex 
challenges given the underlying political and historical reasons 
for the conflicts.5 Despite these significant difficulties, best 
governance practices such as incorporating stakeholder input and 
financing strategies could both prevent and resolve conflicts. This 
article summarizes findings about a number of important external 
and internal factors fueling conflict, institutional and governance 
challenges in managing resources, and highlights a number of 
ways in which donor institutions have worked with policymakers to 
improve resource governance in the DRC. In adopting these tech-
niques for equitable and efficient natural resource management, the 
DRC could achieve long-term peace and economic stability. 
armed conFlIcT and The role  
oF naTural resources
There is a large body of quantitative research on the external 
factors relevant for understanding civil conflicts at the local, 
national, and international level.6 Examples of these external 
factors include resources type and the characteristics of the 
state.7 These studies have focused on the access to and use 
of natural resources by conflict parties, especially the role of 
conflict financing through the exploitation of natural resources.8 
Valuable natural resources like diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and 
even drug crops and medicinal plants, have been found to be 
prone to misappropriation.9 The control of these resources may 
allow rebels to generate conflict financing.10 
Along similar lines, several quantitative political science 
studies demonstrated that the abundance of natural resources 
increases the statistical risk of armed conflict at the national 
level.11 However, numerous other studies have criticized the 
robustness of such conclusions.12 This criticism reflects flaws 
such as the methodology of the quantitative studies, which fail 
to distinguish civil war onset and ongoing civil war as equal 
components of civil war prevalence.13 Despite this flaw, these 
studies can nonetheless be useful in understanding how conflict 
makes the management of natural resources more difficult and 
vice versa.14
Another set of academic studies focuses on environmental 
scarcity and competition between groups for these natural 
resources.15 Increasing demand from growing populations and 
inequalities in the distribution of natural resources can ulti-
mately lead to environmental degradation.16 These studies have 
also been criticized for methodological weaknesses, paucity of 
data, and according too much weight to environmental factors 
and too little emphasis on human factors such as technological 
innovativeness and ingenuity.17 Nevertheless, the concept of 
competition between groups over distribution of resources 
is pertinent to an understanding of the current, and sometimes 
violent, community-level conflicts over land and forest usage in 
the eastern provinces of the DRC.18 
PasT and currenT naTural resources 
conFlIcTs In The drc 
The DRC includes most of the Congo Basin region, an 
area of enormous wealth in terms of biodiversity, timber, and 
mineral resources.19 Despite this natural wealth, however, the 
DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world with signifi-
cant infrastructure deficiencies and an economy that is highly 
dependent upon agriculture and forestry.20 Violent and non-
violent conflicts linked to the use of its natural resources have 
historically prevented the DRC from fully utilizing its resources 
to generate revenue and improve quality of life for its citizens.21 
Specifically, numerous policy reports have highlighted the 
role of minerals in financing the armed groups involved in the 
* Clementine Burnley works as a senior project manager for Adelphi Research 
on topics of natural resources governance and peace building in the Great Lakes 
region. She has carried out fieldwork in Western Uganda, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Clementine has also worked on several 
research projects to derive indicators of environmental status from a combina-
tion of earth observation and socio-economic data. 
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most recent DRC conflicts.22 Control over mining areas in the 
eastern provinces continues to shift between different indepen-
dent armed groups and units of the Military of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (“FARDC”).23 The struggle for control 
over these resources has exacerbated conflict and created greater 
difficulty in managing the resources to benefit the public.24 
Despite a recent transition towards peace, conflict and inse-
curity remain in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, 
Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga.25 These conflicts are par-
ticularly acute in the northeastern provinces of Ituri in Orientale, 
and North and South Kivu, where local militia and foreign rebel 
forces continue to terrorize the regions.26 A prime example of 
conflict is the Virunga National Park (“Park”) located in north-
eastern DRC, on the border with Uganda and Rwanda.27 The 
Park was the site of some of the large-scale armed conflicts that 
occurred in the Kivu Provinces.28 The 1994 Rwandan genocide 
and resulting refugee crisis led to the presence of about 700,000 
refugees on the edges of the Park.29 These displaced groups 
increased the consumption of resources both inside and outside 
the Park, furthering the impact on the environment and leading 
to mass deforestation.30
Identity and nationality, which are linked to land and politi-
cal power, have also played an important part in the different 
conflicts of the DRC. In the absence of alternative income-
earning opportunities in the formal economy or in commerce, 
access to land is essential to livelihoods in DRC.31 There have 
been several historic conflicts over grazing land and land 
ownership between Hema and Lendu peoples in Ituri.32 These 
conflicts have killed 10,000 and displaced 50,000.33 Moreover, 
these types of conflicts are likely to continue until those natural 
resources with income-generating potential, such as timber, are 
better managed.34
naTural resource managemenT and 
governance challenges 
The twin challenges of governance for the DRC are to 
provide security for all of its citizens and to build democratic, 
transparent, and accountable institutions capable of manag-
ing its enormous resource wealth for the benefit of its entire 
population.35 Although the existing legal framework recognizes 
the right to use land via customary law, it also allows for land 
grabbing, the purchase of occupied land, and the eviction of 
tenants.36 And since the government retains the right to define 
“Congolese people,” the issue of who is entitled to land rights is 
highly politicized.37 Further tensions stem from the unclear role 
of formal and customary authorities.38 Thus legal reform is nec-
essary to prevent future land-grabbing opportunities that could 
cause armed conflict.39 Legitimizing certain existing formal 
and customary systems of land administration, and providing a 
forum for land use disputes, could help diffuse both future con-
flicts and lay a framework for sustainable land management.48
The demarcation of conservation areas in the DRC is also a 
contentious political issue. The existence of conservation areas 
has been linked to colonial land demarcations, which are not 
always understood or accepted by the communities affected.40 
In response, managers of these protected areas have engaged 
in participatory management methods involving local communi-
ties, such as consultations, participatory demarcation, and the 
creation of alternative livelihood activities.41 
However, conflict exists not only over the natural resources 
but also over collaboration: site-specific, cross-border collabo-
ration efforts between conservation organizations in Rwanda, 
DRC, and Uganda have continued during various wars at the 
regional level.42 Furthermore, the DRC continues to face signifi-
cant challenges in its reform processes in all natural resources 
sectors.43 The widespread disintegration of government func-
tionality during the prolonged conflicts has left a legacy of 
bureaucratic inefficiencies in knowledge, expertise, capacity, 
and resourcing across all sectors.44 These shortcomings mean 
that institutions often are unable to respond to the serious prob-
lems they face.45 For instance, in the area of education, only 
thirty-two percent of teachers in secondary school and twenty 
percent of those in higher education are qualified at the level 
mandated by their posts.46 Congo’s National Statistical Institute 
(“INS”) lacks resources to collect the necessary information by 
which ministries’ performance can be verified.47 Even in areas 
where periodic reporting is mandatory, such as the mining indus-
try, it is still difficult to find reliable data on mining operators, 
production, or exported commodities.48
Transparency in governance remains another main chal-
lenge to effective natural resources in the DRC. The country now 
ranks 164th out of 178 in the 2011 Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index, while the World Bank/IFC Doing 
Business 2011 survey ranks DRC 175th out of 183 countries.49 
A number of authors have highlighted the negative effects of 
corruption on the management of natural resources in DRC.50 
For instance, policy processes are prone to disruption by politi-
cians acting in their own, rent-seeking interests.51 Furthermore, 
government agents at mine sites illegally tax the operations in 
eastern DRC, justifying their practice by blaming the lack of 
monetary support from the central government.52
The need For caPacITy BuIldIng In The drc 
The concept of “capacity” refers to the ability of individuals 
and institutions to conceive and carry out decisions effectively 
and efficiently.53 There is a clear need for institutional capacity 
building in the DRC to ensure compliance with the international 
norms and agreements relevant to environmental management.54 
At the individual level, capacity building refers to the 
processes of teaching and skills training.55 At the local and 
national institutional level, improvements to the functioning 
of institutions and capacity of administrators could help civil 
services better use revenue and natural resources to reduce 
poverty.56 Increasingly, administrators are using capacity build-
ing to encourage ownership through participation and mutual 
exchange of knowledge.57 Building individual capacity in terms 
of natural resource management would involve increasing the 
level of expertise in its legal, scientific, or technical aspects.58 
For example, increasing expertise in the implementation and 
monitoring of regulatory compliance or increasing awareness of 
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the conflict risk in managing natural resources would increase 
the government and different communities’ ability to address 
these conflicts.59 Moreover, increasing scientific expertise in 
the geological field would allow DRC’s institutions to improve 
their negotiating power with extractive industry counterparts.60 
Similarly, capacity building for local businesses could help 
to promote the development of homegrown industries in the 
minerals sector.61 
On the international level, governance initiatives relevant 
to the environment in the DRC are conditioned by the various 
international treaties and environmental agreements to which 
the country is a signatory.62 These initiatives and treaties specify 
actions to protect the DRC’s biodiversity, endangered species, 
timber, and wetlands as well as to mitigate climate change.63 
USAID and the European Development Fund both have agree-
ments with the DRC to fund such programs, which encompass 
regional conservation and production areas.64 Given this outside 
support for local and national institutions, it is vital to create 
an implementation framework that creates coherent sector-wide 
programs.65 
Specifically, the DRC is currently developing a governance 
framework for the forestry sector.66 The population is highly 
dependent on the forestry sector and, although precise data is 
uncertain, the expansive forests of the DRC provide a wide array 
of benefits, including timber for domestic use and export, fuel 
wood, a variety of forest foods and medicines, and a carbon 
sink for sequestration programs.67 It is estimated that the DRC’s 
timber resources are equal to that of all other African countries 
combined and the timber industry is expected to benefit from 
increasing demand in China and India.68 Therefore, this sector 
is a high priority for reform.69 The ongoing forestry reforms 
are part of the preparation of a national strategy for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(“REDD”), by the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conserva-
tion and Tourism (known by the French acronym “MECNT”).70 
The DRC’s 2002 Forest Code is an important first step in both 
regulating an important resource and creating an implementation 
framework for fund programs such as REDD. 71
BesT PracTIces oF PosT-conFlIcT naTural 
resources managemenT 
Land use conflicts between different resource users and 
managers have often arisen in eastern DRC. And although 
individual organizations managing land within or adjacent to 
protected areas have each addressed the conflicts differently, 
a number of good practices have been proven to reduce usage 
conflicts.72 Such practices include devolving rights to local 
communities, diversifying economic activities around protected 
areas, improving land use planning and zoning, securing tenure 
to land and resources, ensuring stakeholder participation in 
resource management, integrating policies relating to natural 
resources, and legitimizing community-based management 
initiatives.73 Given the success of these tactics, many national 
programs in the DRC are beginning to embrace these concepts.
Accordingly, donors and the government of the DRC are 
working together to build institutional and individual capacities 
for participatory management of natural resources in various 
sectors.74 
forestry 
In the forestry sector, the International Development 
Association and the Global Environment Facility are support-
ing the Forest and Nature Conservation Project to provide 
infrastructure, equipment, training, and project coordination 
at the national level for the MECNT, regional, and provin-
cial management bodies.75 Implementing best practices will 
strengthen MECNT’s institutional capacity to as well as commu-
nity participation in sustainable forest management.76 Striving 
for similar goals, WWF and United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (“UN-HABITAT”) are collaborating to manage 
conflicts linked to land tenure bordering protected areas in east-
ern DRC, combining participatory demarcation with conflict 
mediation and land administration.77
To facilitate best practices, it is important to recognize that 
the external economic environment, such as levels of direct 
foreign investment and variability in price of commodities, 
is largely outside the control of the Congolese.78 However, Con-
golese policymakers and administrators can nonetheless control 
how revenues and investments are managed.79 Improvements to 
the institutional governance systems for resource revenues have 
focused on increasing efficiency in three dimensions: manage-
ment, allocation of revenue, and distribution of benefits.80 
International efforts have focused on supporting transpar-
ency in revenue management and restricting the financing 
of armed groups.81 The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (“EITI”) tries to increase transparency surrounding 
resources exploitation, revenue generation, and budget alloca-
tions.82 The DRC has been classified by the EITI as “close to 
compliant.”83 Transparency initiative objectives support the 
disclosure of information for the extractive industry and civil 
stakeholders’ demands for accountability from policymakers 
and institutions.84 However, it will take time for capacity build-
ing to redress the current imbalance between levels of influence 
by state and civil society actors.85 At the moment, capacity and 
knowledge gaps on the part of civil society mean that it is diffi-
cult for civil stakeholders to hold institutions and political actors 
accountable for their actions.86 
miNiNg
Trade restrictions have also been introduced to reduce 
availability of resource-based financing to conflict actors.87 For 
example, the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds is an 
intergovernmental process established to regulate and reduce 
trading in diamonds from rebel-controlled areas.88 This and 
other similar initiatives require companies to report whether 
their supply chain contains minerals sourced from conflict zones 
that may have contributed to the financing of armed groups.89 
This, in turn, requires due diligence and traceability mechanisms 
to distinguish between “clean” and “dirty” minerals.90 
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In the DRC, a number of traceability initiatives already exist 
at the national, regional, and international levels. At the national 
level, the DRC’s Mining Law of 2002 requires community 
consultations, disclosure of contract terms by both companies 
and the government, and revenue transparency through adher-
ence to EITI guidelines.91 The publication of the 2010 Mining 
Contracts Review, carried out to determine benefits of these 
contracts to the DRC, is still in progress.92
At the regional level, several regional groups have adopted 
traceability and accountability mechanisms. The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), 
for example, has drawn up auditing guidelines for mineral 
processors.93 The International Conference of the Great Lakes 
has also committed to a regional certification mechanism, which 
provides a clear procedure and adequate records of mineral 
origins.94 The International Tin Research Initiative has also 
improved due diligence, traceability, and certification processes 
for tin through the Tin Supply Chain Initiative.95 However, 
these traceability initiatives in DRC ultimately face difficulties 
linked to cost, implementation, monitoring, human capacity, and 
resource gaps.96
National initiatives supplement industry-led and regional 
traceability schemes. In the United States, the recent 2010 
Conflict Minerals Provision of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies to 
represent accurate information regarding the source and supply 
chain of certain minerals.97 The German Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources has supported the estab-
lishment of Certified Trading Chains.98 These initiatives would 
assist in reducing resource-based financing to conflict actors 
through international trade channels.99
There are some examples of good non-renewable resource 
management in from countries of the global north. Norway, for 
example, has successfully used macroeconomic tools to guide 
oil revenues, domestic oil retention, and revenue utilization, 
avoiding the potentially harmful effects of equitable redistribu-
tion.100 In this way, Norway has managed to avoid the typical 
problems of an oil economy, such as the boom-bust cycle and 
wealth concentration.101 Despite the fact that the two countries 
differ in their government accountability systems and transpar-
ency, Norway’s solutions may provide guidance to the DRC.102 
Combining Norway’s approach with transparency and account-
ability initiatives could provide a better system for managing 
non-renewable resources.103
The challenge for the DRC is to improve the workings of 
institutional and political processes at both the national and 
the local level to ensure that natural resources are used in a 
sustainable manner to improve the lives of communities. 
International examples of successful resource management 
are often supported by international organizations and private 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”). The World Heritage 
Institute (UNESCO), Congolese Institute for the Conservation 
of Nature (“ICCN”), and local NGOs are currently collaborating 
on “Biodiversity Conservation in Regions of Armed Conflict: 
Protecting World Heritage in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.”104 That project, which has been running since 2000 
with multi-donor funding, supports not only the key financial, 
logistical, and technical sectors, but also provides access to the 
higher political decision-makers at the national regional and 
international levels.105
 Another example, the World Wildlife Fund’s (“WWF”) 
Eco-Makala Project, has responded to the deforestation by refu-
gees in the southern part of the Virunga National Park in North 
Kivu Province by introducing legal fuel wood plantations.106 The 
WWF project increases the availability of sustainable energy 
for the area around Goma and to reduce rural poverty in Masisi 
and Rutshuru.107 The United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”) Central Africa Regional Program on 
the Environment is helping to support the WWF, demarking 
protected areas using a combination of participatory methods, 
mapping, and GIS tools.108 The project works with local com-
munities and chiefs, restricting access to certain areas in order to 
sensitize communities to the benefits of maintaining biodiversity 
in their surrounding areas.109 Conservation International is sup-
porting the ICCN to jointly manage resource reserves with local 
communities in the Equateur Province to provide livelihood 
alternatives and also to track deforestation.110
With normalization of relations between the DRC and 
Rwanda, and integration of some armed groups into the state 
army and police forces, the most important conflict management 
processes affecting the Kivu Provinces have taken place at the 
national and international level.111 Security sector reform is 
also ongoing, but still leaves much to be desired.112 The most 
immediate challenge for policymakers is to end illegal control 
over, and taxation of, mining, both by the Congolese army and 
by armed groups.113 This would require bringing areas currently 
under the control of armed groups under state control through 
military action or negotiation.114 
Additionally, the government needs to stop those at the 
highest military and political levels from seizing the profits from 
minerals. A number of specific recommendations have been 
made by expert organizations working in the field of safeguards, 
advocating the monitoring and inspection systems for mining 
areas where the Congolese military are deployed and reinforce-
ment of military sanctions to end impunity and increase account-
ability in army units.115
conclusIon
The theories of environmental scarcity and of natural 
resources wealth as conflict causes in the DRC are well docu-
mented. What remains unclear, however, is why large-scale 
armed violence persists in some eastern provinces of the 
country, while other, equally resource rich provinces, such as 
Katanga and the hinterlands of the Kivu Provinces, escape such 
violence.116 This suggests that additional tensions, such as those 
between industrial and artisanal miners and those linked to local 
socioeconomic factors are of the upmost relevance.117
This article has described the consequences of prolonged 
instability for natural resource management in the DRC. Fur-
ther, natural resources management remains a low priority for 
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political actors, many of whom favor the consolidation of power 
and wealth.118 The presence of those stakeholders who instigate 
and profit from instability constitutes the major obstacle to 
effective natural resources management and to improvements in 
overall governance in the DRC.119
The political, economic, and social contexts in which natural 
resources are used and the manner in which resources are man-
aged is paramount to prevent and manage conflicts at all levels. 
The nature and scale of the conflicts described in this paper are 
each different and, therefore, the management approaches cor-
respondingly different. 
This article has also outlined a number of ways in which 
donor institutions have worked with policymakers to improve 
resource governance in the DRC. The initiatives described sup-
port alternative income opportunities for local communities, 
redistribution of revenues from some extractive industries, and 
prevention of local resources usage conflicts. Many of the natu-
ral resources management activities have had active participa-
tion of communities as a key component.
Governance objectives are often broadly formulated to 
strengthen institutions, build institutional and human capacity, 
and improve rule of law. These broad aims, while useful as guid-
ing principles, remain extremely abstract. Successful governance, 
however, requires specific measures and binding timeframes for 
implementation in order to reform key areas such as the accurate 
monitoring and legal enforcement of natural resources manage-
ment strategies. While the institutional structures and processes 
may already be in place, it will still take a long planning process, 
significant additional resources, and political will to achieve the 
needed transparency and accountability for the management of 
all natural resources sectors in the DRC. 
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water crisis iN the murray-darliNg BasiN: 
australia attemPts to BalaNce agricultural 
Need with eNviroNmeNtal reality
by Joshua Axelrod*
Overuse, pollution, increased salinity, and drought are threatening the water resources of Australia’s Murray-Darling River Basin (“MDB”), a drainage 
of twenty-three rivers that is home to more than two million 
people1 and generates nearly forty percent of Australia’s agri-
cultural revenue.2 To address these threats, the Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority (“MDBA”) submitted the Guide to the Basin 
Plan (“Guide”) for public comment in October 2010, sparking 
controversy between the government and MDB’s agricultural 
communities.3 The Guide’s comprehensive sustainable water 
management strategies seek to balance human and environmental 
water needs.4 In an attempt to minimize the socio-economic 
impact of policy changes, the Australian government is buy-
ing water allocations from farmers and investing in irrigation 
infrastructure improvements.5 Despite public opposition to these 
actions, aggressive sustainable water management strategies 
must nonetheless be implemented, and tied to environmental 
outcomes, if the MDB is to remain a key agricultural producer 
in the future.6
Efforts to implement sustainable water use policies are recent 
innovations in Australia.7 The Australian states and territorial 
governments took significant steps to reform the management 
of overused rivers in 2004 with the ratification of the National 
Water Initiative.8 Since the Initiative, the Australian government 
has moved quickly to preserve scarce water resources. The 2007 
passage of the Water Act gave Australia’s national government 
the legal authorization to create a centralized, independent 
agency9 to draft, implement, and enforce water use policy for 
the MDB.10 Soon after, the newly created MDBA began its work 
on the Guide.11 The Guide provides the scientific,12 economic,13 
and sociologic14 rationale for a proposed Basin Plan that will be 
released in late 2011.15
The Guide sets forth comprehensive and aggressive water 
use policies with the goal of stabilizing and improving the 
health of the MDB’s critical natural resources.16 To accomplish 
this goal, the Guide proposes four key management policies: 
sustainable diversion limits (“SDLs”), environmental quality 
benchmarks, state-level SDL compliance, and an efficient water 
market.17 SDLs will limit the volume of water that may be taken 
from a given river or aquifer;18 environmental benchmarks 
will measure river salinity, overall water quality,19 and wetland 
health;20 monitoring state-level SDL compliance will localize 
enforcement of water resource allocation;21 and an efficient 
water market will allow farmers to buy and sell allocated water 
resources to ensure a reliable revenue stream or increased water 
needs.22
Critics of the Guide argue that there was a lack of public 
input during the planning process and that the proposed plan 
will have a disproportionate impact on the communities most 
dependent on the MDB’s water resources.23 Food processers,24 
farmers,25 and irrigation organizations26 contest the MDBA’s 
reliance on economic models that show that the proposed water 
management changes will have minimal impacts on the overall 
MDB economy.27 They argue that economic assessments should 
have focused on short-term impacts to local and regional com-
munities instead of nation-wide impacts.28 Individual citizens, 
meanwhile, suggest that the Guide’s proposals will lead to the 
continued economic and cultural decay of MDB cities and towns 
as residents relocate and abandon the MDB in search of eco-
nomic stability.29
However, the fundamental issue remains: Action is required 
if Australia’s scarce water resources are to be preserved. The 
MDB recently suffered the longest drought in recorded history 
and faces a predicted eleven percent decline in surface water 
availability by 2030.30 At the same time, water use in the MDB 
has increased from 2,000 gigaliters annually in the early 1900s to 
more than 10,000 gigaliters in 2010.31 The escalation of human 
water use coupled with historic drought illustrates the need for 
Basin-wide adaptation to diminished water resources if these 
resources are to remain viable in the future.32 
Decision-makers must implement policies that require 
adaptation to declining water availability without compromising 
the overall economic vitality of the region.33 Though irrigated 
agriculture in the MDB is vital to Australia’s agricultural sec-
tor,34 it represents only seven percent of the MDB’s economy.35 
Thus, while reports to the MDBA suggest that there will likely 
be significant socio-economic impact on irrigation-dependent 
farmers36 and communities,37 actions can be taken to transition 
these communities to a more stable economic foundation.38 Eco-
nomic diversification of local communities39 through flexible 
labor and capital markets seems to be the most viable option.40 
Delaying reform because of community disappointment and 
apprehension presents a risk that the Australian government and 
local communities cannot afford to take.41 Still, it is important 
for the MDBA to consider community input in order to ensure 
* Joshua Axelrod is a J.D. candidate, May 2014, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
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BaNkruPtiNg Peace sPoilers:
what role for uN PeacekeePers?
by Philippe Le Billon*
InTroducTIon
Curtailing belligerents’ access to weapons has been a major focus of international security actors.1 Although weapons embargoes and disarmament initiatives remain 
important, they are difficult to implement and generally insuffi-
cient to secure long-term peace.2 Curtailing belligerents’ access 
to revenues from high-value natural resources—such as timber, 
minerals, and opium—provides a complementary approach to 
attain security, particularly when combined with resource man-
agement reforms.3 
This paper focuses on the methods that United Nations 
(“UN”) peacekeepers employ and their capacity to help curtail 
belligerents’ access to resource revenues.4 The first part of this 
paper reviews the principal instruments used by the UNSC to 
address “conflict resources.”5 The second part examines the 
specific use of peacekeeping forces to secure resource produc-
tion areas and prevent the trafficking of conflict resources. Issues 
associated with the deployment of peacekeepers in efforts to 
curtail access to conflict resources are also discussed. 
un InITIaTIves
UN initiatives to address the links between high-value 
natural resources and armed conflicts have included commodity 
sanctions, expert panels, and specific measures undertaken6 as 
part of the peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding tasks.7 
Among these methods, the main approach taken by the United 
Nations Security Council (“UNSC” or “Security Council”) to 
curtail belligerents’ access to resource revenues has been eco-
nomic sanctions.8 Commodity sanctions target rebel groups by 
curtailing their access to resources in order to “bankrupt” peace 
spoilers.9 Examples include the Khmer Rouge’s access to logs 
in Cambodia;10 the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola’s (“União Nacional para a Independência Total de 
Angola” or “UNITA”) access to diamonds;11 the Revolutionary 
United Front (“RUF”) access to diamonds in Sierra Leone;12 
the Taliban’s access to opium production in Afghanistan;13 and 
the New Forces’ (“Forces Nouvelles”) access to diamonds in 
Côte d’Ivoire.14 Resource-focused sanctions have also targeted 
the governments of Iraq15 and Liberia,16 for their training and 
funding of insurgent groups in civil wars, and Libya,17 for its 
involvement in the Lockerbie bombing.18 
With the exceptions of Cambodia, Iraq, and Libya, all 
these sanction regimes were associated with investigations by 
UN expert panels—consultants hired by the UN Secretariat to 
investigate war economies and “sanction-busting,” or “trading 
with a country with which trade has been forbidden.”19 Because 
the panels’ reports are made public, they have been instrumental 
in successful “naming and shaming” campaigns.20 Even though 
less than a handful of sanction busters were successfully pros-
ecuted by 2006, the public reports nonetheless had the desired 
chilling effect.21 
Although the UNSC holds the greatest potential and has so 
far carried the most weight in efforts to address linkages between 
high-value resources and armed conflicts, UN transitional 
authorities and specialized UN agencies have also engaged in 
activities related to managing conflict resources, by deploying 
border monitors and troops, deploying UN troops as backup 
for resource management officials, and providing supervision 
and technical assistance for economic reforms and resource 
management.22 Furthermore, these UN entities have partnered 
with national authorities and international aid agencies to reform 
resource sectors and build local institutional capacity to peace-
fully manage resources in post-conflict settings.23 For example, 
the UN Transitional Authority in Timor-Leste renegotiated 
the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia, 
the results of which had implications for petroleum exploita-
tion.24 Additionally, the UN Mission in Liberia supported the 
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program 
(“GEMAP”).25 An initiative led by the World Bank, GEMAP 
is a quasi-trusteeship agreement that allows direct international 
supervision of most of the financial operations of the Liberian 
government—including monitoring the administration of 
natural resources such as timber and mine products.26 Other UN 
missions have had an indirect impact on resource sectors; for 
example, effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion programs often lead to employment for former soldiers who 
might otherwise turn to illegal resource exploitation.27 
The UNSC decides whether to impose economic sanctions 
and dispatch UN expert panels, as well as the size and mandate 
of UN missions in conflict-affected countries.28 Since the end 
of the cold war, the UNSC has theoretically had greater free-
dom to impose sanctions and similar measures because fewer 
members of the Security Council were inclined to veto such 
steps in order to support their allies.29 However, he UNSC 
* Philippe Le Billon is an associate professor at the University of British Colum-
bia, with the Department of Geography and the Liu Institute for Global Issues. 
His most recent book is Wars of Plunder: Conflict, Profits and the Politics of 
Resources (forthcoming Jan. 2012). The analysis for this article draws on pri-
mary and secondary sources, personal communications with staff at the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and on direct observation of, or par-
ticipation in, peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia.
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has been somewhat slow in adopting this potential in practice. 
Meanwhile, the importance of resources to armed groups 
has grown rapidly since the late 1980s, as belligerents turned 
to natural resources to replace external political sponsorship.30 
For most of the 1990s, the UNSC made increasing use of arms 
sanctions, negotiated settlements, and regional or UN peace-
keeping missions, but rarely placed commodity sanctions.31 
Although arms sanctions may be more effective than commodity 
sanctions, and may therefore continue to be the principal sanc-
tion strategy, the two approaches can be combined to resolve 
conflicts.32
Although the UNSC began implementing commodity 
sanctions in the late 1980s, it has only done so in approximately 
one-third of the conflicts involving resources between 1989 
and 2006.33 Furthermore, most of these sanctions have been 
imposed after the late 1990s, nearly a decade after resources 
came to play a major role in belligerents’ finances.34 When the 
use of commodity sanctions finally increased, it was given a fur-
ther boost by a more proactive use of sanction committees and 
expert panels.35 Because of broader engagement on the part of 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), conflict analysts, and 
resource industries, sanctions are now better targeted, monitored, 
and enforced, and their humanitarian impact is more carefully 
considered.36 The UNSC has even recently bolstered the author-
ity and capacity of UN peacekeeping missions to more directly 
intervene in the control of resource sectors, most notably in the 
case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”).37
un PeacekeePIng mIssIons  
and conFlIcT resources
UN peacekeeping operations have been established in at 
least eight countries where conflict resources contributed to 
prolonging hostilities. This section briefly reviews the mandates, 
specific measures, and effectiveness in each case building on the 
three main cases: Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC.
sierra leoNe
Despite UN hesitation, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra 
Leone (“UNAMSIL”) used peacekeeping forces to regulate the 
diamond sector during the last stages of its 1999-2005 opera-
tion.38 Before that point, peacekeeping forces had intervened in 
an ad hoc fashion to prevent the escalation of resource-related 
conflicts.39 This ad hoc intervention was based on UNAMSIL’s 
fear of overstepping its mandate,40 antagonizing local interest 
groups, exposing UN troops to criminal violence, and reinforc-
ing rumors that peacekeeping forces were involved in diamond 
deals.41 Although some of these concerns were legitimate, 
reports from military observers about diamond-related armed 
conflicts, as well as requests for assistance from the govern-
ment and from the donors who were funding diamond reforms, 
eventually led UNAMSIL to take on a more proactive role.42 In 
2003, two years after hostilities had ceased, UNAMSIL began 
conducting aerial surveys, deploying foot patrols, and engaging 
in targeted conflict-settlement interventions in the diamond sec-
tor.43 Most notably, UNAMSIL also worked to prevent clashes 
between local youths with former RUF soldiers.44 These efforts 
were often undertaken jointly with the Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Mines, where UNAMSIL occasionally served in a supervisory 
capacity for the ministry.45
liBeria
The ongoing UN Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”), estab-
lished in 2003, has illustrated potential complications of using 
peacekeeping methods to address conflict resources. UNMIL’s 
mandate is “to assist the transitional government in restoring 
proper administration of natural resources” as part of the imple-
mentation of the peace process.46 Conflict resources—mostly 
timber, but also rubber and diamonds—had played a major role 
in the Liberian conflicts between 1989 and 2003.47 
Because of the rapid cessation of hostilities and improving 
security after 2003, UNMIL did not confront extensive problems 
with conflict commodities.48 This was a positive factor consid-
ering that UNMIL’s full deployment took nine months, largely 
because UN member countries failed to provide the pledged 
troops.49 Nevertheless, UNMIL was subject to criticism for fail-
ing to do more to address the problem of conflict resources.50 
Among its critics was Global Witness, the leading NGO in 
the realm of resources and armed conflicts.51 In 2005, Global 
Witness wrote a letter to the UNSC, stating that UNMIL had 
failed to implement its mandate because 
they have not been given the legal authority to act  
as independently and proactively as they need to 
effectively seek out and stop illegal timber or diamond 
operations. . . . UNMIL’s ability to fulfill its mandate 
is further undermined by its lack of deployment  
in diamond and timber-rich areas, particularly along 
Liberia’s porous border regions with Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Sierra Leone.52
While UNMIL did not undertake sufficient efforts to secure 
conflict commodities, it did create an environment and natural 
resources unit that worked with local and international organiza-
tions on protecting Liberia’s natural resources53 Arguably, other 
UN agencies—such as the UN Environment Programme, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN Development 
Programme—have a more general mandate to engage in envi-
ronmental protection and resource management, but the creation 
of the environment and natural resources unit was in line with 
UNMIL’s quasi-trusteeship functions during the transition period 
from 2003 to 2005.54
UNMIL did carry out some aerial reconnaissance to monitor 
mining, along with occasional, but rare, ground patrols.55 On 
some occasions, UNMIL also deployed troops in resource-rich 
areas—for example, to remove artisanal diamond miners oper-
ating illegally within an oil palm plantation;56 to close a large 
artisanal diamond mining site that had been identified by an 
expert panel but had not been shut down by the transitional gov-
ernment—allegedly, diamonds were being stockpiled at the site 
while the owners waited for sanctions to be lifted;57 and to pro-
tect the interests of a U.S. diamond company and “restore calm 
and order” after demonstrations at a Firestone rubber concession 
in 2007.58 Some troop deployments have sparked controversy. 
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In particular, Liberian mining interests and company employ-
ees have accused UNMIL of protecting the interests of foreign 
companies over those of local populations.59 Such accusations 
demonstrate that UN peacekeeping activities in resource sectors 
can generate new conflicts, and should therefore be considered 
from a political perspective instead of being narrowly conceived 
as a law-and-order measure.
democratic rePuBlic of the coNgo (“drc”)
The UNSC has implemented an array of peacekeeping 
tools to address conflict resources during the UN mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Mission de l’Organisation 
des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo,” or 
“MONUC”). Mineral resources have historically financed both 
local and foreign-armed groups especially in the eastern part of 
the country during the first civil war between 1996 to 1997, the 
second war from 1998 to 2003, as well as during the aftermath of 
the second war.60 Although the UN has used expert panel inves-
tigations and public reporting to address this issue, it did not 
impose sanctions on conflict resources in the DRC until 2008.61
In December 2008, through Resolution 1856, the Security 
Council gave MONUC a mandate to “coordinate operations with 
the [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(“FARDC”) to prevent] the provision of support to illegal armed 
groups, including support derived from illicit economic activi-
ties.”62 Resolution 1856 also gave MONUC the authority to “use 
its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision 
of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in 
natural resources.”63 In Resolution 1857, the UNSC extended 
the list of individuals and companies subject to travel sanctions, 
financial sanctions, or both, to “individuals or entities supporting 
the illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo through illicit trade of natural resources,” 
sending a strong signal to companies involved in trading conflict 
resources.64 Despite its broad authority, however, MONUC faced 
challenges implementing Resolution 1856. These challenges 
included the fact that MONUC troops’ lacked autonomous 
authority to intervene without the FARDC, and accusations of 
human rights abuses and resource trafficking by the FARDC.65
Table 1. Control of Conflict Resources by UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1988–200992 







Policy coordination and technical cooperation; no military component.
Angola: UNAVEMa (1988–1997); 
MONUAb (1997–1999)
Observation. Ban on  
noncertified diamond exports
The mission had very limited effectiveness, but the ban was effective—partly 
because of military pressure on UNITA from the Angolan government, and 
partly because the governments in Kinshasa and Brazzaville, which had pro-
vided conduits for UNITA’s diamond smuggling, were toppled; peacekeepers 
provided some assistance to UN expert panels.
Cambodia: UNTACc (1992–
1993)
Transitional authority. Ban on 
logging exports (sawn timber 
exempt)
Limited effectiveness because the ban was not implemented for long enough, 
and there was no UN enforcement of the ban in Khmer Rouge areas along the 
Thai border; the UN mission provided some assistance as a transitional author-
ity in the area of environmental and resource management.
Côte d’Ivoire: MINUCIj (2003–
2004), UNOCIk (2004–present)
Assistance. Ban on all  
diamond exports
Embargo-monitoring unit; no mandate to address key resource sectors (e.g., 
cocoa) from which rebels obtain financing.
Croatia: UNTAESd (1996–1998) Transitional authority.  
Border monitoring
Limited support for local police forces.
DRC: MONUCf (1999–2010), 
MONUSCOg (2010-present)
Assistance. Curtailing  
financing of illegal groups
Monitoring, border control at airports, some military assistance to Congolese 
army to curtail armed groups’ access to natural resources.
Liberia: UNMILi (2003–present) Assistance. Ban on timber and 
all diamond exports
Limited assistance in key areas; UNMIL also maintains an  
Environment and Natural Resources Unit, which assists UN expert panels.
Sierra Leone: UNAMSILe 
(1999–2005)
Assistance. Ban on noncertified 
diamond exports
Peacekeepers provided some assistance with monitoring and conflict resolu-
tion in the diamond sector.
Notes:
a. UN Angola Verification Missions; b. UN Observer Mission in Angola; c. UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; d. UN Transitional Administra-
tion in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium; e. UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone; f. UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo); g. UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo); h. UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan; i. UN Mission in Liberia ; j. UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire ; k. UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire.
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dIscussIon
As an international military force deployed to “keep the 
peace,” UN peacekeeping operations—and, more broadly, 
non-UN peacekeeping forces, such as regional peacekeeping 
forces—have a unique ability to help sever links between resources 
and peace spoilers. Although peacekeepers could theoretically be 
deployed to control diamond mining, logging, or drug trafficking 
operations that finance armed groups, the governments that are 
mandating peacekeeping operations—through the UNSC, for 
example—are often reluctant to assign peacekeepers such roles.66
When deciding whether to deploy UN troops for combat 
operations intended to curtail rebel access to resources a number 
of considerations must be addressed, including the direct inter-
vention’s legality, the intervention’s affect on relations between 
the UN mission, the host government, and local populations, and 
the peacekeeping missions capacity to intervene successfully. 67
Legally, local authorities have the right to prohibit unilat-
eral UN troop deployment, unless the country is under a UN 
trusteeship mandate whereby sovereign authority is vested in a 
UN administrative body.68 Moreover, because many missions 
are carried out under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which 
addresses pacific settlement of disputes, rather than Chapter 
VII, which addresses forceful settlement of disputes, peacekeep-
ing missions are prevented from engaging in any “offensive” 
combat role, such as taking control of resource production 
areas.69 Out of the half-dozen peacekeeping missions estab-
lished since 1989 in response to commodity-financed conflicts, 
only one—MONUC—has been specifically mandated to address 
the financing of illegal groups by illicit economic activities.70 
That lone example included military support to DRC govern-
ment troops.71 In recent years, the UN Head of Mission and the 
UN Mission Chief of Staff, as well as individual UN-mandated 
military contingents have used their “room for maneuver” 
to investigate, report on, or stop illegal resource trade and 
management practices.72 Despite this trend, decision makers 
within UN missions have generally been wary of overstepping 
their mandate, overextending or diverting resources, alienating 
economic or political stakeholders, or putting both peacekeepers 
and civilians at risk by interfering with the economic interests of 
criminals and armed groups.73 
Sovereignty issues, including sovereignty over resources, 
have also discouraged those governments sending and receiving 
resources from assigning UN peacekeepers an active role in 
preventing conflict resources from funding peace spoilers.74 The 
economic interests of governments and companies may conflict 
either because a company and a host government are competing 
producers, or because a sending government also happens to be 
the home government of investors.75 Therefore, if peacekeepers 
are directly involved in conflict resources issue, there may be 
allegations that the peacekeepers are serving the interests of 
their home countries—specifically by protecting those countries’ 
access to resources.76 Although the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not 
a “peacekeeping” mission, the non-UN mandated and U.S.-led 
“coalition of the willing” was the subject of such allegations.77 
On the other hand, shared economic interests could create an 
incentive for granting peacekeeping missions broader mandates 
and thereby increasing their effectiveness.
Military capacity must also be considered when deciding 
whether to deploy UN troops to protect resources from peace 
spoilers. Most governments provide troops to UN missions on the 
assumption that the risk of casualties is very low.78 In addition, 
the military capacity of most UN contingents is usually limited, 
especially for offensive combat operations.79 Many governments 
that send troops to UN peacekeeping missions view resource 
control not only as a high-risk option, but as a distraction from 
or counterproductive to peacekeepers’ principal political and 
humanitarian mandates.80 “Robust” peacekeeping—entailing 
combat operations in mining or logging areas, for example—is 
thus unlikely, in part because of the risk of casualties among 
both civilians and UN troops.81 Nevertheless, in some cases, the 
deployment of UN troops in resource areas has been viewed as a 
necessity.82 Where such efforts have been undertaken, however, 
they have occasionally met with determined resistance from 
armed groups, and the resource-rich areas have often been the 
last ones to come under UN control.83 
At the mission level, operational staffs, both at headquar-
ters and on the ground, recognize the importance of curtailing 
peace spoilers’ access to high-value resources, but they are also 
aware of the difficulties associated with intervention. Mission 
staff often report on the role of resources in local skirmishes, 
not only between armed groups, but also between rival govern-
ment security agencies, private militias, and criminal gangs.84 
This low-level violence rarely receives political attention, 
but political affairs officers in UN missions have nevertheless 
warned of the potential for escalation.85 They have also noted the 
broader implications of resource revenues for relations within 
and between armed groups.86 Such issues have also received 
greater consideration because UN intelligence efforts have been 
boosted by Joint Mission Analysis Cells, which are charged 
with assessing the overall political and security situations of UN 
missions and reporting to the Special Representatives of the UN 
Secretary General that head the missions.87
After addressing these considerations, the UN intervention 
would proceed if it will likely make a substantial contribution to 
a speedier end to the conflict, without creating harmful conse-
quences in the future, for example loss of livelihood or abuse by 
rebel groups. When armed groups’ access to conflict resources 
is curtailed, they sometimes turn on the local populations, either 
to obtain funding or simply for revenge—events for which the 
UN would bear some responsibility.88 Furthermore, analysis 
reveals that rebel groups operating in resource-rich environ-
ments tend to commit worse abuses against civilians.89 This 
behavior appears to be associated with a membership pool of 
“consumers” rather than “investors”—that is, combatants who 
are drawn to the rebellion by short-term, opportunistic economic 
objectives rather than by long-term political objectives.90 In the 
short term, UN military interventions in resource sectors may 
risk exacerbating abuses by rebels against civilian populations. 
But in the long term, such interventions may not only reduce the 
funding and operating capacity of rebel groups, but may also 
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help focus rebel movements on political objectives, and there-
fore on negotiations, rather than on survival and profiteering.91
conclusIon
Peacekeeping forces can play a role in curtailing peace 
spoilers’ access to resource revenues. Yet, the evidence reviewed 
for this paper suggests that peacekeeping missions have so 
far gained limited direct experience in seeking to achieve this 
goal. Such interventions must be carefully considered from 
legal, humanitarian, political and economic standpoints before 
being carried out, preceded by careful operational planning, and 
conducted by adequately trained, equipped, and disciplined 
international forces so that the risks of human rights abuses, 
military failure and corruption are minimized. Additionally, any 
collaboration between peacekeepers with local forces should be 
come under stringent guidelines and monitoring. Short of engag-
ing in interdiction, peacekeepers do have the potential to help 
collect information on resource sectors, remove peace spoilers 
from important resource extraction areas, and back up police 
efforts to arrest illicit traders.
Endnotes: Bankrupting Peace Spoilers: What Role for UN 
Peacekeepers?
1 Tracing Small Arms is Key to Reducing Violence, Says the UN General  
Secretary, uNited NatioNs office oN drugs aNd crime (2011), http://www.
unodc.org/southerncone/en/frontpage/2011/04/26-rastreamento-de-armas-leves-
e-estrategico-para-reducao-da-violencia-afirma-secretario-geral-da-onu.html. 
2 Peter walleNsteiN et al., uNited NatioNs, the stockholm Process 105 
(2003).
3 NorwegiaN miNistry of foreigN affairs, curtailiNg coNflict By Block-
iNg BelligereNts’ exPorts of Natural resources to legal markets 7 (2006), 
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1643(2005).
4 In resource-rich areas, a higher incidence of abuses against civilians may 
also be linked to low dependence on local populations for sustenance; this is in 
contrast to rebellions that operate in resource-poor areas or that lack access to 
external sponsors. iNgrid samset, ralPh BuNche iNstitute for iNt’l studies, 
Natural resource wealth, coNflict aNd PeaceBuildiNg 3 (2009), http://www.
cmi.no/publications/file/3283-natural-resource-wealth-conflict.pdf. 
5 Conflict resources are defined as “natural resources whose systematic 
exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from  
or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations  
of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under  
international law.” See Conflict, Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org/ 
campaigns/conflict (last visited Nov. 2 2011).
6 See Update Report No. 2 Natural Resources and Conflict, sec. couN-
cil rePort (June 20, 2007), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.
glKWLeMTIsG/b.2822787/k.CEE6/Update_Report_No_2BRNatural_
Resources_and_ConflictBR20_June_2007.htm. 
7 The UN has also supported other initiatives to address the links between 
high-value natural resources and armed conflicts, through resolutions; for 
example, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, passed in the UNSC and 
General Assembly, which is designed to stem the trade in conflict diamonds, is 
seeking strengthened standards of corporate practices among extractive compa-
nies operating in conflict zones through the work of UN Special Representative 
John Ruggie and the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. See 
Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/rug-
gie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pdf.
8 See Update Report No. 2 Natural Resources and Conflict, sec. couN-
cil rePort (June 20, 2007), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.
glKWLeMTIsG/b.2822787/k.CEE6/Update_Report_No_2BRNatural_
Resources_and_ConflictBR20_June_2007.htm.
9 Philippe Le Billon & Eric Nicholas, Ending ‘Resource Wars’: Revenue 
Sharing, Economic Sanction or Military Intervention?, 14 iNt’l PeacekeePiNg 
613, 617 (2007), http://www.relooney.info/0_New_8467.pdf.




14 Id. at 624.
15 S.C. Res. 661, § 3(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (sanctioning all 
commodities from Iraq).
16 S.C. Res. 1478, § 17(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1478 (2003) (sanctioning timber 
products originating in Liberia)
17 S.C. Res. 883, § 17(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/883 (1993) (freezing funds and 
financial resources that contribute to Libya’s publicly owned oil).
18 PhiliPPe le BilloN, Natural resources, armed coNflicts, aNd the 
uN security couNcil 2 ( 2007), http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/
Publications/30May2007_Natural_Resources_Armed_Conflicts_UNSC07-001.
pdf.
19 Id. at 2. See Sanction-Busting Definition, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/sanctions-busting (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2011). 
20 Id. at 2.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 uNa-caNada, is Peace iN the world a utoPiaN dream? the role of the 
uNited NatioNs (2011), http://www.unac.org/peacecp/factsheet/role.html (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2011) (stating that the Food and Agriculture Organization, the 
UN Environment Programme, and the UN Development Programme are among 
the UN agencies involved in efforts to reform resource sectors and build local 
institutional capacity in post-conflict settings). 
24 See Clive Schofield, A “Fair Go” for East Timor? Sharing the Resources of 
the Timor Sea, 27 coNtemPorary se. asia 255, 269 (2005).
25 reNata dwaN & laura Bailey, liBeria’s goverNaNce aNd ecoNomic maN-
agemeNt assistaNce Programme 6 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLICUS/Resources/DPKOWBGEMAPFINAL.pdf.
26 Id. at 8, 16-18.
27 Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa Kinshasa, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, June 12-14, 2007, DDR and Transitional 
Justice, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/ddr%20and%20tj%20in%20
africa%20-%20english.pdf.
28 Role of the Security Council, uNited NatioNs PeacekeePiNg, http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolesc.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
29 JohN stremlau, carNegie corP. of New york, sharPeNiNg iNterNatioNal 




30 See generally Phillip Le Billon, The political ecology of war: natural 
resources and armed conflicts, 20 Political geograPhy, 561 (2001).
31 stremlau, supra note 29, at 9.
32 Peter walleNsteeN et al., saNctioNs for coNflict PreveNtioN aNd Peace 
BuildiNg: lessoNs learNed from cote d’ivoire aNd liBeria 8, 17 (2006).
33 Le Billon, supra note18, at 2.
34 Id. at 5.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2-3.
continued on page 54
18 SuStainable Development law & policy
the real cost of chiNa’s rare earth exPort 
Quotas oN americaN JoB security
by Katherine Weatherford*
The populist appeal for job creation currently domi-nating U.S. politics has spurred copious discus-sion about whether regulatory policy is responsible 
for the present economic condition.1 Although this debate cen-
ters primarily on domestic regulations, recent congressio-
nal action2 confirms reports that China’s economic policies, 
particularly its export restraints and currency manipulation, 
have not only increased the already significant trade deficit 
between the U.S. and China, but have cost approximately 2.8 
million U.S. jobs.3 Of specific concern are China’s export 
quotas on Rare Earth Minerals (“REMs”).
REMs are used in the production of virtually all technological 
goods—from cell phones to wind turbines.4 Thus, it is no surprise 
that the demand for REMs has increased exponentially over the last 
decade.5 Even though the U.S. has sufficient REM reserves to satisfy 
demand, importing REMs from China costs less than producing them 
domestically.6 And because many other nations also rely on China’s 
low–cost REMs, China has dominated the global REM market, and 
currently produces 97% of the world’s supply.7 Consequently, when 
China set export quotas on REMs, it resulted in uncertainty about 
future availability accompanied by a drastic price increase.8 
The implications of export quotas on rare earths, especially in 
light of the current economic downturn, make it evident that the U.S. 
must begin to consider feasible solutions to the REM access con-
flict.9 One option is to continue accepting REMs from China subject 
to its export quotas. Yet, choosing this option will undoubtedly force 
U.S. taxpayers to continue financing China’s REM stockpiles at the 
expense of American jobs.10 This is because product manufactur-
ers located in China can purchase REMs without the added costs 
associated with export quotas. This incents foreign manufacturers, 
including U.S.based companies, to relocate to China in pursuit of 
these cheaper REMs, and ultimately, to take U.S. manufacturing 
jobs overseas as well.11 
A second option is for the United States to file a complaint 
with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), as it did in 2009 in 
collaboration with the European Union and Mexico.12 This 2009 
complaint asserted that China’s export quotas on raw minerals vio-
lated Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”),13 and various provisions of China’s Accession Protocol 
and China’s Working Party Report.14 China invoked GATT Article 
XX exceptions, framing its export restraints as a means to “protect 
the environment and [its] limited resources” and arguing that its 
actions advance “the sustainable development of the global econ-
omy.”15 Nevertheless, the WTO panel rejected China’s defense,16 
prompting China to file an appeal, which is currently pending.17 
In both the 2009 complaint and the current conflict over REMs, 
China disguises its economic motives by implying that export 
quotas will result in reduced production, which will help protect 
natural resources. But this is not the case if China merely supple-
ments wouldbe exports with domestic production. If China actually 
intended to protect its environment, it should have regulated its 
mining operations rather than its exports.18 Regardless of China’s 
intention, it seems futile for the United States to pursue a resolution 
through the WTO process given the failure of the 2009 consulta-
tions to produce an effective outcome thus far. 
A third option is for the U.S. to produce REMs domestically.19 
While this is technically feasible, the U.S. closed its only remaining 
rare earth mining operation in 2002 as a result of environmental 
damage and intense global competition.20 Plans are in motion to 
reopen the Molycorp, Inc. facility in Mountain Pass, California by 
2012;21 however, building new facilities will require a large invest-
ment.22 Even with domestic production, the U.S. will still need to 
send the REMs to China for alloying and manufacturing, at least 
until the technology needed to safely and economically perform 
these processes is developed.23 Although domestic production is 
likely the most sustainable mechanism to stimulate longterm job 
growth, the United States must take other steps in the interim to 
respond to China’s REM export quotas.24 
One intermediate step is to enact legislation modeled after 
the Conflict Minerals provision in § 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.25 That provision 
instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate a 
rule requiring any producer who uses conflict minerals “to disclose 
in . . . its annual report whether its conflict minerals originated in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”26 
Just as the § 1502 reporting requirement will help to prevent human 
rights abuses in the Congo, a similar rule requiring disclosure of 
REMs originating in China would assist in combating China’s pro-
tectionist policies and lax environmental regulations.27 
Ultimately, the United States must begin evaluating legitimate 
solutions to the REM access conflict. In doing so, the U.S. must 
not act hastily, as an illconsidered solution will likely fail to focus 
on longterm sustainable development. Most importantly, in choos-
ing whether and how to pursue domestic REM production the U.S. 
must be especially attentive not to neglect environmental protection 
in favor of economic stability.28 Only by considering both domestic 
action and international diplomacy can the United States resolve the 
REM access conflict. 
* Katherine Weatherford is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University 
Washington College of Law.
Endnotes: The Real Cost of China’s Rare Earth Export Quotas 
on American Job Security on page 55
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high-value Natural resources:
a BlessiNg or a curse for Peace?
by Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad*
InTroducTIon 
High-value natural resources have the potential to promote and consolidate peace. Too often, however, they make the path to sustainable peace long and haz-
ardous. Valuable resources can help to jump-start development, 
secure sustainable growth, raise living standards, and increase 
economic equality. 1 They are also an important source of for-
eign currency for cash-strapped governments, can reduce depen-
dence on international aid, and can support compensation and 
post-conflict relief for war-affected populations.2 But the prom-
ise of a brighter and more peaceful future is often spoiled by 
deep-rooted corruption and patronage, which confer benefits on 
small groups rather than on the population as a whole, and by 
shortsighted management of the resources and the revenues they 
generate.3 In addition, the mere presence of high-value resources 
can jeopardize peace if the resources become the focus of vio-
lent disputes or provide financing for groups that seek to ignite 
(or resume) armed conflict.
In many post-conflict countries, revenues from high-value 
natural resources— such as oil, natural gas, minerals, gemstones, 
and timber—are an integral (and even dominant) part of the 
national economy and state budget.4 In post-conflict Algeria, 
Angola, and Sudan, for example, oil and gas account for more 
than sixty percent of government revenues and over ninety percent 
of all export revenues.5 See Figure 1. In Sierra Leone, following 
a brutal civil war that ended in 2002, when diamonds accounted 
for ninety-six percent of all exports.6 And in Chad, Iraq, Libya, 
and Nigeria—all of which were affected by armed conflict during 
the early years of the twenty-first century—oil and gas account for 
as much as seventy percent of gross domestic product and more 
than eighty percent of government revenues.7 In Niger, uranium 
and gold are important revenue sources,8 as are oil, cocoa, and 
coffee in Côte d’Ivoire,9 and diamonds and timber in the Central 
African Republic.10 In Burma, gas exports made up one-quarter 
of all exports, while forest products and gemstones were other 
important exports between 2008 and 2010.11
When peace comes, the revenues from high-value natural 
resources—when managed well—can help finance reconstruc-
tion and other vital peace-related needs.13 When mismanaged, 
however, resource revenues can undermine both economic per-
formance and the quality of governance, and thereby increase 
the risk of renewed violence.14
Recent high-prof ile reports 
by the U.N. Secretary-General, the 
World Bank, the U.N. Environment 
Programme, and the United Nations 
have highlighted the need to more 
effectively harness high-value natural 
resources for development and peace-
building.15 If managed effectively, 
high-value natural resources constitute 
substantial assets that national and 
international actors can use to sup-
port core peace building objectives, 
including macroeconomic recovery, 
generation and support of livelihood, 
the reform of governance and political 
processes, and security improvement.16
The fact that so many resource-
rich countries are unable to achieve 
long-term peace, however, raises some 
difficult questions about how high-
value resources should be managed 
in post-conflict settings. For example, 
* Päivi Lujala is an associate professor of geography at the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (“NTNU”) and a senior researcher at 
the Department of Economics, NTNU, and the Centre for the Study of Civil War 
(“CSCW”) at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (“PRIO”). Siri Aas Rustad is 
a researcher at CSCW, PRIO, and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at 
NTNU.
Figure 1. The Economic Role of the Extractive Sector in Selected 
Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Countries12
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how can the environmental effects of resource extraction be 
minimized? How can illegal extraction be curtailed without 
damaging livelihoods? How can one ensure that revenues are 
used to advance long-term development objectives? The goal 
of our analysis here is to provide insight into these and similar 
questions — for the benefit of national and local governments, 
national and transnational civil society organizations, extractive 
industries, and the international community. To this end, policy 
makers, field researchers, practitioners, and scholars—all of 
whom have close knowledge of the issues at hand—have been 
asked to share their views on the challenges associated with 
the management of high-value resources in post-conflict and 
conflict-affected countries.
From PoTenTIal ProsPerITy To conFlIcT:  
WhaT goes Wrong?
High-value natural resources have been associated with 
dozens of armed conflicts, millions of deaths, and the collapse 
of several peace processes; case study and statistical evidence 
confirms that such resources play a role in sparking and fuel-
ing armed civil conflict.17 According to 
data gathered by Siri Aas Rustad and Helga 
Malmin Binningsbø, between 1970 and 
2008 the portion of armed civil conflicts 
that were in some way related to high-value 
natural resources ranged from twenty-nine 
to fifty-seven percent.18 See Figure 2.
Why is peace so difficult to achieve 
and sustain in the presence of these 
resources?19 High-value natural resources 
increase the risk of conflict in a number of 
ways. The risk of conflict can be directly 
increased when access to revenues moti-
vates or finances belligerent movements, or 
when grievances are created (1) by unmet 
expectations or inequalities in the distribu-
tion of revenues, jobs, and other benefits, or 
(2) by the negative side effects of resource 
exploitation.20 The risk of conflict can be 
indirectly increased when resource sectors 
undermine a nation’s economic perfor-
mance and the quality of its institutions.21 
Thus, the three main avenues that lead 
from natural resources to armed conflict 
are resource capture, resource related grievances, and adverse 
effects on the economy and institutions.22
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Päivi Lujala suggest that 
the capture of resources for personal or regional enrichment is a 
possible motivation for rebel uprisings and violent secessionist 
movements.23 Although resource capture can be one of the goals 
of armed rebellion, it is rarely, if ever, the sole motivation.24 
Even in Sierra Leone, where the Revolutionary United Front has 
been represented as the classic example of a predatory, greed-
driven movement, the reality is far more complex.25 More often, 
resource capture is a means of financing warfare and attracting 
supporters.26 For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
“FARC”) has for decades relied on kidnapping and the produc-
tion and selling drugs to finance its insurgency.27 As efforts to 
curtail FARC’s access to income from these activities have met 
with some success, FARC has turned to gold mining to support 
its violent campaign against the government.28
Grievances can motivate armed conflict, particularly when 
the parties to a resource related dispute are divided along 
ethnic, religious, or other lines.29 Among the events that may 
spark violent uprisings are land appropriation, environmental 
degradation, population displacement, large inflows of migrants, 
and frustration over unfulfilled economic expectations.30 Exam-
ples of grievance-based conflicts include Aceh, in Indonesia; 
Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea; Kurdistan, in Iraq; northern 
Niger; and southern Sudan.31 Grievances do not necessarily arise 
in the context of potential regional autonomy, as was the case in 
Aceh and South Sudan.32 They may also occur in response to the 
abuse of power by local elites, as was the case in Sierra Leone.33
With respect to economic growth and developmental out-
comes, many resource-rich countries perform poorly in compari-
son to their less resource-rich counterparts.35 This phenomenon, 
often referred to as the resource curse or the paradox of plenty,36 
is exemplified in countries such as Algeria, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Nigeria.37 The resource curse 
has a number of potential causes, including the following:
•	 A government that is able to finance its budget through nat-
ural resource revenues rather than public taxation can easily 
become detached from, and therefore less accountable to, 
the populace.38
Figure 2. Armed Civil Conflicts Involving High-value Natural Resources, 1970 
–200834
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•	 Resource revenues often fuel patronage, corruption, and 
rent seeking, all of which may promote the interests of a 
small and predatory elite.39 In Nigeria, for example, it is 
estimated that one percent of the population enjoys eighty 
percent of the oil revenues.40
•	 When the group in power focuses on short-term gains 
(sometimes in an effort to meet popular demands), the 
results may include overspending, poor investment deci-
sions, and ill-conceived economic policies.41
•	 In countries whose economies depend on a few valuable 
resources, the weakness of political and economic institu-
tions may be compounded by exposure to price shocks, 
which occur when rapid shifts in raw material prices lead to 
abrupt fluctuations in resource revenues.42
Political and economic underperformance is endemic in 
many resource-rich countries—which, according to empirical 
studies, renders them vulnerable 
to conflict.43 Several studies have 
documented that armed civil 
conflict is more likely to occur in 
poor countries than in rich ones.44 
Research also shows that dysfunc-
tional institutions and low state 
capacity are positively correlated 
with an increased likelihood of 
conflict.45
Supporting the case study 
evidence, several statistical studies 
document strong and signifi-
cant relationships between par-
ticular natural resources and 
conflict, but few have been able to 
disentangle the possible mecha-
nisms behind the relationships.46 
James Fearon and David Laitin, 
for example, have found that oil 
increases the likelihood of conflict—a finding that has been 
confirmed by the work of Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer, 
Macartan Humphreys, and Päivi Lujala.47 Lujala has also found 
that when oil and gas are located in the conflict area, conflicts 
tend to be longer and more severe.48 Taken together, Lujala shows 
that (1) oil-producing countries are 1.5 to 2 times more likely to 
experience armed civil conflict than nonproducers, and that (2) 
when internal conflict occurs in a region that has oil reserves, 
it lasts twice as long as conflicts that occur in areas without oil 
reserves, and combatant deaths are twice as high.49 Collier and 
Hoeffler’s 2006 study of conflict types links oil to higher risk of 
secessionist conflict, and Lujala shows that secessionist conflicts 
in regions with oil reserves tend to be more severe than any other 
conflicts.50
Diamonds and other gemstones have also been subject 
to statistical studies.51 Fearon and Lujala have shown that gem-
stones have effects similar to those of oil—namely, conflict is 
more likely and tends to last longer.52 The role of timber, opium, 
and other high-value crops is less clear.53 There is some evidence 
that opium cultivation makes conflicts last longer, but little 
systematic evidence links timber production to civil war.54
resources For conFlIcT
Because natural resources have varying characteristics, they 
are not equally relevant to conflict—and those that are relevant 
may be so for different reasons.55 High-value resources, for 
example, may be either renewable or nonrenewable, although 
most— such as oil, gas, rutile, coltan, cobalt, diamonds, and 
gold—are nonrenewable, and tend to be located in geographi-
cally limited areas.56 What all high-value resources have in com-
mon, however, is the potential to yield substantial revenue.57
Some high-value resources are limited to confined areas 
and depend on sophisticated and expensive extraction methods 
or require special types of transportation (e.g., pipelines).58 
Because such resources are difficult to loot and are generally 
securely controlled by the govern-
ment during periods of both peace 
and war, they provide fewer oppor-
tunities for conflict financing.59 
Thus, the revenues from resources 
such as oil, natural gas, kimberlite 
diamonds, copper, and rutile are 
likely to accrue to the central gov-
ernment and those who control it.60 
Such resources may nevertheless 
play a role in conflict: rebel move-
ments may seek to oust the govern-
ment to gain control of them, and 
if the resources are located in more 
remote areas, they may play a role 
in secessionist uprisings.61 Rebels 
may also loot existing stockpiles 
of commodities or may attempt to 
bring extraction or transportation 
to a halt, in order to cut off the 
central government from its revenue source.62 Finally, the large 
revenues derived from high-value resources may increase the 
risk of conflict through adverse effects on political and economic 
institutions.63
Some high-value resources are linked to conflict because 
of their financing potential.64 However deep grievances may be, 
rebellion is unlikely to begin or to be sustained without financ-
ing opportunities.65 Since the end of the Cold War, financing 
from the superpowers has declined and revenues from valuable 
natural resources have gained importance as a source of conflict 
financing.66 The resources most suitable for wartime looting 
have extremely high value-to-weight ratio and can be easily 
extracted, concealed, smuggled, and sold.67 Easy extraction is a 
particular advantage: a resource that can be extracted by indi-
viduals or small groups using simple tools (that is, through arti-
sanal mining techniques) can be readily exploited by rebels who 
either undertake the mining themselves or use forced labor.68 
Among the commodities with high price-to-weight ratios that 
can be artisanally mined are alluvial gold, alluvial diamonds, and 
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gemstones such as rubies and sapphires.69 Rebels do not need to 
rely on extraction directly; they also engage in illegal taxation 
of trade and export routes.70 In some cases, including Colombia 
and Nigeria, rebels have succeeded in obtaining ransoms from 
extractive firms by threatening to blow up oil pipelines or by 
kidnapping personnel working on installations.71
When it comes to conflict financing, many natural resources 
have another advantage: they are generic, which means that their 
origins cannot be traced as easily as those of manufactured prod-
ucts.72 Because generic illegal commodities can be readily inte-
grated into legal trade channels, they are a particularly lucrative 
form of contraband, with trade prices that differ only marginally 
from those of their legal counterparts.73 Another advantage of 
some high-value resources is their scarcity.74 Some occur in only 
a small number of countries and have few substitutes, and are, 
therefore, of strategic importance.75 Demand for such resources 
may sometimes override other considerations, such as the legal-
ity of the exploitation, the behavior of the government that has 
granted exploitation rights, and the role of the commodities in 
financing warfare.76
Of course, resources other than high-value minerals may 
play a role in conflict or have adverse effects on economic 
and political institutions.77 Most notable are coca and opium, 
which have been linked to conflicts in Latin America and Asia, 
respectively, and timber, which has been connected to a number 
of conflicts in Africa and Southeast Asia.78 Fisheries have also 
been used to finance conflict; in Somalia, for example, some 
warring groups have sold false fishing licenses for offshore tuna 
reserves.79
conclusIon
When conflict ends, many of the original causes often 
remain unresolved—whether they relate to resources or not—
and may even have been aggravated by the grievances and eco-
nomic and political havoc associated with the conflict itself.80 
Post-conflict countries thus face daunting challenges when it 
comes to building peace, reducing poverty, and managing natural 
resources—particularly when poor resource management may 
be undermining both peacebuilding and poverty reduction.81 
It is clear that many resource-rich post-conflict countries are 
unable to sustain peace.82 This observation has been confirmed 
by empirical studies: for example, Rustad and Binningsbø’s 
analysis of 285 episodes of armed civil conflict shows that when 
natural resources play a role, the period of post-conflict peace is 
forty percent shorter than when they do not.83
The difficulty of sustaining peace when high-value natural 
resources are involved has two key implications: (1) the conflicts 
involving such resources are generally harder to resolve; and (2) 
thus far, the measures that have been used to manage natural 
resources and their associated revenues are generally unsatis-
factory.84 Thus, improved management of high-value natural 
resources and the associated revenues is fundamental to peace 
building.
Endnotes: High-value Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?
1 See generally Shahid Yusuf, World Bank, Economics through the Critical 
Look at Thirty Years of the World Development Report (2008) (discussing the 
successes and failures of the World Bank and global development). 
2 See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The 
Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, (Feb. 2009), http://www.unep.
org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf. 
3 See Philippe Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources 
and Armed Conflict, 20 Pol. geograPhy 561, 566-67, 578 (2001) (asserting that 
although many patronage systems are corrupt, the phenomenon of patronage is 
distinct from that of corruption).
continued on page 56
This article is an edited version of the first chapter 
of a volume entitled High-Value Natural Resources and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, which addresses a full range 
of challenges associated with high-value resources in post-
conflict settings. This volume reflects the perspectives of 
forty-one contributors and considers the experiences of 
eighteen countries with analyses of additional countries. 
The volume’s chapters are grouped into five sections 
that examine specific challenges and opportunities within 
each stage of the resource chain:
1. The ways in which host governments, extractive indus-
tries, and the international community can strengthen 
the management of extraction to promote peace. 
2. The instruments used to track commodities and 
revenues.  
3. The pros and cons of various options for revenue 
distribution, including whether producing regions 
should receive preferential treatment in revenue distri-
bution, as well as measures for stemming corruption. 
4. The role of revenue allocation and institution building, 
including several in-depth case studies on various 
approaches.
5. The importance of taking local livelihoods and econo-
mies into account in the design and implementation of 
approaches to managing high-value natural resources. 
Taken together, the chapters in the volume offer a consistent 
message: proper management of high-value natural resources 
is crucial in the aftermath of armed conflict. Effective manage-
ment of these key assets can support a range of peacebuilding 
objectives—from livelihood and macroeconomic recovery, 
to good governance and inclusive political processes, to 
improved security. The volume also demonstrates that there is 
no single, universally applicable approach to natural resource 
management in post-conflict settings.
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weak PlaNNiNg Process frustrates ProtectioN 
of Puerto rico’s threateNed coastliNe
by Mark Borak*
For over a decade, conservationists in Puerto Rico have waged a constant battle to gain legal protection for one of the island’s most ecologically sensitive natural resources.1 
Thanks in part to its location on a picturesque stretch of coastline 
near its capital, San Juan, a swath of undeveloped land known 
as the Northeast Ecological Corridor (“NEC”) has come under 
constant threat of large scale development.2 Aside from its stun-
ning view of verdant hills descending from El Yunque National 
Forest to the pristine shoreline, the corridor harbors a seven 
mile long sandy beach, a bioluminescent lagoon, mangrove for-
est, and habitats for over fifty rare, threatened, endangered and 
endemic species—including the leatherback sea turtle.3 The crit-
ically endangered leatherback returns each year to nest on the 
beach, which is one of only three significant nesting sites left in 
the United States.4 Leatherbacks are especially vulnerable to the 
effects of development activity such as beach renourishment and 
artificial lighting.5 In response to a petition from the Sierra Club 
in August 2011, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service expressed 
its intent to review and revise the designated critical habitat for 
the leatherback, and possibly add the NEC as a critical habitat.6 
This review process, however, will likely take several years, and 
would only afford protection from Federal actions, leaving the 
NEC vulnerable to private development.7 
During the administration of former Governor Aníbal Ace-
vedo Vilá, concerned residents, fisherman, and environmental 
activists formed the Coalition for the Northeast Ecological Cor-
ridor (“Coalition”), which successfully swayed the former Gov-
ernor to designate the area as a nature reserve.8 Acevedo Vilá’s 
order prohibited the planned development of large-scale Mar-
riott and Four Seasons golf resorts in favor of less invasive uses 
centered on eco-tourism.9 However, once Vilá’s term expired in 
2009, his successor Governor Luis Fortuño abruptly rescinded 
the nature reserve designation and pushed through a new plan 
that allows large scale residential, commercial and tourist 
development.10 After a decade-long citizens campaign finally 
secured protection for the corridor, there was no effective check 
to prevent the new administration from reversing the order and 
further hampering conservation by changing the planning and 
permitting process in order to encourage more development.11 
Among the first actions that Fortuño took upon entering 
office was to create a new agency to handle construction per-
mits, which promises to process most permits within ninety days 
of receipt regardless of their complexity.12 With the stewardship 
of several officials who had direct ties with local developers, the 
new development plan for the corridor was shuttled through the 
planning process with minimal opportunity for review or public 
comment.13 This new plan, dubbed the Great Northeast Reserve, 
cobbles together tracts of existing parkland and retains some of 
the originally protected areas, but omits over 430 acres that were 
protected under the previous designation and permits extensive 
development in the heart of the corridor.14
While representatives from the Coalition contend that the 
new plan falls far short of conservation and are backing a Puerto 
Rico Senate bill to reverse it, the deeper issue is the manner in 
which it was approved.15 After limited opportunity for public 
review, the plan gained rapid approval by the Puerto Rico Plan-
ning Board (whose Chair and four other members were appointed 
by Fortuño) and the Department of Natural and Environmental 
Resources (whose Secretary consulted for a private development 
project that was included in the new plan).16 The Tourism Com-
pany (whose Director of Planning and Development prepared 
the Environmental Impact Statement for one of the developers) 
and the Department of Economic Development and Commerce 
(whose principal officer in charge of strategic project develop-
ment served as construction manager for one of the proposed 
resorts) both assented to the plan after limited review.17 
These direct conflicts of interest demonstrate how Puerto 
Rico’s land use process has succumbed to regulatory capture, a 
condition in which industries most affected by regulation exert 
a disproportionately large amount of influence over the regula-
tory bodies meant to keep them in check.18 Aside from the harm 
this bias toward rapid development does to responsible land use 
planning, the situation can also have a detrimental effect on the 
economic growth of the island, and even on real estate devel-
opers themselves.19 Agency officials’ current favoritism toward 
developers is largely a result of the pro-development Governor’s 
ability to place sympathetic officials in key agencies. Likewise, 
the future election of a populist, anti-development Governor 
could result in a sharp reversal of fortunes and a chilling effect 
on development. Additionally, the Fortuño administration seems 
to have overlooked the fact that the NEC in its natural state is 
both an ecological haven and a tourist attraction that cannot be 
replicated elsewhere, which makes it an integral asset to the 
long-term viability of Puerto Rico’s tourism industry. In the long 
run, political instability and unpredictable development policies 
satisfy neither the environmentalist nor the real estate developer.
Such has largely been the experience of Puerto Rico’s land 
use planning process–repeated attempts at solidifying a predict-
able land use scheme have been frustrated by countless excep-
tions and orders circumventing the process.20 Furthermore, 
* Mark Borak is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Washington 
College of Law.
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liQuid challeNges:
coNtested water iN ceNtral asia
by Christine Bichsel*
InTroducTIon
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two large river systems of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya were no longer situated within one state, 
but instead transected the borders of five newly independent 
states: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan.1 In the discourse of hydro politics, this was 
perceived as a geographical misfit between water and state 
boundaries, raising the potential for “water 
wars.”2 Water is a scarce resource that may be 
contended for by states and identity groups 
because it is essential for physical survival 
and basic for most human activities.3 Indeed, 
water plays a crucial role in all five states of 
post-Soviet Central Asia.4 The existing arid 
climate in the region limits the possibility 
for rain-fed agriculture and necessitates the 
supply of additional water.5 
Irrigation zones have been mainly 
developed along the two major rivers, the 
Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, which drain 
into the Aral Sea.6 One of the most hospi-
table areas to irrigated agriculture in Central 
Asia is the Ferghana Valley, an almond-
shaped intramontane basin surrounded by 
extensive mountain ranges.7 United as part 
of the Soviet Union until 1991, the Ferghana 
Valley is presently divided among the three 
successor states Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan.8 It accounts for forty-five percent 
of the total irrigated area within the Syr 
Darya basin.9 However, water in Central Asia is not only used 
for irrigated agriculture, but also for energy production.10 
This article discusses conflicting claims to water in the Syr 
Darya basin with a specific focus on the Ferghana Valley. It traces 
the emergence of these claims back to Soviet water management 
and irrigation and explores the contentious nature of water both 
at the regional as well as sub-state level. It equally assesses 
international efforts to mitigate the potential for violence and 
degradation of the environment. This article also makes recom-
mendations in three fields. First, it stresses the continued need 
to address water conflicts and related issues in Central Asia 
not solely in the technical, but also the social, economic, and 
political contexts. Secondly, it emphasizes the links between the 
work of border commissions and water conflicts, particularly 
those in the Ferghana Valley. Thirdly, it proposes a rethinking 
of blueprint approaches to water management in Central Asia, 
and to allow for more space for alternative conceptualizations. 
The article concludes with the opinion that conflicts over water 
in Central Asia may be driven more by particular interests of 
specific domestic actors in each country than by non-cooperative 
inter-state relations.
Map 1: The Aral Sea Basin, courtesy of International Water 
Management Institute
The syr darya BasIn and The Ferghana valley
The irrigation network in Soviet Central Asia received 
particularly large financial and technological investments after 
World War II.11 This entailed not only extending and widening 
the major canals, but also expanding the irrigated area upwards 
and outwards from the plains to the foothills.12 Built in the 
1970s on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, the Toktogul reservoir 
was designed to support this expansion and provide seasonal 
and multi-year water storage in order to increase the availability 
*Christine Bichsel is a senior researcher of the Department of Geosciences 
at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. This article has been adapted from 
Christine Bichsel (Switzerland), with Kholnazar Mukhabbatov (Tajikistan) and 
Lenzi Sherfedinov (Uzbekistan), “Land, Water, and Ecology,” in Ferghana Valley: 
The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
2011): 253-277. Used by permission of M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
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of water for irrigation in the Uzbek and Kazakh republics, as 
well as to regulate the distribution of water downstream in the 
Syr Darya River basin.13 As was common with reservoirs in the 
USSR, a hydroelectric plant was constructed at the same time, 
enabling the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in con-
junction with its water management function.14 
The Soviet Union, like the Russian Empire before it, encour-
aged cotton production in Central Asia to satisfy the demand 
of the domestic textile industry.15 The Soviet Union therefore 
fervently pressed this water-intensive crop on the agriculturally 
and ecologically suitable lowlands of the Uzbek and Tajik repub-
lics, as well as further downstream in the Kazakh republic.16 
There, the Soviet Union developed irrigation and drainage proj-
ects primarily to increase cotton production in these lowland 
republics, which facilitated the rise in cotton production from 4.3 
million tons in 1960 to approximately 10 to 11 tons in 1990.17 
With cotton being a strategic priority, Soviet leaders designated 
the lion’s share of the Syr Darya river’s flow to cotton production 
in the lowlands.18 Conversely, Soviet planners resolved that the 
strategic priority in the Kyrgyz republic was animal husbandry 
with a focus on meat and milk products, as well as growing rain-
fed fodder.19 The energy needs of the Kyrgyz Republic were met 
by importing electricity and/or natural gas, coal, and oil for its 
thermal power plants from the downstream Central Asian and other 
Soviet republics.20 Thanks to these arrangements, the Toktogul 
reservoir, as part of a highly integrated network, became the key ele-
ment in large scale cotton growing in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 21
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the for-
merly integrated scheme of economic management collapsed.22 
Each of the five newly-independent Central Asian states was left 
to restructure the previously centralized water management sys-
tem.23 The Soviet Union left behind a highly integrated network 
of large irrigation canals and reservoirs, which was parceled out 
among its successor states.24 This sudden transition meant that 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan were now 
individually responsible for managing the Syr Darya’s water.25 
Moreover, these countries had to face the environmental con-
sequences of Soviet irrigation practices.26 During the 1970s it 
became apparent that the massive Soviet investments had not 
increased the efficiency of water use in Central Asia.27 Rather, 
infrastructure problems actually led to huge water losses and 
inappropriate irrigation practices caused excessive application 
of water to the fields.28 These problems culminated in the well-
publicized disaster of the Aral Sea, which suffered decrease 
in water levels, substantial pollution, and increased salinity as 
a result of heavy water diversion for irrigation and poor water 
management policies.29 Finally, although ample funds had been 
devoted to the construction of an irrigation infrastructure, little 
was spent on maintaining it.30 Thus, by the early 1990s when 
these countries became independent large parts of the irrigation 
networks in Central Asia were already in need of repair.31
Accordingly, independence necessitated the subsequent 
establishment of new water management organizations, at both 
a domestic and inter-state level.32 Each country established its 
own ministries and departments to supervise water resources.33 
These new, individualized ministries retained many of the Soviet 
organizational structures, yet faced drastically reduced fund-
ing.34 The resulting water management organizations suffered 
from declining salary pools, shrunken operating budgets, and 
little money for equipment.35 These difficulties, along with con-
cerns over the efficiency of water usage, prompted the new states 
to introduce cost recovery measures, and shift the ownership of 
tertiary irrigation infrastructures to local water users as a way to 
increase their rights and responsibilities.36 
The end of the centralized Soviet system of water manage-
ment also necessitated new agreements among the new Central 
Asian states to regulate the Syr Darya and Amu Darya Riv-
ers.37 The Almaty Agreement of 1992 established the Interstate 
Commission for Water Coordination (“ICWC”) as the highest 
decision-making body for all matters pertaining to the regula-
tion, efficient use, and protection of interstate watercourses 
and bodies of water in Central Asia.38 The ICWC consists of 
leading water officials from each of the five countries, who 
met several times annually to set allocations and quotas as 
well as resolve disputes.39 From this commission a number of 
additional agreements emerged, some of them pertaining to all 
Central Asia and others to specific rivers.40 On the Syr Darya 
River, annual agreements were reached in 1995 and subsequent 
years among riparian states concerning the allocation of water 
and energy.41 In 1998, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
concluded a watercourse-specific agreement on the use of the 
water and energy resources of the Syr Darya River, thus folding 
earlier annual agreements into the new Syr Darya Framework 
Agreement.42 Tajikistan joined this agreement in 1999.43 Thus, 
while the countries retained national control over crops, indus-
trial goods, and electric power generated by their use, they also 
worked with one another to manage available water resources. 44 
conTesTed lInks BeTWeen WaTer,  
energy and PolITIcal IndePendence
Neither the processes of domestic reform nor inter-state 
negotiations have been smooth or predictable as disputes over 
how to distribute shared water resources have arisen. The first 
major conflict regarding the seasonal distribution of water across 
the Ferghana Valley involves the operation of the Toktogul res-
ervoir and hydroelectric plant.45 The disintegration of the Soviet 
Union placed great stress on the existing system of inter-repub-
lican compensation for water and energy.46 The newly indepen-
dent downstream countries experienced difficulties consistently 
providing cheap gas for Kyrganstan, and ultimately raised 
prices.47 Unable to purchase enough gas to generate its thermal 
power plants, Kyrgyzstan experienced chronic electrical outages 
during the winter, and in the early 1990s began to release more 
water from the Toktogul reservoir during that season to drive its 
hydroelectric generators.48 But by providing for its own heating 
and lighting needs in winter, Kyrgyzstan reduces the quantity 
of water available to downstream Uzbekistan for irrigating its 
sector of the Ferghana Valley in the spring and summer.49 And 
since a limited quantity of water can be retained in facilities such 
as the Kairakkum reservoir, Kyrgyzstan’s release of water in the 
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wintertime have repeatedly flooded these downstream areas.50 
Uzbekistan often complains about the damage caused by winter 
flooding, demanding that water should be released mainly in 
summer so as to prevent flooding and sustain irrigated crops.51 
A second dispute concerns the economic value of water 
provided across national borders. Since its independence, Kyr-
gyzstan has been neither willing nor able to assume the total 
financial burden of operating and maintaining the Toktogul dam 
and hydroelectric station nor willing to take actions to regulate 
the flow of water into the Naryn River and, accordingly, the flow 
into the Syr Darya.52 Kyrgyzstan therefore seeks compensation 
from the downstream countries.53 The annual cost to Kyrgyzstan 
of maintaining the Toktogul reservoir and its related infrastruc-
ture amounts to an estimated $15 to $27 million.54 Until 2002, 
however, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not contribute to the 
cost of maintaining and operating this facility.55 Rising gas 
prices and the shift to a more market-oriented economy have 
prompted Kyrgyzstan’s lawmakers to re-evaluate the value of 
water as a resource.56 They argue that the Syr Darya waters flow-
ing from Kyrgyzstan bring considerable economic benefit to the 
downstream countries via irrigated agriculture.57 Therefore, they 
seek to place a specific value or price on water and to charge 
its users for what they receive from Kyrgyzstan.58 Uzbekistan 
has, to date, been critical of this idea, questioning whether any 
country can actually own water and whether the water supply 
should be treated as an economic commodity.59 Moreover, it 
asserts that because Kyrgyzstan provides no “value added” to the 
water flowing from its territory, it is hardly justified in asking for 
financial compensation.60
A third point of contention concerns the apportionment of 
water from the Syr Darya River and the quantity to which the 
respective riparian countries are entitled. Kyrgyzstan contests 
the old Soviet inter-republican quotas, which designated the 
lion’s share of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and Kazakh-
stan.61 With the 1992 Almaty Agreement on Water Resources, 
the new states confirmed that they would continue to observe 
the existing quotas for the time being, but did not detail the pos-
sibility of later changes.62 The Agreement assigned 51.7 percent 
of the river flow to Uzbekistan, 38.1 percent to Kazakhstan, 9.2 
percent to Tajikistan and only 1 percent to Kyrgyzstan.63 The 
Kyrgyz claim is that this arrangement effectively barred them 
from developing irrigated agriculture during the Soviet period 
and denied them the economic benefit that would have come 
from development.64 Kyrgyzstan, therefore, now seeks to correct 
what it sees as a historical injustice by claiming enough water to 
develop self-sustaining and market-based irrigated agriculture.65 
However, this runs in direct conflict with plans by Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, all of which seek to expand and mod-
ernize their own irrigated agriculture.66
At present, the outlined disagreements have resulted in 
plans to build new dams and to deal with the accompanying or 
resulting controversies. Among many smaller dam building proj-
ects in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are each attempt-
ing to resume the construction of large reservoirs designed in 
the 1960s and 1970s and partly constructed in the 1980s.67 In 
Kyrgyzstan, the two Kambar-Ata dam structures are planned 
upstream of the Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn River.68 These 
dams would allow electricity production during winter, while 
saving water in the Toktogul reservoir for downstream irriga-
tion purposes in the summer.69 Moreover, since the necessary 
grid is already in place, the hydropower complex could generate 
surplus electricity for exportation.70 However, there are doubts 
about the financial viability and environmental impacts of the 
project, one being that climate change-induced glacial melt and 
projected reduced water flow could render the structure obsolete 
within a generation.71 Kambar-Ata I and II are estimated to cost 
around $3 billion, a significant investment which Kyrgyzstan is 
unlikely to assume.72 So far, possible investors, including Rus-
sia, have been hesitant to invest.73 Questions of political stability 
aside, this may also be due to Uzbekistan’s firm opposition to the 
project, objecting, among other issues, to the increased control 
Kyrgyzstan would acquire over the Syr Darya River flow.74
The Rogun dam in Tajikistan is a similar project with com-
parable goals to regulate water usage and release of the Amu 
Darya River.75 Its original purpose was to guarantee sufficient 
water supply during water-scarce years for users in the Amu 
Darya basin, an area that suffers from a greater lack of regula-
tion than the Syr Darya River.76 The Soviets never completed 
the project due to the USSR’s collapse that delayed construc-
tion in 1992 but if completed, the large hydropower plant and 
enormous water reservoir to be situated on the Vaksh River, a 
tributary of the Amu Darya River, will provide yearly water run-
off regulation of the Amu Darya.77 This goal is aided by the fact 
that the Rogun River is not followed by a downstream reservoir, 
which would likely affect the flow of the Amu Darya directly.78 
However, the Rogun Dam has significant hurdles to overcome 
before it can become a reality as the huge financial investment 
needed to resume and complete the construction has not yet been 
secured.79 Once operational, Rogun is expected to cover as much 
as eighty percent of Tajikistan’s average energy consumption 
and even offers opportunities for exporting electricity.80 How-
ever, Uzbekistan has raised opposition toward the dam, listing 
concerns about reduced downstream water availability and dam 
safety.81 Downstream countries are particularly worried about 
water availability during the one to two decades in which the res-
ervoir would need to be filled.82 Moreover, downstream nations 
and communities stress the future risks of the dam, as Rogun is 
situated in a seismically active area near a geological fault line.83 
A potentially sudden outflow of such a large scale could have 
disastrous consequences for downstream riparian zones.84
InTer-grouP conFlIcTs over WaTer and land
Thus far, the focus of disputes over water and energy has 
been among the successor states following the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union. However, no less serious tensions over water 
can arise within states.85 With regard to conflicts over water, Eric 
Sievers, a Harvard University Russian and Eurasian scholar, 
writes that, “As the Syr Darya basin contains the Ferghana Valley, 
which is the most sensitive part of modern Central Asia in terms 
of ethnic violence, it presents a special case of conflict.”86 He 
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suggests that water scarcity and strained inter-ethnic relations 
could lead to violent conflict.87 Indeed, many water users have 
faced declining access to water and greater uncertainties over its 
delivery after independence.88 The changing seasonal patterns 
of water distribution and the effects of the inefficient and dilapi-
dated infrastructure have negatively affected the situation.89 
Moreover, as the population continues to grow, there will be a 
further increase of pressure on water, land, and other natural 
resources.90 Finally, as Sievers suggests, parts of the Ferghana 
Valley experienced a rapid social and economic decline follow-
ing independence, which, if accelerated, could spur violence 
among a population overwhelmingly dependent on irrigated 
agriculture.91
Conflicts over water distribution are a frequent occurrence 
in the irrigated sections of the Ferghana Valley.92 On the southern 
side of the valley, tensions tend to emerge in springtime when the 
beginning of the agricultural season brings a high water demand 
but the flow of the glacier-fed rivers has not yet filled irrigation 
canals to meet that demand.93 Since most of the Ferghana Val-
ley irrigation systems are gravity-operated, nearly all conflicts 
occur between upstream and downstream users.94 A more erratic 
post-independence water supply has accentuated differences in 
access to water between upstream and downstream users and has 
increased competition for water during the springtime.95 As a 
result, conflict parties form along territorial or residential affilia-
tion rather than ethnic or kinship lines, although these categories 
frequently overlap.96
Water sources are contested particularly when rivers or 
canals transect the new international borders and are thus subject 
to inter-state agreements.97 In the southern part of the Ferghana 
Valley this has entailed revising the allocation of water from 
several rivers and springs.98 For example, during the Soviet 
period sixty-nine percent of the Shakhimardan Sai River’s flow 
was allocated to the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic SSR, as 
compared with twenty-one percent for the Kyrgyz SSR (plus ten 
percent “water losses”).99 After the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Kyrgyzstan claimed, and sometimes simply appropriated, 
more water for itself.100 Finally, in 2001 the Departments of 
Water Resources in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed that the 
water of the river should be divided equally between them.101 
Similar claims have been made on other rivers and sources, 
with several of them ending in allocation agreements.102 These 
changed allocations that benefit upstream users have left down-
stream users discontent over their reduced water supply.103 It is 
tempting to attribute these conflicts to the inevitable disputes 
arising out of new inter-state borders, however, it is at least as 
valid to suggest that they should be understood as the fallout from 
long-term economic shifts that are occurring in the region, the 
character and final dimensions of which are not yet fully evident.
As a general rule, Uzbek and Tajik groups in the Ferghana 
plains have a much longer history of agricultural production 
and sedentary lifestyles than the Kyrgyz, most of whom prac-
ticed animal husbandry and pursued a nomadic or transhumant 
existence in the foothills and premontane zones.104 However, 
without clear-cut boundaries between them, there were constant 
interactions between these modes of production and lifestyle. 105 
But with the 1924 Soviet national-territorial delimitation, these 
socio-economic distinctions became territorialized.106 They 
served as a basis for establishing the political-administrative 
divisions of the Ferghana Valley in the Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz 
SSRs.107 The borderlines of the Ferghana Valley represented 
not only the territory of newly established Soviet nationalities, 
but to some extent follow the territorial distinction between 
different socio-economic practices such as irrigated agriculture 
and animal husbandry.108
Initially, Soviet regional economic specialization enhanced 
these territorialized socio-economic distinctions. For example, 
specialization fostered irrigated agriculture in the form of cotton 
production in the Uzbek SSR and animal husbandry in the 
form of meat and milk production in the Kyrgyz SSR.109 Later, 
however, Soviet actions undermined specialization. The effort to 
relocate and permanently resettle nomadic populations as well as 
the expansion of irrigated agriculture zones into the foothills had 
precisely this effect.110 With independence, the disintegration of 
the big state farms that produced meat and milk in the Kyrgyz 
sector, and the subsequent privatization of land, led many Kyrgyz 
to turn to private agriculture for their livelihood.111 Today, 
Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in the foothills practice both animal 
husbandry and agriculture.112 This has had the effect of further 
increasing the demand for both land and water in the foothills of 
the Ferghana Valley.113
This shift in resettlement created new claims for water and 
land in the foothills of the Ferghana Valley, with the competing 
interests drawn along geographic zones, economic classes, 
and ethnic distinctions.114 Thus, conflicts over water and land 
are also driven by territorial claims to the Ferghana Valley.115 
Although the current de facto borderline is unlikely to undergo 
major changes resulting from delimitation, many areas on the 
border are still contested among the three countries.116 Ulti-
mately, the form of land use and the identities of the people using 
a specific section may influence decisions on the borderline.117 
A consequence of national-territorial delimitation is conflicting 
territorial claims among the new countries.118 These tensions 
tend to be especially concentrated in the irrigation systems 
in the foothills.119 While such claims have existed throughout 
the Soviet period, they acquired a new dimension with the 
post-independence nation-building processes. 120 
InTernaTIonal InvolvemenT
Immediately after the Central Asian countries gained their 
independence in 1991, a large number of international aid agen-
cies rushed into the region with projects and funding.121 A prime 
concern of early international engagement was to avoid violent 
conflict among new states over water and to instead seek more 
cooperative modes of engagement.122 A further concern was the 
shrinking of the Aral Sea and its adverse impact on the people 
and the environment.123 With a growing emphasis on agriculture, 
an increased need for irrigation and a wasteful water distribution 
infrastructure caused124 the water levels in the Aral Sea to drop 
between thirteen and eighteen meters since 1960.125 Combined 
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with salinity levels eight times higher than they were in 1960 
and over 400,000 kilometers of land lost to heavy pollution, the 
Aral Sea garnered much attention.126 Efforts were geared toward 
mitigating the disaster as well as protecting the environment for 
the future.127 This meant reducing the draw of water for agriculture 
from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers by rehabilitating 
infrastructure and instituting water-saving irrigation practices.128 
It also meant finding more efficient means of using water, 
including the institution of some sort of pricing mechanism.129 
Finally, international institutions criticized Soviet top-down 
approaches that had reduced farmers—or farm workers, as it 
were—to the status of passive implementers of decisions rather 
than entrusting them with responsibility for their own water 
use.130 Instead, international groups opted for decentralization in 
water management and supported the granting of a high degree 
of self-governance to water users.131
Efforts to rectify the Aral Sea environmental disaster 
led directly to the formulation of inter-state initiatives for 
the improvement of water management in Central Asia as a 
whole.132 The well-publicized disaster generated large funds 
and a multitude of projects from multilateral agencies, bilateral 
donors, and private foundations.133 Spearheading these projects 
from the outset were the World Bank, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (“UNDP”), the European Union (“EU”), 
and the United States Agency for International Development 
(“USAID”).134 To different degrees, each of these organizations 
conducted scientific assessments, produced management plans, 
initiated conservation schemes, and held inter-state negotiations 
to improve the water regulation and ecological condition of the 
Aral Sea.135 
Opinions differ on what all this work and funding actually 
accomplished.136 Several agreements were reached on the 
management of water in the Syr Darya basin and the institu-
tions established to implement them.137 However, the actual 
allocations of water remain hostage to yearly barter agreements 
among the states.138 Moreover, while the ecological condition of 
the Aral Sea region has been improved, it remains unlikely that 
this body of water will ever be restored to its pre-1960s level.139 
Among the many explanations for these outcomes, two warrant 
thorough consideration. One is that nearly all the inter-state 
negotiations sponsored by international agencies focused on the 
nexus of water and energy, but devoted insufficient attention to 
agriculture.140 As a result, parties ignored environmental issues 
in the Syr Darya basin that were caused by water-intensive pro-
duction and other critical agricultural policies.141 Second, many 
of the international funders and agencies were not organized 
enough to assure substantial outcomes, while the local actors 
with whom they interacted lacked commitment to the projects 
and offered only hollow promises.142
Additionally, international involvement with water manage-
ment in Central Asia has focused on promoting reform along 
the lines of Integrated Water Resource Management (“IWRM”), 
usually coupled with the rehabilitation of infrastructure.143 In the 
Ferghana Valley, for example, the Swiss Agency for Develop-
ment and Cooperation has run an IWRM project in cooperation 
with the ICWC since 2001.144 The aim of the project was to 
improve and reorganize the institutional arrangements for water 
management.145 This included the restructuring of water man-
agement on the basis of hydrological rather than administrative 
boundaries, and increasing farmers’ participation in decision-
making.146 The project was joined by an effort towards Canal 
Automation, which would automate the measurement of water 
flows and the transmission of data.147 More generally, interna-
tional funders and organizations have been involved in decen-
tralizing irrigation management along the lines of IWRM have 
established Water User Associations (“WUAs”). Major donor 
organizations promoting this work include the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank in Kyrgyzstan, USAID in Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan, and the World Bank in Tajikistan. 148
Irrigation reform based on IWRM principles altered the 
structure of water management in Central Asia. For example, 
International donors have established a large number of WUAs 
and introduced water service fees in Central Asia.149 Consider-
able progress has recently been made to actually collect water 
fees, a process which was initially under-enforced.150 Nonethe-
less, shortcomings remain.151 WUAs usually enjoy little legiti-
macy in the irrigation communities in which they operate, exert 
limited influence on the actual distribution of water compared to 
informal authorities, and are frequently misunderstood as an arm 
of the state instead of representatives of local communities.152 
Yet it remains unclear who is to blame for these shortcomings. 
Dr. Jenniver Sehring, a policy associate at Ecologic Institute, has 
analyzed the irrigation reforms in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
finding that WUAs themselves must bear responsibility for their 
modest impact on the distribution of water.153 Thus, the WUAs’ 
failures stem from their faulty implementation. 
IWRM is a prescriptive concept predicated on the belief that 
democratic governance is good governance.154 IWRM is based 
on a market economy and democratic governance inspired by 
neo-liberal thinking and assumes that the conditions for such 
governance are already in place.155 As a consequence, IWRM 
is “politically blind” to the actual political economy and power 
relations which exist in the Ferghana Valley, especially in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.156 It is questionable whether the 
IWRM goals of economic decentralization, self-government, 
and empowerment of water users can ever be achieved within 
strongly centralized governance systems. 
At present, another major organization in Central Asian 
water relations is the bilateral donor Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (“GIZ”).157 GIZ is commis-
sioned by the German Federal Foreign Office to run the program 
“Transboundary Water Management in Central Asia” during the 
period of 2009-2011, targeting all five countries of the region.158 
The program aims to enhance the expertise and capacity of 
supra-state water management institutions and the International 
Fund for the Aral Sea (“IFAS”).159 An additional focus is on 
the improvement of management by river basin organizations 
situated on selected cross-border rivers.160 GIZ approaches 
these issues with the advisory support of experts, the training of 
personnel, and the creation and facilitation of forums to foster 
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interdisciplinary and cross-regional exchange.161 GIZ also provides 
funds for technical equipment, refurbishment of irrigation infra-
structure, demonstration facilities, and small hydroelectric plants.162 
PolIcy recommendaTIons
Irrigated agriculture is likely to continue to play a major 
role in Central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana Valley.163 It 
remains the source of people’s livelihoods and the backbone 
of the economies of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and of Kyrgyzstan, 
especially because of the water-energy nexus.164 Desertification 
of the Aral Sea basin remains a critical issue affecting all Cen-
tral Asian countries.165 Although largely a result of poor Soviet 
management, like water diversion schemes, the Aral Sea basin 
remains a major environmental concern and an area of politi-
cal contention.166 In the coming years, the possible restoration 
of infrastructure and the correction of existing flaws remain a 
daunting challenge due to the social and economic concerns.167 
Constructing and maintaining a viable water management 
infrastructure will be a critical step towards mitigating the ten-
sion over water as the expansion of agriculture further forces 
nations to secure their own water needs even at the expense of 
a neighboring country.168 Estimates from scholars Dukhovny 
and Sokolov show the cost of such repairs throughout the Aral 
Sea basin would reach $16 billion.169 Still, this figure does not 
include the cost of applying water-saving technologies or adding 
new hydropower complexes.170 
Identifying sources of such large investments will be a 
major challenge that cannot be borne by the Central Asian states 
alone.171 Moreover, while the updating of irrigation systems is 
seemingly a matter of technical considerations, the physical, 
economic, and legal configuration of such systems are also 
shaped by the character of property rights and user relations.172 
Any effective step towards improving and expanding irrigation 
systems in the Ferghana Valley must address the social and 
political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. Decisions 
on what form of irrigated agriculture are economically viable, 
environmentally sustainable, and ethically acceptable in the 
Ferghana Valley should be the result of social negotiation. Fur-
thermore, that negotiation requires considering both the existing 
political economies and the needs of people’s livelihoods.
As outlined above, the dilapidated infrastructural heritage 
of the late Soviet period has left huge problems which must be 
addressed. Water is limited in the Ferghana Valley and might 
become even scarcer in the Syr Darya basin over time due to 
climate change and population increase.173 Moreover, these 
concerns are at the same time bound up with state territorializa-
tion and the construction of new collective identities.174 Yet, the 
evidence presented above suggests that the core conflicts over 
land and water do not trace back to any inherent ethnic animosi-
ties, but to the to the economic and social modes that define the 
lives of each group.175 This becomes particularly relevant as the 
ongoing processes of state-building foster new economic and 
moral attachments. Therefore, the decision of the bilateral and 
tripartite border commissions involving Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeki-
stan, and Tajikistan on the final delimitation and demarcation of 
the Ferghana Valley will have a decisive impact on these con-
flicts.176 However, the border commissions have not yet finished 
their work and the process is likely to be slow at best.177 The 
historical changes of these borders and their linkages with the 
spatial layout irrigation infrastructure must be taken into account 
if conflict over water is to be addressed.
International actors have been engaged with water and 
ecological issues in the Ferghana Valley for fifteen years, and 
they are likely to continue such work in the future.178 Large sums 
have been invested, but limited results have been attained.179 
This is partly the result of the normal work constraints of the 
involved international agencies. However, involvement has 
largely taken place within the framework of promoting neo-
liberal reforms leading to market economies and democratic 
politics in the region.180 In the area of water management, the 
IWRM model was promoted both for its own survival and also 
as an indirect means of providing some kind of quid pro quo for 
broader governance reforms.181 This may not always be the most 
productive way to resolve pressing water problems as overly nor-
mative or prescriptive approaches may divert attention from the 
stubborn realities on the ground. It is thus necessary to rethink 
approaches to water management and allow room for alternative 
conceptualizations.
conclusIon
Yearly barter agreements remain the central mechanism 
to determine water and energy transfers between upstream and 
downstream countries.182 Again, it is important to note that they 
do not only result from interstate relations characterized by an 
uncooperative mode, but also from the domestic politics in the 
respective states.183 Currently Kyrgyzstan is still cash-strapped 
and, thus, limited in acquiring energy carriers from abroad.184 
Kyrygyzstan’s inevitable need for heating during cold winters, 
and the government’s inability to provide sufficient electricity, 
is likely to give rise to public discontent and political unrest.185 
Operating the Toktogul reservoir to generate hydropower in win-
tertime, therefore, is an urgent political and economic concern 
of the government of Kyrgyzstan.186 A similar logic applies to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan interests in the construction of Kam-
bar-Ata and Rogun dams as well as hydropower plants. Beyond 
solving perennial power shortages, both countries also hope 
to export electricity to Central Asia and neighbors and, thus, 
become regional energy suppliers.187
Conversely, political elites in Uzbekistan, and to some extent 
Tajikistan, rely on cotton production in the Ferghana Valley to 
generate income and to support the existing system of social, 
political, and economic control.188 This partly accounts for lead-
ers’ unwillingness to change to less water-intensive crops in the 
Ferghana Valley.189 Furthermore, any related economic change 
may not sustain the existing, cotton reliant systems, which are 
based on exploitation and rent-seeking.190 Thus, the annual ad hoc 
barter agreements on the use of Syr Darya’s water may be less the 
result of inter-state cooperation and more the result of the conflict-
ing political interests of domestic actors within each country. 
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Addressing the challenges in Central Asia requires the reas-
sessment of domestic and regional policies, including improve-
ment to the water management infrastructure of the Aral Sea 
basin. Additionally, any improvements to, or expansion of, the 
irrigation systems in the Ferghana Valley must first consider the 
social and political challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. 
International actors need to consider alternative approaches to 
water management outside of the prevailing neo-liberal reforms. 
Only by assessing the spatial layout of watercourses and irriga-
tion infrastructure can resource management effectively avert 
conflicts over water and land in Central Asia. 
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a case for the uNited states’ oPPositioN of 
iNterNatioNal aNd domestic coal suBsidies
by Josh Fieldstone*
Since the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change1 came into effect in 1994, international financial institutions have provided more than $37 bil-
lion in direct financial support for at least 88 new and expanded 
coal plants.2 Although the United States has stated that it wants 
to deter international financial institutions from subsidizing 
coal,3 it supports its vast domestic coal subsidies.4 So long as 
these subsidies remain, the United States should refrain from 
opposing international coal subsidies in order to maintain its 
credibility.5 The United States faces the following dilemma: 
it could either actively oppose domestic and international coal 
subsidies even though the subsidies are in its short-term energy 
interest, or it could continue supporting coal subsidies despite 
coal’s long-term damaging effect on the environment and human 
health. The United States should prioritize public health and 
environmental interests and oppose all coal subsidies domesti-
cally and internationally. Specifically, it should begin by with-
drawing tax credits for domestic coal production and pressure 
the World Bank to stop funding coal projects internationally. 
International financial institutions have continued to finance 
coal projects despite the emergence of climate change as a major 
international issue.6 Meanwhile, the United States refrained 
from applying political pressure to curb such financing. In 2010, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“IBRD”), one of five institutions that compose the World Bank 
Group, funded a record high $4.4 billion for coal projects7 in 
the face of both substantial protests8 and a recommendation by 
the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review to refrain from 
financing coal.9 The United States Executive Director abstained 
from voting on—and using its substantial political clout10 to 
oppose—the largest of the projects,11 a $3 billion loan to a South 
African coal-fired power plant.12 However, if the United States 
takes a more active stance against coal projects, it could send 
a stronger message of opposition to international institutions 
that fund coal, in which the United States is involved, including 
the Inter-American Development Bank13 and the African Devel-
opment Bank.14
The United States has not only refrained from opposing 
international financial institutions’ funding of coal, it has also 
continued subsidizing coal domestically. A great percentage of 
these domestic subsidies come from the Internal Revenue Code 
Section 45k15 credit for production of nonconventional fuels.16 
This tax credit amounted to a $14 billion subsidy between 2002 
and 2008, which has primarily benefited coal producers.17 In 
addition to tax credits, the United States’ subsidies for coal 
include low-interest loans18 and loan guarantees.19
The United States has a strong incentive to promote coal 
subsidies because it has substantial short-term interest in 
maintaining—and even expanding—its present coal use to 
reduce energy costs and unemployment.20 The United States 
has more coal reserves than anywhere else in the world and is 
the second largest producer after China.21 In 2009, coal mines 
alone employed 90,000 people in the United States.22 Coal can 
generate usable energy at a cost between $1 and $2 per Million 
Metric British Thermal Units (“MMBtu”) compared to $6 to $12 
per MMBtu for oil and natural gas, providing an inexpensive and 
relatively stable energy source.23 Additionally fifty percent of 
electricity generation in the United States is dependant on coal, 
illustrating both the United States’ interest in coal use and the 
importance of its domestic coal policy.24
Even though the United States’ short term interests favor 
coal subsidies, its long term interest are against them. Some 
of the downsides of coal use are immediately tangible such 
as harm to the environment25 and health hazards to those 
working at coal facilities.26 Still, perhaps the most pressing 
concern is its effect on climate change.27 A recent study of 
Harvard’s Center for Health and the Global Environment found 
that the total external cost—the negative effect of an economic 
activity on a third party—of United States’ coal-use28 could 
amount to $523 billion annually.29 The National Resource 
Council found the external costs to be $120 billion even without 
generally taking coal’s effect on climate change into account.30
In light of these long-term realities, the United Sates 
should oppose coal subsidies domestically by terminating the 
tax credit for production of nonconventional fuels and inter-
nationally by pressuring the IBRD to refrain from giving any 
further loans to coal projects. By subsidizing coal now and 
leaving the greater cost of externalities for the future, the United 
States is supporting an economically and socially irresponsible 
position. Ending the existing tax credit and pressuring the IBRD 
would help mitigate coal’s effect on climate change, catapult the 
United States as a credible leader on the climate change debate, 
and protect the United States from the predicted economic losses 
that far outweigh its current problems. 
*Josh Fieldstone is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
Endnotes: A Case for the United States’ Opposition of International 
and Domestic Coal Subsidies on page 61
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Natural resource “coNflicts” iN the u.s. 
southwest: a story of hyPe over suBstaNce
by Laura Peterson, Jay C. Lininger, Marty Bergoffen, Bill Snape, and Curt Bradley*
InTroducTIon
Environmental laws and the ecosystems they support are under attack. Intermittently since the Reagan administration and increasingly 
since the 2008 economic collapse, certain politicians 
and their industry sponsors have inundated the media 
with angry rhetoric, blaming historic job losses on 
“overregulation.”1 Environmental laws are a frequent 
target of these politicians who often benefit from 
contributions supplied by the fossil fuel and mining 
industries.2 Ignoring the successes of these laws—
cleaner air, cleaner water, and recovering imperiled 
wild species and habitat—they claim that environ-
mental regulations are “job killers.”3 Reflecting the 
success of these claims, the recent House Fiscal Year 
2012 Interior and Environment spending bill con-
tained forty-two proposed anti-environmental riders. 
These riders range from limiting the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s ability to curb carbon emissions4 
to blocking the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s abil-
ity to list new threatened and endangered species.5
In the midst of these attacks, the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”)—an act President Nixon signed 
in 1973 with the enormous popular support of the 
American people—has become a target for repeal.6 
A bedrock environmental law, the ESA protects both 
imperiled species and the habitat necessary for those 
vulnerable species to survive.7 Capitalizing on wide-
spread economic anxieties, opponents of industry 
regulation have proposed legislation to undermine the 
ESA and block the listing of threatened and endan-
gered species.8 Sometimes based on more hyperbole 
than fact, these opponents promote the false belief that 
resource development and environmental protection 
are mutually exclusive. Some industry supporters argue that 
jobs would be created if the government opened up protected 
lands for private use,9 and that increased regulation may block 
development and destroy jobs, leading to further economic 
depression.10 Such attacks on the ESA characterize the issue as 
a tradeoff between the economy and the environment, claiming 
that the government must choose between using scarce natural 
resources to protect wildlife or help the economy.11 In the cur-
rent climate of economic distress, these arguments, regardless of 
their truth, are particularly effective. Whenever environmental 
protections are proposed or enforced, industry proponents 
predictably forecast dire economic consequences.12 However, 
these gloomy predictions rarely materialize.13 There is no stark 
dichotomy of economy versus the environment when it comes to 
developing natural resources; the issues are much more nuanced. 
Overblown rhetoric about environmental regulation obstruct the 
public’s access to open and honest debate about the best uses for 
scarce natural resources.
* Laura Peterson is a Legal Fellow at the Center for Biological Diversity; Jay C. 
Lininger is an Ecologist at the Center for Biological Diversity; Marty Bergoffen 
is an Endangered Species Organizer at the Center for Biological Diversity; Bill 
Snape is Senior Counsel at the Center for Biological Diversity and a Practitioner 
in Residence at American University, Washington College of Law;Curt Bradley is 
a GIS Specialist and Information Technology Director at the Center for Biologi-
cal Diversity.
Figure 1: Dunes Sagebrush Lizard Distribution, 2010
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conTroversy In The PermIan BasIn
The American Southwest, which is itself an intersection 
of diverse cultures, ecosystems, and political ideologies, is the 
on the front line for the cutting-edge natural resource battles of 
the early 21st Century.14 The Permian Basin in southeast New 
Mexico and west Texas is the focus of the latest and most serious 
attacks on the ESA (See Figure 1). The Permian Basin is an area 
of great economic and ecological significance. It is one of the 
largest domestic producers of fossil fuel in the United States, 
providing seventeen percent of the nation’s domestic crude oil.15 
In 2004, the Permian Basin produced about 841,000 barrels of 
oil per day.16 In addition to oil and gas extraction, the Permian 
Basin is home to significant agricultural interests, producing 
both food crops and grazing livestock.17 While these activities 
are important for the region’s economy, they also have a signifi-
cant effect on wildlife.18 The lesser prairie chicken and the dunes 
sagebrush lizard are particularly vulnerable to these industrial 
activities that are destroying their diminishing habitats.19 Their 
habitats and populations have been declining steadily for decades 
and their survival depends on protection under the ESA.20 
As a result of their population decline, these two species are 
now candidates for listing under the ESA.21 If approved, their 
listing would trigger certain protections for both the species 
and their habitats.22 However, opponents argue that listing these 
imperiled species would virtually shut down oil and gas drilling 
and inhibit agricultural production, both of which are bases of 
the local economy.23 These opponents argue that public resources 
should be dedicated to economic development to benefit workers 
rather than protecting environmental resources.24 Responding 
to these claims, local members of Congress have spearheaded 
legislation that would preclude listing the dunes sagebrush lizard 
and lesser prairie chicken, regardless of the scientific merit of 
protecting them as endangered species.25 
This article examines the pronounced controversy over 
natural resources in the Permian Basin, arguing that the sup-
posed conflict between environmental protection and resource 
exploitation is not as stark as many claim. Protection would have 
little real effect on energy development and may ultimately help 
the economy of the American Southwest and lead to improved 
land management practices.26 To the extent that there is a real 
conflict over use of scarce resources, the controversy presents a 
much-needed opportunity for healthy dialogue about sustainable 
development in the region. Any actual conflict can be resolved 
within the existing flexible mechanisms provided in the ESA. 
The lesser PraIrIe chIcken
The lesser prairie chicken is a medium-sized, gray-brown 
member of the grouse family that lives in the short grass prairies 
of the American Southwest.27 It forages for insects, leaves, and 
buds on the shinnery oak and sand sagebrush grasslands in lim-
ited areas of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and 
Texas.28 While the prairie chicken is best known for the male’s 
unique courtship displays on communal breeding grounds, it 
also provides the vital ecosystem service of regulating the grass-
land insect populations, which can cause substantial economic 
damage to agricultural operations.29 Destruction of habitat is 
one of the primary threats to the lesser prairie chicken.30 Since 
the 1800s, its range has been reduced by over 90%, and its 
population has declined significantly.31 The remaining habitat 
faces a myriad of ongoing threats from livestock grazing, oil 
and gas drilling, fire suppression, deliberate poisoning of shin-
nery oak, and fragmentation from structural and transportation 
development.32
The lesser prairie chicken has been caught in regulatory 
limbo for over a decade. In 1998, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“FWS”) concluded that it warranted protection as an 
endangered species.33 However, it has since remained a “candidate 
species” with no protection while its numbers decline.34 Now, the 
FWS characterizes the extinction threat to this terrestrial bird as 
high, ongoing, and imminent.35 To survive and recover, the lesser 
prairie chicken needs protection under the ESA.
The dunes sageBrush lIzard
The dunes sagebrush lizard is arguably the most contro-
versial animal in the current ESA fight. The lizard exclusively 
makes its home in shinnery oaks on the sand dunes of south-
eastern New Mexico and west Texas.36 This habitat specialist 
has a limited range.37 living under the shade of oak trees and 
burying itself in white sand to avoid predators and regulate its 
body temperature.38 
The primary threats to the lizard stem from fossil fuel devel-
opment and agricultural activities within the lizard’s specialized 
habitat.39 Roads, pipelines, and power lines, as well as vehicular 
traffic and soil compaction associated with extraction operations, 
have destroyed and fragmented the lizard’s native environment.40 
In addition, ranchers historically used herbicides to kill the 
shinnery oak necessary for the lizard’s survival because it is poi-
sonous to livestock in the spring when it is budding.41 Farmers 
also remove the oak to clear land for livestock grazing and crop 
production.42 Killing the shinnery oak not only removes the 
lizard’s habitat, it also destabilizes the entire dunes ecosystem.43 
The FWS classified the dunes sagebrush lizard as a can-
didate for listing under the ESA in 1982.44 As a candidate 
species, neither the lizard nor its habitat has received any fed-
eral protection.45 As a result, and despite listing by the State of 
New Mexico as an endangered species, its habitat has decreased 
by forty percent since 1982.46 This fact is particularly troubling 
given the direct link between the lizard’s survival and the quality 
and quantity of the shinnery oak.47 In 2010, after twenty-eight 
years, the FWS proposed to formally list the dunes sagebrush 
lizard as endangered under the ESA.48 The survival of the dunes 
sagebrush lizard depends on its ultimate protection under the 
ESA. However, this protection could be undermined if federal 
action under the ESA is blocked by oil, gas, and agricultural 
interests.
Backlash over ProTecTIon exPloITs economIc Fears
Based on media reports, it would seem that protecting 
the lesser prairie chicken and the dunes sagebrush lizard from 
extinction would have a significant negative impact on economic 
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activity in the Permian Basin.49 Proposed ESA listings have 
generated virulent opposition, with some predicting dire 
economic scenarios in the region if these at-risk species receive 
protection.50 Representative (“Rep.”) Steve Pearce (R-NM) 
alleged that protecting the lizard would place “[m]ost of the oil 
and gas jobs in southeast New Mexico . . . at risk.”51 Echoing 
this sentiment, a Texas newspaper asserted that listing the lizard 
as an endangered species would put 27,000 jobs in jeopardy by 
severely limiting oil production.52 Senator (“Sen.”) John Cornyn 
(R-TX) has advanced similar claims, stating that lizard protec-
tion is just another way the federal government puts obstacles 
in the way of job creation.53 These members of Congress have 
proposed legislation that would preclude the ability of the FWS 
to list either species as endangered.54 In addition to these claims, 
industry has inundated the local media with claims that environ-
mentalists are determined “to shut down the oil and gas industry 
in Texas.”55 
However, when the rhetoric is peeled away, these claims of 
imminent job loss resulting from wildlife protection have little 
substance. Instead, protection of at-risk wildlife would arguably 
have little or no effect on continued fossil fuel extraction in the 
Permian Basin.56 A recent study on the impact of listing the 
dunes sagebrush lizard on oil and gas activities in New Mexico 
shows that claims of economic calamity are overblown.57 The 
dunes sagebrush lizard’s potentially suitable habitat covers 
only 600,000 acres—less than one percent of all oil and gas 
lands in the Permian Basin.58 The study examined the leasing 
activity from January 2010 to July 2011 of the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) Pecos District, which manages most of 
the land in the animal’s range in New Mexico.59 Instead of the 
consequences purported the media, the study shows that lizard 
protection will have almost no effect on oil and gas activity.60 
Only five percent (2,920 acres) of 52,874 acres offered for lease 
in New Mexico are habitat for the lizard.61 Moreover, only fif-
teen percent (3,484 acres) of 22,383 acres where BLM proposed 
leases in the second half of 2011 were lizard habitat.62 The 
Permian Basin Petroleum Association claims that lizard protec-
tion “would shut down drilling activity for a minimum of two 
and as many as five years” while the FWS determines whether 
listing is warranted.63 On the contrary, BLM will defer leasing 
of only 560 acres—less than one percent of lands proposed for 
oil and gas development during the study period—to conserve 
habitat for the animal.64 Further, leases offered by BLM during 
the study period outnumbered those purchased by oil and gas 
companies, indicating a market surplus.65 Additionally, in Texas, 
the state comptroller and land commissioner jointly found that 
only three percent of the 197,606 acres of dunes sagebrush lizard 
habitat overlaps developable oil and gas land.66
Instead of shutting down all oil and gas activities in the 
Permian Basin, protecting the dunes sagebrush lizard and its 
habitat would affect only a miniscule portion of lands that the 
oil and gas industry wishes to exploit in the Permian Basin.67 
Given the current surplus of leasing opportunities on public land 
in New Mexico alone, listing the lizard would have little effect 
on oil and gas activities in the Permian Basin.68
The esa ProvIdes The FlexIBIlITy  
To deal WITh conFlIcTs ThaT arIse
This article does not deny the existence of conflict over 
natural resource development in the American Southwest or that 
the ESA can inhibit resource development. The ESA does and 
should prevent development in certain circumstances. However, 
to the extent that conflicts about the use of natural resources in 
the Permian Basin exist, the ESA provides flexible mechanisms 
to minimize the economic impacts of wildlife protection. 
The ESA requires public involvement and recognition 
of competing interests when the FWS considers protection of 
at-risk species.69 The ESA is flexible: it either mandates or 
allows socio-economic considerations at nearly every stage 
of the process including designation of critical habitat,70 con-
sultation with federal action agencies,71 recovery planning,72 
and prohibition against “take”73 (i.e., harm or harassment of 
endangered species).74 The act provides ample opportunity for 
public involvement and for provision of information on listing 
decisions and critical habitat determinations. 
The decision to list an imperiled species under the ESA 
must take into account only “the best scientific and commercial 
data available” after a status review.75 This science-based listing 
requirement ensures that decisions are based on the actual status 
of the species as opposed to politics.76 However, the FWS does 
not act unilaterally.77 Before making a determination of whether 
to list a species as endangered, the agency must take into account 
any state or local efforts to protect that species.78 Although the 
FWS ultimately must base its decision to list a species only 
on the best available science—a requirement that is essential 
to prevent extinction—it must undertake extensive procedural 
steps to ensure that wildlife protection is accomplished through 
a transparent process.79 The FWS must notify the state and local 
jurisdiction that might be affected by the listing decision.80 If it 
decides that listing is warranted, the FWS must conduct a “status 
review” and solicit comments and information from the public, 
including industry and conservation groups, scientific experts, 
as well as affected state, local, tribal and federal agencies.81 
After the status review, the FWS must publish a proposed rule 
in the Federal Register, which then undergoes another public 
comment process and sometimes includes public hearings.82 The 
FWS then incorporates the comments into a final listing rule.83 
In addition to the public review processes, listings undergo 
considerable internal review as well as formal, independent 
scientific peer review.84 
The FWS must undertake a similarly public process when 
it designates critical habitat, which by law is necessary for the 
survival and recovery of imperiled species.85 The FWS must 
consider economic impacts, the impacts on national security, as 
well as any other relevant impact of specifying a particular area 
as critical habitat.86 The FWS can go so far as to exclude an area 
from critical habitat if it determines that the benefits of exclud-
ing the area outweigh the benefits of designation as long as this 
decision will not result in the extinction of the species.87 
Beyond these opportunities for involvement in the decision-
making process, stakeholders can minimize the impact of 
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regulatory protections by voluntarily entering into conservation 
agreements to prevent extinction of a species and potentially 
preclude the need for listing under the ESA.88 Conservation 
agreements routinely facilitate the protection of species that 
are candidates for listing or are proposed to be candidates for 
listing.89 They give non-federal property owners incentives to 
implement measures that prevent the decline of imperiled spe-
cies.90 Conservation agreements are not overly burdensome, and 
participants must only address the issues that they can control 
under their property rights.91 Such agreements can protect popu-
lations on participants’ land, restore degraded habitat, create 
new habitat, and promise not to take an action that would harm 
an at-risk population of wildlife.92 After signing a conservation 
agreement, if the FWS later lists the species under the ESA, 
non-federal property owners may not be subject to additional use 
restrictions beyond those agreed to in the conservation agree-
ment.93 This provides landowners with valuable operational 
certainty in the face of potential regulation.
WhaT Is drIvIng The aTTacks on The  
esa In The PermIan BasIn?
Resistance to regulation by affected industries is the primary 
force driving attacks on the ESA. By capitalizing on widely-
shared anxieties created by the current economic climate and 
high unemployment, industry proponents can advance a long-
standing agenda to avoid new regulations and rollback existing 
ones.94 Backers of industry claim that listing the chicken or the 
lizard will lead to regulatory uncertainty and cost jobs in rural 
communities.95 However, there is little evidence to support this 
contention.96 Studies show that there is little connection between 
supposed “regulatory uncertainty,” and economic growth.97 
Financial incentives play a significant role in the decisions 
of potentially affected industries. Accordingly, industry financial 
support of Congressional initiatives to block wildlife protection 
is not surprising. Rep. Pearce is largely funded by the oil, gas and 
agriculture industries.98 In the 2011 to 2012 campaign cycle, the 
oil and gas industry was his number one industrial contributor.99 
Yates Petroleum, Mack Energy, and Exxon Mobil were included 
in Pearce’s top five individual contributors.100 In 2009-2010, 
Pearce’s top contributors included Yates Petroleum, Marbob 
Energy, Devon Energy, Chesapeake Energy and Exxon Mobil.101 
Sen. Cornyn is similarly funded by the oil and gas industry—
Exxon Mobil is his largest organizational contributor.102 The 
heavy industry backing of both politicians may explain their 
stances on federal regulation that would financially benefit these 
contributors with promises of increased profits.
BlockIng WIldlIFe ProTecTIon Is 
counTerProducTIve To The PuBlIc InTeresT
Proposed amendments to shortcut listing the lesser prairie 
chicken and dunes sagebrush lizard under the ESA would 
exclude the public from standard ESA involvement in the 
decision-making process.103 Rep. Pearce and Sen. Cornyn’s 
proposed policy riders to appropriations bills would therefore 
prevent the consideration of competing interests in making 
decisions regarding natural resources. This result is unaccept-
able. A functioning democracy requires accurate information 
about the real implications and benefits of wildlife protection 
and an open and honest dialogue about the best uses for natural 
resources. 
Creating a false dichotomy between economic development 
and wildlife protection is also counterproductive to the eco-
nomic future of the Permian Basin. Studies show that protection 
of natural resources actually helps to diversify local economies 
and can even lead to job growth.104  
The Pacific Northwest provides an instructive example of 
habitat protection improving long-term economic health.105 
Like the current controversy in the Permian Basin, there were 
foreboding claims in the Pacific Northwest that species pro-
tection would lead to significant job losses in the region.106 In 
response to a federal court ruling temporarily banning logging 
on twenty-four million acres of national forest land to protect 
the northern spotted owl from habitat loss, the local timber 
industry rallied communities around predictions of a widespread 
economic depression.107 Industry spokespersons stated that the 
ban would cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and create ghost 
towns throughout the region.108 However, these predictions 
failed to materialize. Instead, in the decade following the tempo-
rary logging ban, the Pacific Northwest’s economy outperformed 
the rest of the country in job and income growth.109 The regional 
economy’s base has continued shifting away from the logging 
industry and the newly-protected forests provide recreational 
opportunities and enhanced quality of life, drawing new busi-
nesses and mobile professionals.110 Accordingly, protection 
of owl habitat directly contributed to the economic growth of 
the Pacific Northwest, leading to higher quality of life, higher 
income, and more jobs.111 
Protecting the lesser prairie chicken and the dunes 
sagebrush lizard in the Permian Basin would arguably lead to 
similar benefits. For one, a healthy economy is linked to a healthy 
environment and preservation of resources.112 From quality 
of life to public health to recreation and tourism, preservation 
of resources has a positive effect on regional economies.113 
In addition, protecting at-risk wildlife in the Permian Basin 
will likely have a beneficial effect on the very industries that 
currently seek to avoid new regulation. Preserving the shinnery 
oak habitat that is necessary for the survival of both species 
keeps sand dunes intact and prevents erosion.114 The continued 
existence of the lesser prairie chicken allows that species to 
continue regulating the insect population in a way that could 
benefit agricultural interests.115 Sustainable development of 
energy resources will promote the continued vitality of the 
region in the long term. Therefore, species protection will not 
only benefit these individual species, but will benefit the public 
at large. 
conclusIon
Conflicts over the allocation of natural resources in the 
American Southwest are overblown, driven more likely by eco-
nomic greed and political power than a rational examination of 
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the public interest. The economic downturn has provided a con-
venient opportunity for industry-backed interests to capitalize 
on economic fears and campaign for de-regulation of the power-
ful fossil fuel industry. Listing and protecting the lesser prairie 
chicken and the dunes sagebrush lizard under the ESA will not 
destroy the economy of the Southwest, nor will it stop oil and 
gas drilling or lead to widespread job loss. Instead, protecting 
these animals from extinction will uphold an honest and science-
based debate of the best uses of the natural resources.
To ensure constructive dialogue about the use of natural 
resources, Congress and the current Administration must allow 
environmental laws to work. Yielding to hyperbolic rhetoric 
neither preserves natural resources nor aids the working people 
directly impacted by natural resource conservation. The goal of 
natural resource management must continue to be the recovery 
of imperiled species and their natural habitats, which remain the 
best gauge of healthy ecosystems and the economies upon which 
we ultimately depend.
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cuBaN offshore drilliNg: PreParatioN  
aNd PreveNtioN withiN the framework  
of the uNited states’ emBargo 
by Richard Sadowski*
InTroducTIon
Cuba plans to drill seven exploratory oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico by 2014.1 Some argue that the threat of Cuban offshore oil drilling will increase the embargo’s 
costs and that U.S. oil companies will miss out on oil exploration 
that will go to foreign countries.2 In response, some U.S. law-
makers and U.S. oil lobbyists have advocated for an exception 
to the Cuban embargo permitting energy cooperation.3 Notwith-
standing these concerns, the long-standing Cuban embargo is an 
economic restriction with a significant purpose and should not 
so easily be forsaken. 
This article argues that, despite the added pressure Cuba’s 
offshore oil developments have placed on U.S. policy, the embar-
go’s twin goals of bringing democracy to the Cuban people 
and ending their oppressive rule have not been met. Thus, now 
is not the time to lift or ease the embargo. The embargo itself 
serves to restrict Cuba’s drilling efforts4 and new legislation may 
further hamper Cuba’s exploration.5 Additionally, the economic 
concerns of the U.S. energy industry do not warrant a change 
in the U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, and those concerns can 
be better met by tapping U.S. resources. Furthermore, fears of 
a Cuban oil spill can be assuaged through less drastic measures 
such as an oil spill emergency response agreement with Cuba, 
similar to the one that the United States has enacted with Mexico. 
The emBargo
In 1960, President Eisenhower ended U.S. sugar purchases 
from Cuba and halted all oil deliveries to Cuba in response to 
the then new communist government under Fidel Castro.6 These 
sanctions were put into place to destabilize Castro’s new govern-
ment and promote democracy.7 The Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 authorized the president to impose a “total embargo upon 
all trade between the United Stated and Cuba.”8 On February 7, 
1962, President Kennedy signed an Executive Order9 utilizing this 
authority to initiate the Cuban embargo.10 This was followed by 
the enactment of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on July 8, 
1963,11 under the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”).12 
In 1996, during the Clinton administration, the Helms- 
Burton Act13 was passed in an effort to prevent foreign com-
panies from trading with Cuba.14 The Helms-Burton Act also 
codified much of the embargo as well as restricted the power 
of the President to unilaterally remove the embargo.15 President 
Obama recently eased restrictions through the Omnibus Appro-
priations Act of 200916 and has planned even further changes.17 
The Cuban government applauded these new measures, but 
averred that the United States did not go far enough to ease 
the economic sanctions.18 According to the Cuban Foreign 
Minister, Bruno Rodriguez, U.S. policy has, in fact, become 
more restrictive.19 Indeed, these changes stop well short of 
ending the embargo20 or even opening dialogue between the 
United States and Cuba.21 Ultimately, trade between the United 
States and Cuba remains heavily restricted.
restrictioNs relevaNt to cuBa’s oil exPloratioN
The embargo on Cuba has widespread and significant 
economic effects for both the United States and Cuba. Various 
provisions of the embargo impact Cuba’s ability to obtain U.S. 
technology and to work with U.S. companies.22 Additionally, 
TWEA prohibits U.S. oil exploration companies from dealing 
with Cuba by prohibiting the transfer of assets in which the 
Cuban government or Cuban nationals have an interest.23
On September 9, 2009, Platte River Associates (“PRA”), 
a U.S. company, was fined for violating TWEA.24 PRA sold 
oil and gas exploration software to the Spanish oil company 
Repsol25 even though PRA was told that the software was being 
utilized for drilling in Cuban waters.26 Describing the serious-
ness of the violations, United States Attorney David Gaouette 
explained that “[t]rading with the enemy is a serious crime, 
and in this case, a Colorado company has been rightfully held 
accountable for committing that crime.”27 PRA was sentenced 
to a fine of $14,500 for its violations.28 This case exemplifies 
the extent of the embargo and the related laws to restrict Cuba’s 
access to offshore-drilling technology. 
iNcreased Pressure to eNd the emBargo
A U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba’s offshore 
oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recover-
able oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas.29 Cupet, the 
state-owned Cuban energy company, insists that actual reserves 
are double that of the U.S. estimate.30 One estimate indicates 
that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day.31 
Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil 
exploration blocks to operators from Spain, Norway, and India.32 
Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure 
for the United States to end the embargo. First, U.S. energy com-
panies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves.33 
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Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill are argued to warrant U.S. 
investment and technology.34 Finally, the concern over Cuban 
offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a fail-
ure and harms human rights.
ecoNomics: u.s. comPaNies waNt iN
For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they 
will lose out on an opportunity to develop a nearby resource.35 
Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure 
for self-serving purposes.36 American politicians, ever fearful of 
high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pres-
sures.37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice 
President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce that “oil is being drilled right now sixty 
miles off the coast of Florida. But we’re not doing it, the Chinese 
are, in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the com-
munists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is 
more supply.”38
This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by 
America’s expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil com-
pany stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, 
more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock 
valuation.41 “The last thing that American energy companies 
want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while Euro-
pean, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop 
new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States.”42
the BP disaster adds to coNcerNs
Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing 
environmental concerns about Cuba’s drilling plans.43 These 
concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of Brit-
ish Petroleum’s (“BP”) historically tragic Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill.44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United 
States and Cuba to deal with oil spills.45 The embargo would pre-
vent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid any 
cleanup efforts.46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies 
designed to prevent or contain oil spills from being sold to Cuba.47 
 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington 
Ocean Foundation punctuated the United States’ concerns over 
the potential impacts of Cuba’s drilling by remarking that “the 
Gulf isn’t going to respect any boundaries when it comes to oil 
spills.”48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba’s 
own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach 
its shores.49 The Deep Horizon oil spill’s threat was enough that 
several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba’s 
own plan to extract oil off its shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba’s oil 
exploration plans seem unfazed.51 
oPPoNeNts argue the emBargo harms humaN 
rights aNd does Not work
Many critics of the embargo complain that the policy is 
inherently ineffective and actually exacts a human toll.52 They 
note that many of the societal ills of the Cuban people are 
furthered by the embargo’s economic impacts on Cuba. 53 For 
instance, the American Association for World Health’s year-
long study of Cuba concluded that the embargo itself has led 
to increased suffering and death in Cuba, a condition that has 
been aggravated by the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.54 
The study found that “the declining availability of foodstuffs, 
medicines and such basic medical supplies as replacement parts 
for 30-year-old X-ray machines is taking a tragic human toll.”55 
Further, they argue that the opposition of the Cuban people to 
the embargo is ignored.56 Opponents view the embargo as a hyp-
ocritical U.S. policy that allows enthusiastic trade with China, a 
communist nation where political oppression is at least as great 
as in Cuba.57 These criticisms put further demands on the United 
States to end the embargo in the interest of human rights.58 
dealIng WITh cuBa’s oIl Plans WIThouT 
comPromIsIng The emBargo 
the emBargo is still Necessary
Despite calls for its revocation, the embargo’s purpose is as 
important now as when it was enacted. Cuba is still an oppressive 
country.59 Cubans may not leave the country without permis-
sion and still lack fundamental freedoms of expression.60 José 
Miguel Vivanco, the director of Americas division at Human 
Rights Watch, notes that as “Cuba’s draconian laws and sham 
trials remain in place, [the country] continue[s] to restock the 
prison cells with new generations of innocent Cubans who dare 
to exercise their basic rights.”61 Moreover, a recent proposal by 
the Cuban Communist Party makes clear that there will be no 
change in the country’s oppressive one-party political system.62 
In doing so, the lengthy document declares “[o]nly socialism 
is capable of overcoming the current difficulties and preserv-
ing the victories of the revolution.”63 Cuba’s treatment of its 
own citizens is a situation the United States cannot ignore. The 
embargo’s twin goals of backing democracy and ending oppres-
sive rule have not been met. Until they are, the embargo must 
remain in place. 
calmIng envIronmenTal Fears WITh an oIl 
sPIll resPonse agreemenT WITh cuBa
Fears that Cuban offshore drilling poses serious environ-
mental threats because of the proximity to the United States and 
the prohibition on U.S. technology transfer are overblown. Cuba 
has at least as much incentive to ensure safe-drilling practices 
as does the United States, and reports indicate that Cuba is tak-
ing safety seriously.64 Lee Hunt, President of the Houston-based 
International Association of Drilling Contractors, said, “[t]he 
Cuban oil industry has put a lot of research, study and thought 
into what will be required to safely drill,” and that “they are 
very knowledgeable of international industry practices and have 
incorporated many of these principles into their safety and regu-
latory planning and requirements.”65 Thus, while the economic 
embargo of Cuba restricts American technology from being uti-
lized, foreign sources have provided supplemental alternatives.66 
Further, spill response planning can be implemented before 
drilling begins. The United States currently has oil spill response 
agreements with Mexico67 and Canada,68 but not with Cuba.69 
As the Deepwater Horizon spill highlighted, planning for disas-
ter is essential. To achieve this goal, the United States can model 
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a Cuban plan on the Joint Contingency Plan between the United 
Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding 
Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharge of Hydro-
carbons or Other Hazardous Substances (“MEXUS Plan”).70 
That plan originates from an agreement between Mexico and 
the United States signed on July 24, 1980, and developed in 
accordance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, adopted on November 
30, 1990.71 The Plan pre-designates on-scene coordinators, a 
joint response team, response coordination centers, rapid notifi-
cation protocols, and communications procedures for the event 
of an oil disaster.72 The Plan has triumphed in test simulations, 
which validates its concepts.73 
The United States must initiate the same level of plan-
ning with Cuba. Given the proximity of potential Cuban wells 
to the Florida coast, the need for a contingency plan is clear. 
Fortunately, the MEXUS Plan provides a guiding framework 
upon which the United States and Cuba can draw. Furthermore, 
a recent Congressional report indicates that Cuba is open to 
certain bilateral agreements with the United States, noting Raul 
Castro’s willingness to engage with the United States where 
mutual interests exist.74 Since an oil spill agreement is of mutual 
interest, both countries should work to draft and implement it.
the uNited states should first utilize  
u.s. oil resources
The United States’ thirst for oil should first be quenched 
with local resources before resorting to end the embargo. Allow-
ing U.S. companies access to Cuban offshore oil fields would 
effectively allow those companies to drill for oil in waters closer 
to the U.S. coast than laws currently allow.75 J. Larry Nichols, 
Chairman of Devon Energy, an independent U.S. oil and natural 
gas producer, opined that “[w]hen U.S. companies are not even 
allowed to drill in the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico, we 
have a long way to go before we can think about international 
waters off the coast of Cuba.”76 If access to oil is indeed the 
main U.S. rationale behind lifting the embargo, this need is best 
met by first allowing companies to drill more extensively in U.S. 
waters.77 
Moreover, dependence on other countries for oil is not a 
responsible option.78 Because the United States has the best oil 
safety standards in the world, it is most environmentally com-
petent to tap America’s own natural resources.79 Furthermore, 
because drilling has yet to start, there is time yet for Cuban 
political change to occur.80 Not only is there simply no pressing 
need for Cuban oil, as portrayed by U.S. oil lobbyists, but U.S. 
resources offer a more attractive alternative.81
receNt ecoNomic Policy chaNges iN cuBa sigNal 
the eNd of oPPressive cuBaN rule
Economic pressure has been weighing heavy on the Castro 
regime, foreshadowing an end to its oppressive rule over Cuba.82 
When asked if Cuba’s economic system was still worth export-
ing, Fidel Castro admitted, “[t]he Cuban model doesn’t even 
work for us any more.”83 Stephen Wilkinson, a Cuba expert at 
the London Metropolitan University, notes that Castro’s words 
are not a condemnation of socialism but rather “an acknowledge-
ment that the way in which the Cuban system is organised has to 
change . . . [w]e can now expect a lot more changes and perhaps 
more rapid changes as a consequence.”84 Fidel’s departure as 
the leader of Cuba and Raul’s subsequent economic reforms are 
indicative of imminent political changes, and signal the end of 
communism in Cuba.85 These developments may result in an 
improvement in Cuban human rights and social conditions. For 
example, Raul has already eased the impact of the world food 
crisis, released prisoners, and commuted death sentences.86
coNgressmaN BuchaNaN’s Bill to stoP cuBaN 
offshore drilliNg is the ProPer actioN for the 
uNited states
On January 21, 2011, Florida Congressman Vern Buchanan 
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives aimed at 
thwarting Cuba’s drilling efforts.87 The bill would permit the 
U.S. Secretary of the Interior to deny drilling leases to foreign 
companies that deal with countries under U.S. trade sanctions, 
including Cuba.88 Following the successful application of U.S. 
pressure on Repsol to pull out of drilling in Iran, Buchanan’s bill 
is designed to again put pressure on Repsol to pull out of Cuban 
drilling plans.89 Buchanan’s bill could threaten Repsol’s projects 
elsewhere in U.S. territory where the company operates rigs near 
Texas and Louisiana.90 
While the success of the bill is not yet certain,91 foreign 
firms should seriously weigh the rewards of Cuban oil against the 
possible risk of being ostracized by America economically.92 Mr. 
Buchanan’s bill is the proper approach for U.S. legislation and 
policy to make a stand against Cuba’s offshore oil exploration.93
conclusIon
Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and 
flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be 
increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime 
characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros 
utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s 
failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to 
accomplishing its goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil 
producers, want the embargo dropped.
Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place 
until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively 
countered through bilateral response and preparation agree-
ments with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more 
properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately, 
with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United 
States should exercise its political and economic power to pres-
sure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The 
United States can dissuade foreign investment without compro-
mising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist 
rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to 
both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in 
meeting the goals of the economic embargo. 
Endnotes: Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention 
within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo on page 63
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the arctic couNcil: gatekeePer or doormat 
to the world’s Next maJor resource Battle? 
by Oded Cedar* 
It has long been said that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1 If history indeed repeats itself, then all indicators suggest that the global community 
is ripe for another major “land grab.”2 This time, the land at issue 
is the Arctic3 and the bounty is the abundant oil and natural gas 
reserves trapped beneath its surface.4 
Over the last decade, a coalescence of different factors has 
shifted the search for natural resources such as oil and gas to the 
Arctic.5 Advances in exploration, drilling, and extraction tech-
nologies have helped mitigate the traditionally cost-prohibitive 
factors of developing ice-locked reserves.6 Geopolitical concerns 
about the waning global supply of oil and gas have also driven 
countries to explore for these resources in the Arctic.7 However, 
the primary force behind this focus is the undeniable fact that the 
Earth’s changing climate is melting away the Arctic’s ice sheet 
and permafrost, making the region’s oil and gas reserves acces-
sible for the first time.8 
The Arctic Council (“AC” or “Council”) is a leading forum 
for the dialogue on the development of natural resources in the 
region.9 This intergovernmental body is comprised of eight 
member-nations, all of which border the Arctic Circle.10 The 
Council also includes six “permanent-observer” nations11 who, 
though they have no voting rights, can participate and contrib-
ute to the work of the Council.12 The AC’s stated mission is to: 
“promot[e] cooperation, coordination, and interaction among 
the Arctic States . . . on common Arctic issues, in particular [on] 
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection 
in the Arctic.”13 
The AC’s mission stems from the Ottawa Declaration, which 
established the AC in 1996.14 This document avows the commit-
ment of AC member-nations to seek “sustainable development 
in the Arctic region including conservation and sustainable use 
of natural resources.”15 This language from the Ottawa Declara-
tion incorporates the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(“AEPS”) that was instrumental the Council’s creation.16 Thus, 
the impetus behind the AEPS and the AC makes it reasonable to 
expect as well as demand some action from the Arctic Council 
to oversee and regulate the development of fossil fuels in the 
Arctic.17 
Despite its benevolent mission and establishing documents, 
the AC has in actuality provided a forum for member-nations 
to lay the groundwork for unsustainable fossil fuel development 
in the Arctic.18 Most recently, the Danish ambassador to China 
noted his strong support for China’s inclusion into the AC as a 
permanent-observer nation.19 This move garnered speculation 
from scholars and analysts, who noted China’s aid to Denmark 
in the development of Greenland’s natural resources, and China’s 
interest in Arctic resources since 2004.20 Canada is an especially 
vocal claimant, touting the country’s long-standing sovereignty 
over certain areas in the Arctic, and further expressing the coun-
try’s intent to exercise its sovereignty in documents published 
with the AC.21 Other actions by the AC member-nations outside 
of the forum, like Russia’s placement of a national flag on the 
Arctic’s ocean floor, presumably stir echoes through the AC.22 
At one point or another, every member nation of the AC has 
published reports with the council, expressing their plans to 
exercise sovereignty over the region and to develop its fossil fuel 
resources.23 
These national assertions make fossil fuel extraction in the 
Arctic seemingly expected and inevitable.24 However, the AC 
member-nations’ plans for fossil fuel extraction contradict their 
commitment to protecting the Arctic environment expressed in 
the Ottawa Declaration.25 In addition to worsening the effects 
of climate change, unchecked oil and gas development can have 
direct, catastrophic environmental consequences. For example, 
the lack of oversight that allowed the BP oil spill to occur illus-
trates what could happen in the Arctic without proper regula-
tion by the AC.26 Furthermore, the AC has emerged as the key 
platform for the indigenous tribes of the Arctic to voice their 
concerns.27 Without a proper oversight mechanism, these indig-
enous tribes will lose a key forum for ensuring their negotiating 
parity with the member-nations.28 Therefore, it is imperative for 
the AC to develop environmentally conscious standards for fos-
sil fuel extraction to protect the Arctic environment under the 
Ottawa Declaration. If the AC fails to do so, then it risks becom-
ing an obsolete and ineffectual organization. 
The AC should also create mechanisms that will enforce 
the member-nations’ Ottawa commitments and environmental 
regulations for oil and gas development in the Arctic. However, 
since the AC is a “cooperative” group it currently has no bind-
ing enforcement authority.29 Therefore, the first step must be 
the establishment of the AC’s binding powers, .30 Without the 
essential ability to enforce its resolutions, the AC has no mecha-
nism through which it can ensure that its member-nations do 
not act in contradiction with the AC’s core missions. However, 
given their support for fossil fuel development in the Arctic, 
it is unlikely that the AC member-nations will voluntary cre-
ate a new regulatory authority in the region. Thus action must 
come from the international community, who —through the 
“permanent-observer” nations—must apply pressure on the AC 
*Oded Cedar is a J.D. candidate, May 2012, at American University Washington 
College of Law, specializing in Energy Law and Financial Regulation. 
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threats to a sustaiNaBle future:
water accumulatioN aNd coNflict iN latiN america*
By Rutgerd Boelens, Mourik Bueno de Mesquita, Antonio Gaybor and Francisco Peña**
InTroducTIon
In Latin America, debates over natural resource manage-ment policies and legislation fill discussion forums. This is a needed discussion as coherent policies that both promote 
democratic, equitable water use systems and also safeguard the 
sustainability of water resources are rare in the region.1 The 
absence of effective water regulation that considers the common 
interest and long-term water availability results in poor manage-
ment and use of natural resources, driving explosive conflicts.2 
As in many regions of the world, there is growing demand and 
competition for access to water in Latin America. Agricultural, 
industrial, mining and energy companies, as well as large cities 
and housing developments, have altered socio-natural geography 
and are changing the rural panorama profoundly.3 These recent 
demands are competing with existing water rights and ignoring 
local water management rules in rural communities and indig-
enous people’s territories.4 Moreover, climate change and eco-
system degradation are further reducing water availability in the 
region.5
Generally, new water reform processes have done little to 
curb this situation and some have even worsened it. In many 
cases in Latin America, elites and corporations have taken 
advantage of government interventions.6 New international 
privatization policies trample over the water rights of indigenous 
and other rural peoples, monopolizing water access and control.7 
This article reviews the general context and issues of water 
governance in Latin America and analyzes the accumulation of 
management power by a few elites through modern extractivist 
policies and neoliberal governance. Using case studies in Ecuador, 
Mexico and Peru, this article also illustrates how the prevailing 
water economic and policy models lead to a deepening of 
societal water conflicts, triggering reactions “from below.” 
The conTexT oF WaTer governance
Studies in Latin America have shown a serious disconnect 
between water laws and actual governance. This is particularly 
evidenced by fragmented enforcement of these regulations with 
separate agencies administering different water uses.8 These 
agencies take actions that are often contrary to public interests 
and collective rights.9 State projects and water management 
agencies also favor political agendas, often creating economic 
opportunities for elites and government players.10 
As a reaction to the Latin American government’s disjointed 
and inefficient efforts to manage water resources, there is 
consensus among most of the region’s stakeholders–both 
groups with investment power and indigenous organizations, 
promoting a move toward decentralized water management.11 
Water management agencies have thus initiated decentralization 
and privatization schemes that have transferred some authority 
to local or municipal authorities, user groups, private companies, 
and public-private institutions.12 However, redefining water 
policy is difficult given the varied ideologies and interests held 
by the relevant stakeholders. 13 Among the issues discussed 
is whether water can, or should, be treated as a privatized com-
modity rather than as a fundamental, non-transferable human 
need.14 Discussion also centers around what roles the State and 
private sectors should play in decentralizing water governance, 
as well as whether market forces could effectively allocate water 
to meet various needs.15 Even if these difficult ideological ques-
tions are answered, current Latin American governance structures 
provide a challenging platform for the effective implementation 
of new water management ideas. In some cases, weak agencies 
run by bureaucrats or local elites leave little room for multi-actor 
participation.16 Therefore, even if the government takes action 
to decentralize or privatize water services and establish water 
markets they are face inadequate regulation and enforcement.17 
Furthermore, central government agencies also reject and 
supplant local and indigenous water management initiatives.18 
In general, cultural practices of water management are not taken 
into consideration in national lawmaking; society is portrayed as 
homogenous, with no room for differing water rights or forms 
of water governance.19 Water policies and laws often assume 
that simply adopting official legal norms will work to shape 
and standardize the multi-faceted reality of water management, 
creating a “modern”, “efficient” and “rational” management 
system.20 Therefore, these methods of local water management 
are discriminated against, and water rights are instead turned over 
to “modern production and producers” – legally and illegally.21 
*This paper presents results from investigations done by researchers associ-
ated with the International Justicia Hídrica / Water Justice Alliance (www.
justiciahidrica.org), in collaboration with the NWO-WOTRO (Nether-
lands Organization for Scientific Research) inter-Andean projects ‘Strug-
gling for Water Security in the Andes’ and ‘The Transnationalization of Local 
Water Battles’, all coordinated by Wageningen University, The Netherlands. 
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These centralized practices have disrupted a localized, plural-
istic water management system that has existed for centuries, 
especially in irrigation-based communities that have developed 
management practices by incorporating both ancient water tradi-
tions and modern norms.22 
Water accumulation and control by the few is a long-standing 
problem in Latin America. Recent national and international 
policies, combined with the economic power of multinational 
corporations, make this problem more pressing than ever 
before. Water thievery by these privileged stakeholders in times 
of increasing scarcity, is leading to numerous conflicts, most 
of them local.23 Unfortunately, these conflicts are usually not 
mentioned in the national or international media.24 The few local 
conflicts and protests that do reach the national media, which is 
dominated by the ruling political and economic power sectors, 
are immediately demonized.25 
Latin American is not the only place where public water 
policies are problematic. International interest in coordinating 
better water management and enacting laws to enable local deci-
sion-making is growing.26 This vision calls for a greater decen-
tralization of power from national authorities to local watershed 
organizations, where local citizens would have a voice in decid-
ing how to allocate water resources.27 The following sections 
present some Latin American examples from Ecuador, Peru and 
Mexico that highlight the issues of water governance.
ecuador: concenTraTIng WaTer In agrI-BusIness 
Ecuador has witnessed two simultaneous growing trends 
over the last three decades: the increase in water use for agricul-
ture and the development of irrigation for particularly profitable 
crops.28 In the field, this is producing a certain type of com-
modities.29 In the past, exports were mainly dry land crops, but 
current exports now require higher irrigation water content.30
Irrigated cultivation of certain commodities has become a 
necessary condition for competitiveness in the international and 
national markets where costs are low and the selling prices are 
high.31 Some crops, such as bananas and flowers, would never 
reach the international market without irrigation.32 The main 
exporters of these water-intensive crops are the countries of 
the South; in Ecuador, for example, all corporate agriculture 
(“agribusiness”) for export is irrigated.33 This practice has 
spread throughout Latin America, including growth in Mexico, 
Colombia, and Peru. The domestic large-scale agriculture 
market is also highly extractive of water resources, as evidenced by 
water-demanding sugar cane production.34 In contrast, agriculture 
for domestic consumption from small and medium farms, including 
coffee and cacao for export, is not irrigated for most crops.35
This asymmetry helps explain the highly differentiated 
dynamics of production and reproduction in these distinct 
types of agriculture. In Ecuador, agribusiness profits for some 
crops are high while profits for other crops are extremely low or 
non-existent, especially for most small farmers.36 Thus, to 
narrow the specificity of the agricultural crisis, only small farm-
ing has a crisis while large-scale agribusiness is booming.37 
Agribusiness hoards the best land, almost all the water, and all 
the profit.38 Ecuador is heavily concentrating water with the 
industrial few - this is the age of water dispossession.39 
Neoliberal policy has given national and multi-national 
power groups a normative framework to ensure their monopo-
lization of Ecuador’s water and land.40 Water is plundered two 
ways: formally, through concessions or authorizations granted 
by the Ecuadorian government, or illegally.41 This historical, 
long-standing process has continued to grow over these last 
decades.42 The concentration of water in the hands of a few 
mirrors the similarly inequitable distribution of land in Ecuador. 
According to official figures, rural and indigenous populations 
with community-based irrigation systems account for eighty-
six percent of users, but have only twenty-two percent of the 
irrigated land area.43 What is worse is that these populations 
have access to only thirteen percent of total water flow whereas 
the private sector, representing one percent of agricultural 
production units, has amassed sixty-seven percent of the water.44 
When it come to land distribution, three quarters of farms in the 
country account for only twelve percent of arable area, while the 
two percent of farms owning larger than one hundred hectares 
account for forty-three percent of the national total.45 Water, like 
land, is becoming increasingly scarce, and most irrigation-ready 
water has already been allocated formally or seized illegally to 
national or international corporations.46
Examining some examples reveals the magnitude of this 
water theft. Water monopolies are evident in three parishes 
in the Ecuadorian province of Imbabura where large farms are 
allocated ninety-one percent of the flow and only nine percent 
is left for small and medium farms.47 In the lower Guayas river 
basin, case studies of six rivers show that seventy-six percent 
of water flow is used by sixty-one companies, while nearly one 
thousand small and medium farms are left with the remainder.48 
In the Guayas province, some sixty-two companies formally 
receive water for irrigation at an average rate of six hundred 
liters per second, an amount that could irrigate one thousand 
small farms on the Ecuadorian coast.49 It is common in these 
areas for large companies to block an entire river without 
government authorization to use all or part of its flow.50
Of further concern, some large companies control the entire 
production process, including the transformation of products, 
the marketing of inputs, and capital goods.51 In Ecuador, an esti-
mated 400,000 hectares of farmland (out of eight million total) 
are dedicated primarily to agribusiness and the industrial pro-
duction of sugar cane.52 This area constitutes only five percent 
of the country’s farmlands but demand at least 400,000 liters per 
second of water.53 To put this in perspective, this flow rate is 
eighty percent of the total volume granted by the entire country 
in 2008 (499,000 liters per second).54 
Increasingly, this concentration of water rights and use 
in the hands of a few creates conflict with and mobilization by 
the larger population. These conflicts have historically been 
localized as the farmers and rural residents who are affected 
cannot afford to oppose the more powerful organizations.55 How-
ever, increasingly, conflicts have begun to branch out from the 
local level to become regional, and even national, mobilizations.56 
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mexIco: concenTraTIng WaTer rIghTs In a 
counTry WITh hIgh socIal PolarIzaTIon 
In modern Mexico, it is not only water rights that are being 
concentrated but wealth as well. Scholars estimate that fifty to 
seventy-five percent of Mexico’s population can be classified as 
poor.57 Half of them are in “food poverty,” a federal classifica-
tion whereby their income is not enough to provide the calories 
required to survive.58 In the year 2008, the wealthiest ten percent 
received thirty-six and a half percent of the nation’s income, 
while the poorest ten percent received a mere four and a half 
percent.59 Fifty families repeat and interweave their names 
on lists of the country’s most industrial, financial and service 
groups, thirty-nine of which are among the country’s richest 
families.60 The deciding threads of Mexican economic life are 
held by a small, powerful ruling class.61 
Post-revolution Mexico, which for decades claimed to grant 
social rights and promote “balance among production factors,” 
has instead driven the concentration of wealth to favor the most 
powerful economic groups over the past thirty years.62 For 
example, the political class transferred government property to 
private ownership in exchange for juicy bribes to top officials.63
Similarly, there has been a wave of water rights concentra-
tion by large landowners (mainly in northwestern and northern 
Mexico), and by industry, especially those using large volumes 
of water. Examples can be seen in the food industry, chemical 
plants, cement plants and mining industry (particularly open-pit 
mines using huge quantities of water to separate metal ores by 
leaching).64 Real estate developers also purchase low-priced 
agricultural water rights to transfer for urban use.65 These devel-
opers increasingly expropriate the water of rural communities 
and small localities to supply resort developments (Acapulco 
and Cancún for example) and expropriate community springs to 
promote “green” tourism.66
In such a socially polarized country, this water concentra-
tion is not as visible as it should be. The media tends to conceal 
the realities about the concentration of water rights and uses, 
claiming that water is scarce due to global warming, and waste 
by municipalities.67
Finding legal documentation of this water concentration 
is no easy task. The Mexican Public Register of Water Rights 
(REPDA) is an unreliable instrument with rampant under-
registration of actual use, disclosing little about concessions 
realities.68 Not recording the water used, or under-recording, 
is common practice in Mexico and is often tolerated or even 
promoted by the agencies responsible for enforcing the law.69 
Although federal administrators often complain that small and 
medium farms are the ones to blame, there is evidence that 
industry, urban water supply companies, and even the govern-
ment are guilty of under-reporting actual usage.70 For this reason, 
inequality in accumulation of water rights is revealed through 
direct evidence, such as the size of water facilities, production 
volumes, amounts of wastewater discharged, and the like.71
This under-recording reveals at least two different things. 
First is the existence of a legal pluralism in which indigenous 
and rural communities do not feel it necessary to register their 
water use, simply because this use is perceived to be based on 
their local and historical water sources and rights.72 The second 
revelation is that large landowners who under-record avoid 
paying for their water rights, demonstrating the power of the 
Mexican elite in conjunction with governmental complicity.73 
Corruption also enables major under-recording of industrial 
water use and pollution by large industries.74
Water rights are no exception to the overall concentration of 
wealth throughout Mexican society. The government’s asserted 
efforts to incorporate society into the water management respon-
sibility are far from the truth. Watershed councils, theoretically 
designed to assist this management and build consensus, don’t 
work because they have become yet another arena for deal-
making by controlling elites.75 The councils systematically 
exclude rural groups, small businesses, environmental organiza-
tions and social platforms.76 For example the construction of the 
La Parota dam (designed to supply tourism businesses in Aca-
pulco) was completed without notice from the watershed agen-
cies supposedly responsible for sustainable water management.77 
Conflicts over water continue to increase in number, intensity, 
and regional coverage.
Peru: naTural resource governance and  
socIo-envIronmenTal conFlIcTs 
The recent history of water governance in Peru demon-
strates the contradiction between nationalization efforts by 
reform governments in the 1970s and a push for privatization in 
recent decades.78 Common themes in this recent history include 
the denial of rural communities and small farmers’ management 
of their own water sources, the concentration of water access 
with the few, and the centralizing of water control in government 
agencies and economically dominant sectors.79 When Alan Gar-
cía took office as President in 2006, he aggressively promoted a 
neoliberal policy that included the total opening of investment in 
agro-export, mining, hydrocarbon extraction, and forest conces-
sions.80 He also declared social protests to be “anti-system.”81 
In July and August 2008, the Peruvian government prepared 
a portfolio of ninety-nine legislative decrees to fill the gaps in 
Peru’s policies on natural resources, environment, water, land 
access, and the management and organization of rural and native 
communities.82 These decrees ushered in a Trade Cooperation 
Agreement, generally known as the Free Trade Agreement, with 
the United States and intensified neoliberal economic policy.83
The Amazon indigenous peoples’ movement led protests 
against these legislative decrees which threatened their territo-
ries and livelihoods.84 They argued that the national government 
was not recognizing their rights to territory, natural resources, 
and their cultural systems.85 These groups pointed out that Peru’s 
Constitution obligated the government to consult them before 
any legislation involving them.86 The government’s response 
has been both counterproductive and repressive.87 The conflict 
led to the violent repression in Bagua, in the Amazon region.88 
And while the government made some concessions, its leth-
argy and lack of political will gave indigenous peoples little to 
no hope.89 The same goes for the protests by Andean peoples 
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and communities about mining companies.90 The relationship 
between government and civil society is quite fragile and there 
is no productive dialogue.91 Admittedly, this dynamic has earned 
some indigenous movements political presence and influence in 
Peru92—for example, the government is promoting the legaliza-
tion of land titles and family ownership of land in rural commu-
nities of the Highlands93—but the successes are limited.94 The 
formalization of water rights among as groups and individuals 
ultimately grants mining companies access to water and land 
owned by communities.95 Rural households are threatened 
with the disappearance of community farming and communal 
resource organization.96 These conditions are encouraging youth 
to migrate to seek alternatives in cities or mining.97
A new water law, drafted by a team of professionals in urban 
Lima, enacted with little debate in Peru’s congress,98 speaks 
broadly of integrated water resource management by water-
sheds.99 This new law, however, actually reinforces top-down 
management, creating local offices that are strongly dependent 
on their central offices.100 This practice promotes watershed 
councils that do not effectively involve constituents.101 More-
over, though the law makes vague claims to regulate the “usage 
and customary” rights of rural and indigenous communities, in 
practice it leaves significant gaps regarding the scope of privatiz-
ing water management and access.102
The weak management of water resources by Peru’s pub-
lic sector has resulted in widespread water pollution as well as 
increased concentration of water access by extractive industries 
and some major cities.103 These trends are further generating 
socio-environmental conflicts. For example, the Ombudsman 
Office, which monitors conflicts in Peru, reported 32socio-envi-
ronmental conflicts in April 2007 and 132 in October 2009 (79 
percent involving mining and hydrocarbon companies).104 The 
conflicts between corporations and local communities center 
around inter-basin water transfer, water access, and ownership. 
Some of the corporations involved include hydropower compa-
nies, rural communities, and mining companies.105
Conflicts have also increased between communities in 
micro-watersheds regarding water division, scarcity and degra-
dation. The effects of climate change over the last thirty years 
have only worsened these problems.106 In the Peruvian Andes, 
for example, communities are estimated to have lost fifty percent 
of their water from sources such as springs and high-altitude 
wetlands (bofedales), creating vulnerable rural communities and 
decreased food security.107 Although Andean communities are 
accustomed to climate variations, they are also facing increas-
ing limitations on social governance of rural communities under 
such adverse circumstances.108 Lack of vision and limited socio-
technical capacity for public governance provide no support for 
Andean adaptation efforts, which is worsened in conflicts with 
economically powerful stakeholders.109
The newest Peruvian government regime has a different 
discourse regarding rural communities and indigenous peoples, 
speaking of “inclusion.”110 However, as seen in neighboring 
Bolivia and Ecuador,111 which also have governments who 
are supposedly “anti-neoliberal” policy discourse is often only 
rhetoric as mega-cities and agribusiness or extractive industries 
pressure for water access and control for– water flows in the 
direction of power.112
cIvIl socIeTy resPonses
A variety of responses from populations affected by dis-
possession of water or land and environmental pollution have 
emerged. In general, such mobilizations are both dispersed 
and localized throughout the continent.113 They vary from road 
blockades to litigation, and eventually to partial agreements.114 
Frequently, mobilizations rely on specialized advice from civil 
society organizations working with local leaders.115 In some 
cases, mobilizations can lead to the temporary inclusion of the 
conflict into public and political dialogues.116 However, any 
dialogue is typically prolonged over long periods of time while 
the controlling elite maintains the status quo by dividing the 
mobilizations and prosecuting their leaders.117 However, a select 
few civil society responses have been more successful. In Ecua-
dor, for instance, various social groups—mestizos, montubios, 
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians—mobilized to advocate for 
the inclusion of water rights principles in the Ecuador Constitu-
tion in 2008.118 These groups, working with the Water Resources 
Forum (Foro de los Recursos Hídridicos) and the National 
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), 
held three major events focusing on the issues of water rights, 
allocation, and concentration.119 Approximately 1000 civil soci-
ety delegates from around the country participated, discussing 
water rights at length.120 The conclusions of the delegates were 
then delivered to the Assembly, whose representatives publicly 
committed to incorporating the proposals for the equitable redis-
tribution of water in the political and constitutional plane.121 
The Constitution, approved in October 2008, incorporates the 
proposed redistribution of water in the following terms:
 The Executive Branch, within two years after the 
entry into force of the present Constitution, shall review 
the situation of access to irrigation water for the purpose 
of granting concessions, avoiding abuse and inequity in 
the fees charged for water use, and guaranteeing more 
equitable distribution and access, especially for small 
and medium-sized farm and cattle producers.122
It should be clarified, however, that the Ecuadorian govern-
ment has not followed through with this proposal.123 More pres-
sure is needed from social organizations, particularly along coastal 
regions where the concentration process is the most severe. 
Currently, a new water resources bill is pending in the 
Ecuadorian legislature.124 Also addressed was the human right 
to water.125 Without a doubt, one of the most transcendental 
subjects in the debate was the decentralization of water.126 The 
national indigenous movement also presented on two main 
themes. The first revealed the large amount of irrigation that is 
concentrated among the wealthy as a result of the concessions or 
water theft.127 The second was the implementation of a collec-
tive right under the 2008 law that makes water a public asset.128
In Mexico, less powerful social groups, such as rural and 
indigenous, low-income urban residents, and small businesses, 
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are also taking various lines of action. These groups are promot-
ing local management and action, such as advocating that private 
corporations obtain renewable permits from local communities 
to develop and use water resources, and pay communities to 
preserve water resources from production.129 The movements 
focus on local control of springs, rivers and wells in addition 
to some agricultural water.130 These community actions have 
involved regulations on access to water, shared responsibilities 
to maintain common availability, defensive actions to protect 
community assets, and agreements with neighbors.131 A second 
promising trend is the preference for smaller water systems and 
less-centralized administration. In the last two decades, social 
opposition to large water systems, such as inter-basin transfers 
and dams, has come back to life.132 Conversely, governmental 
programs are now accepting smaller works, even involving 
direct labor input by local inhabitants.133 
A third trend is an increase in mobilization and direct politi-
cal action, particularly in the heaviest conflicts. These actions 
generally overlap with local action, involving coalitions of com-
munity authorities, groups of neighbors, and national or interna-
tional non-governmental organizations.134 
In Peru, like in Mexico, the mobilizations are usually less 
coordinated and less integrated between local and national 
movements.135 However, increasing social mobilizations has 
generated political influences that commonly express themselves 
in electoral processes and strengthen movements at the regional 
and national levels.136 These movements generate high expecta-
tions by the affected populations, but their impacts on big inter-
ests and dominant powers are rarely substantial.137 Instead, the 
influence of international opinion is frequently more influential 
in the Peruvian government.138
When mobilizations begin to have a political presence, the 
government actively works to divide the movements and weaken 
momentum.139 Recent political changes that promise social and 
cultural inclusion or new discourse rarely come to fruition.140 
For actual change to take place there needs to be a restructuring 
of the Peruvian government and a redefining of its relationship 
with the population.141 In Peru, the government resistance is ever-
stronger, easily overcoming the cries for water equity by social 
mobilizations.142
conclusIon
In the last three decades, Latin America has experienced 
aggressive governmental implementation of neoliberal policies 
that are favorable to extractive exploitation and agro-export com-
panies.143 This has generated the accumulation and concentration 
of natural resources in the hands of the few at the expense of water 
security, food security, and less-privileged parts of society.144 The 
affected parties are enveloped in frequent conflicts. State interven-
tions often end unfavorably for rural and indigenous people in 
light of the massive power asymmetry and cultural marginaliza-
tion.145 Under these circumstances, these parties feel increasingly 
excluded and marginalized, making protest intense.146
This article has analyzed how in Ecuador, Mexico and Peru 
this process of water concentration limits and seriously affects 
potential for local development, prospects for survival among 
small communities and reproduction of the social fabric.147 
In “modern” Latin American societies, natural resources—
-particularly water—are valued predominantly in economic mar-
ket terms, to the detriment of social, cultural and environmental 
values.148 At the same time, these last two decades of interna-
tional policies claiming to democratize water management and 
decentralize decision-making, have instead aggressively taken 
over governments in the Latin American region, obscuring any 
interference by the majority of localized water users.149 Political 
and legal reform for water management is grounded in standard-
izing management norms.150 To facilitate bureaucratic control 
by “hydrocrats,” or to create an efficient market for water rights 
along neoliberal lines, it is considered necessary to leave behind 
the practices of the rural or indigenous population labeled 
as “backward.”151 Diversity in rules and rights is actively dis-
couraged because it would obstruct regional and international 
transfers and sales, which require a uniform legal framework.152 
Local rules and rights are considered anomalies that would curb 
investments and profits.153 Therefore, decentralized water poli-
cies are not replacing bureaucratic policies, but instead regiment 
and oppress local pluralism.154 Government bureaucracies are 
“reformed” to draft and enact legislation that enables water mar-
kets to emerge.155 Community and collective rights systems that 
do not fit in the neoliberal system are, by definition, denied as 
“backward” and “inefficient.”156
For these reasons, there is a lack of trust between the gov-
ernment and civil society with obvious exceptions when shared 
public governance is recognized by the public.157 This unwill-
ingness to engage in intercultural dialogue about management of 
natural resources, water, land, and territory is problematic.
The effects and impacts of concentrated water rights by 
dominant economic producers will likely worsen with increasing 
climate change phenomena.158 The vulnerability and poverty of 
rural peoples deepens as water is less available and competition 
increases. If this neoliberal policy and economic development 
model grounded in extractive industries and large agro-export 
companies remains, this situation of accumulation, concentra-
tion, and waste cannot change and conflicts over access to and 
uses of water, land and territories will only increase.
Nevertheless, “bottom-up” responses are useful. In some 
cases, large public protest and the proposals for alternative law and 
policy can be influential, potentially even influencing the national 
constitution, as in Ecuador. In other cases, as in Peru and Mexico, 
mobilization and alternative policy-making tend to be of lower 
profile and the few successes can be noticed especially in localized 
events. Along with protests and mobilizations by civil society and 
rural and indigenous communities against private and concentrated 
water rights, there is also a more subtle struggle for these constitu-
ents to establish and enforce their own rights and rules. 
Endnotes: Threats to a Sustainable Future: Water Accumulation 
and Conflict in Latin America on page 67
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collaBoratioN aNd the ecology  
of democracy*
by Daniel Kemmis and Matthew McKinney**
InTroducTIon 
This article explores various citizen-driven, multiparty natural resource and public land management col-laborations, viewed as one emerging species within the 
“ecology” of democracy. Examples from the Quincy Library 
Group Partnership, Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest, 
Blackfoot Valley, and Valles Caldera Trust will trace the trajec-
tory of collaborative democracy from its organic inception to its 
present form. To anticipate the core of the argument: we believe 
that the kind of problemsolving collaboration we will be exam-
ining is democratic in the most fundamental sense of that word 
because it is nothing more nor less than the effort of people to 
shape the conditions under which they live, rather than leaving 
that shaping to someone else.
 We begin by explaining what we mean by an “emergent 
form of democracy.” This concept of emergence derives primar-
ily from complexity theory. Complexity theorists stress that it is 
inherently impossible to provide in advance a rule or algorithm 
that will produce the structure or pattern that in fact emerges.1 
This phenomenon is illustrated both in the social and physical 
realm: similar to emerging markets and cities, politics seem to 
merge naturally out of the human condition. As the bureaucratic 
state matured throughout the 20th century, it produced its own 
characteristic set of mechanisms for “participatory democracy,” 
including public notice and hearings, comment periods, and 
administrative appeals.
In terms of the evolving ecology of democracy, a new 
democratic life form is emerging in the open spaces left by 
the older, established democratic forms of representative, 
procedural, and direct democracy.2 This movement toward 
a collaborative democracy is a direct response to some of the 
shortcomings of the late 20th-century framework of procedural 
democracy.3 Whatever else public hearings might accomplish, 
they rarely result in democratic solutions.4 Surprisingly, it is the 
stakeholders, who have battled each other in public hearings for 
decades, who are beginning to engage in serious, face-to-face 
problem solving.5 Therefore a desire for authentically-engaged 
and constructive citizen involvement arose, producing new, less 
structured forms of deliberative and collaborative democracy. 
Multiparty collaborative natural resource and land manage-
ment includes elements of alternative dispute resolution and 
deliberation, but also exhibits unique features that justify its 
treatment as a separate species of democracy. Specifically, the 
emergence of collaboration is also a reaction to the previously 
neglected importance of “place” when governing public lands. 
Because so much of the collaborative experience to this point is 
place-driven, it seems worthwhile to explore what there is about 
place-focused problems in land management that has produced 
so much of this emergent democratic form. 
The emergence oF collaBoraTIve land  
and naTural resources managemenT In The 
amerIcan WesT 
To that end, we turn our attention to the remarkable spread 
of collaborative practices in our own place—the American 
West—and to a range of collaborative activities arising within 
this familiar setting. The West is characterized by contentious, 
fairly localized natural resource issues on or near public lands 
in the western states.6 Our hope is that, by examining how col-
laboration has emerged and matured in this rather narrow niche of 
public land management, we can develop useful methodologies for 
studying what catalyzes, constrains, and sustains its existence (or 
for studying what might cause its failure to thrive) in other settings. 
There are two especially salient components of this land 
management niche. One is literally ecological: these collabora-
tions, without exception, revolve around the uses to be made of 
very specific landscapes, as well as the soil, water, flora, and 
fauna of those landscapes.7 Part or all of each of these landscapes 
consist of public land, usually administered either by the U.S. 
Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management.8 In most 
cases, the parties to the collaboration include natural resource 
extractors and users of the public land in question on the one 
hand (timber or grazing interests, for example) and conserva-
tionists seeking to protect the land or the species inhabiting it 
on the other.9 A fundamental feature of the dynamics behind 
collaboration in these cases is the simple fact that different 
people or interests have conflicting objectives for what should 
happen to one particular piece of land and its natural resources. 
The second key component of this setting is the existing 
decision-making system that constitutes the governing frame-
work for the public lands. This decision structure is remark-
ably complex, comprising a broad range of statutes such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),10 the 
*This article has been adapted from Collaboration and the Ecology of Democ-
racy (Kettering Foundation, 2011), a book-length monograph by Kemmis and 
McKinney. The editors of this journal have revised and adapted the longer mono-
graph for purposes of this journal.
** Daniel Kemmis is the author of Community and the Politics of Place and This 
Sovereign Land: A New Vision for Governing the West.
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Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),11 the National Forest 
Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”),12 the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),13 and the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (“FACA”).14 These statutes 
are further fleshed out by a corresponding and even more volu-
minous set of agency regulations, multiple layers of appeals 
(including frequent recourse to federal courts), and the case law 
emerging from that litigation.15 This is the “procedural republic” 
in all its glory.16 
The increasing problems with this governing framework 
have been extensively noted and analyzed. For example, former 
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus describes the public land 
and natural resources governance system as “the tangled web of 
overlapping and often contradictory laws and regulations under 
which our federal public lands are managed.”17 Congressman 
Scott McInnis, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Forests and 
Forest Health, defines the system as “a decision-making appa-
ratus that is on the verge of collapsing under its own weight.”18 
Similarly, former Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas calls 
this governing framework “a sort of blob,”19 and in June 2002, 
Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth presented to Congress a 
report entitled, “The Process Predicament,” which describes the 
effects of regulatory and administrative gridlock on national for-
est management.20 The report focused heavily on the Agency’s 
increasing inability to fulfill its primary duties.21 The undeniable 
fact remains that the current resolution processes for addressing 
natural resource conflicts on public lands simply do not work.
Collaborative democracy is emerging so profusely in this 
setting because many of the people with the greatest stakes in 
the landscapes in question find that the existing decision system 
cannot reconcile competing stakes in these resources as effec-
tively as can the stakeholders themselves acting on their own ini-
tiative.22 This response is especially rife in the vast reaches of the 
West where public lands and natural resources are so prevalent.23 
Here, in what is often referred to as the “public lands West,” we 
have seen a steadily growing number of local agreements among 
environmentalists, ranchers, loggers, miners, and recreation-
ists about how the public land and natural resources should be 
managed in their particular river drainage area or ecosystem.24 
More and more Westerners have come to realize that they 
can do better by their communities, economies, and ecosystems 
by working together outside of the established, centralized 
governing framework.25 Accordingly, they have largely aban-
doned the cumbersome, uncertain, underfunded, and increas-
ingly irrelevant mechanisms of that older structure.26 
The collaboration movement is a pragmatic response to the 
slowly accumulating evidence that our historical experiment 
with proceduralism produces mixed results at best. The more 
statutory and regulatory layers added to any particular issue, the 
denser the maze and the higher the likelihood that the system 
will malfunction. Then, it is not surprising that the “public lands 
West,” where more layers exist than anywhere else, is the place 
where the search for an alternative decision making structure is 
most active.27 It is because the existing system is so pervasively 
and palpably unworkable out West that people are willing to 
put so much work into fashioning an alternative. It is this set 
of circumstances, above all, that is propelling the collaborative 
movement in the West. 
There is simply too much at stake to let the prevailing 
system continue—and inevitably fail. As such, the collaborative 
method of resolving public land and natural resource issues has 
spread across the region evolving from a purely organic creation 
into its now-institutionalized state.28 And although some agen-
cies now promote collaboration in a variety of ways,29 this has 
not established the method’s foothold on the landscape at any-
one’s direction or by anyone’s design; collaborative democracy 
remains almost entirely undirected and most often occurs with-
out any official sanction or any clear way of connecting it to the 
existing decision structure.30 Thus, we will begin our tour of this 
democratic evolution with the most feral examples of collabora-
tion, and then move on to more domesticated instances. 
The QuIncy lIBrary grouP 
The Quincy Library Group is a typical example of a 
collaborative effort that arose organically and originated outside 
the established governing structure. In Quincy, California, mutu-
ally dissatisfied with a management plan proposed by the Forest 
Service, a group of loggers, environmentalists, citizens, and local 
government officials from the area came up with an alternative 
five-year management plan to preserve old growth, endangered 
species habitats, and roadless areas for 2.5 million acres of forest 
surrounding Quincy, and also to keep the town’s local sawmills 
in business.31 Unable to persuade the Forest Service to adopt 
the plan through the traditional methods, the group enlisted the 
support of their congressional delegation and eventually got their 
bill through Congress in 1996.32 Ultimately, the locally initiated 
collaboration created a congressionally binding resolution to the 
region’s valuable timber resources.33
The Beaverhead–deerlodge ParTnershIP 
The Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership is another example 
of the organic development of collaborative democracies. This 
Partnership emerged in response to the Forest Service’s forest 
plan review, which the Forest Service is obligated to conduct 
at least every fifteen years.34 In keeping with that requirement, 
the Forest Service published a new draft forest plan for the 
Beaverhead–Deerlodge National Forest of southwestern Montana 
in 2006.35 But reactions to the draft plan were mixed.36 Con-
servationists and timber interests had a shared history of deep 
antagonism, in which they had typically taken diametrically 
opposed positions at public hearings on anything proposed by the 
Forest Service.37 Thus, the owners of the locally owned lumber 
mills still operating in the area, already hard-pressed by global 
competition, were concerned that the proposed plan would drive 
them out of business because it would not allow them to har-
vest enough timber from the national forest to keep their mills 
running.38 Conservationists, on the other hand, were convinced 
that the proposed plan was short on wilderness designation and 
that the proposed fish and wildlife programs were not protective 
enough of threatened species.39 
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One local sawmill owner, Sherman Anderson, observed that 
environmental activism and Forest Service policy had reduced 
the amount of public timber coming into his sawmill from ninety 
percent of his feedstock to five percent.40 Those supply prob-
lems, coupled with fierce competition from Canadian mills, had 
driven a steady stream of small sawmills out of business over the 
last few years.41 Anderson, operating at a loss even before the 
bottom dropped out of the housing market in the recession of 
2008, feared that he would be next.42 
After years of conventional management tactics that 
resulted in this situation, representatives from five Montana 
lumber mills instead began meeting independently with local 
representatives from the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Montana Wilderness Association, and the Montana Trout 
Unlimited to explore whether they might collectively find more 
beneficial outcomes for forest management than those proposed 
by the Forest Service.43 This collaborative effort became known 
as the Beaverhead–Deerlodge Partnership.44 The partners found 
common ground after some of the conservationists acknowl-
edged that logging itself was not necessarily bad for wildlife 
and water quality if it was conducted in the right way and at 
the right scale.45 The timber interests, meanwhile, acknowledged 
the conservationists’ view that substantial portions of the forest 
should not be logged, but would be better protected as wilder-
ness.46 The two sides hammered out ways to fit fish and wildlife 
restoration into a sustainable timber-harvesting program.47 The 
Partnership’s laborious efforts were eventually incorporated into 
legislation introduced by Senator Jon Tester, which is currently 
pending in Congress.48 
The BlackFooT challenge
As this kind of citizen-initiated collaboration has gained 
momentum in the public land and resources arena, government 
agencies have sometimes been invited to become collaborating 
partners. Consider, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge. This 
collaborative group that includes private landowners, federal and 
state land managers, local government officials, and corporate 
landowners now coordinates much of the management of the 
Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent public and private 
lands—approximately 2,400 square miles in western Montana.49 
Working together, the mission of the Blackfoot Challenge is 
“to coordinate efforts that conserve and enhance the natural 
resources and rural way of life throughout the watershed.”50 The 
Blackfoot Challenge is now known nationally as a collaborative 
model for preserving the wild beauty, ecological health, and 
natural resources of the watershed.51 
When the Obama administration launched its America’s 
Great Outdoors initiative in 2010, it staged its first public event 
on the ranch owned by Jim Stone, the chair of the Blackfoot 
Challenge board, as a way of underscoring how important the 
collaborative efforts of groups like this have become in the 
recent history of American conservation.52 In a recent interview, 
Denny Iverson, the Challenge Board’s Treasurer, explained 
that he moved with his parents from Minnesota to a Blackfoot 
Valley ranch in 1975.53 He was in high school at the time, and 
he tells how his father, whose dream had long been to own a 
ranch in Montana, initially struggled to make this dream ranch 
profitable.54 Many ranchers were already employing creative 
ways to preserve their properties. For example, like many of 
their neighbors, one way the Iverson’s had kept their ranch in 
the black was by leasing some of the surrounding public land 
for their cattle to graze on.55 As with hundreds of other ranchers 
across the West, the profitability of their ranch depended on the 
grazing resources of those leases.56 But once public land grazing 
had become a target of several national environmental groups, 
these groups threatened the ranchers that their leases would not 
be renewed unless grazing could be done in an environmentally 
benign way.57 
Another way the Iversons kept their ranch solvent was by 
spending a fair amount of time in the local woods, supplying 
timber to local sawmills.58 Some of that timber came from private 
land, like their ranch, but some also came from Forest Service 
land.59 As with public land grazing, some national environmental 
groups sought to end all commercial harvesting of timber from 
public land.60 If successful, those efforts would have reduced 
the thin margin that supported the Iverson ranch and family. 
Ultimately, the family survived by collaborating with neighbors 
and local interests in the Blackfoot Challenge. Whether it was 
grazing or logging, the Iversons and their neighbors (including 
the neighboring sawmills) learned that they had to become 
conservationists to preserve their way of life. It is primarily the 
Blackfoot Challenge that enabled them to do that. Above all, i 
t has given them a new way of working with conservation 
organizations like the Nature Conservancy or Trout Unlimited, 
and with government agencies like the Forest Service. 
Both federal and state land management agencies are seated 
on the Board of Blackfoot Challenge, and Iverson spends a lot 
of time working with them.61 When asked whether his involve-
ment with this collaborative group has changed his view of 
government, Iverson responded, “It’s changed it in a big way. 
Before, I was just trying to scratch a living out of the ground. 
I was a pretty right-wing conservative, with very little use for 
government, especially the federal government.”62 Although he 
has not changed his core principles, he now recognizes that both 
he and the government agencies have changed since their initial 
consultations; Iverson considers himself to be more moderate 
than before, 63 and says that the agencies are “more efficient 
[and] more responsive.”64 Iverson attributes his involvement with 
the Blackfoot Challenge with enabling him to see the agency 
personnel as people who share similar community values.65 
According to Iverson, “When the meeting’s over, we’ll buy them 
a beer. In fact, we’d never have gotten to know each other so well 
if we hadn’t started going to Trixie’s Antler Saloon together.”66 
Iverson and the Blackfoot Challenge have show “how govern-
ment works—or maybe more important, how it can work.”67 
Here again, as with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, 
a diverse group of citizens has taken the initiative to conserve a 
place that is near and dear to their hearts. As a result, the Black-
foot Challenge’s mission statement, “to coordinate efforts that 
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conserve and enhance the natural resources and rural way of life 
throughout the watershed,” has finally become a reality.68
The valles caldera TrusT
At present, one of the strongest tributes to the effective-
ness of collaboration in the public land and resource arena 
is the fact that the practice itself has become more often 
blessed, if not mandated, by both statutes and agency rules and 
procedures.69 One good statutory example is the Valles Caldera 
Trust.70 In 2000, Congress acquired the privately-owned Baca 
Ranch in northern New Mexico.71 Instead of giving one of the 
existing land management agencies responsibility for this newly 
acquired public land, Congress mandated that “an experimental 
management regime should be provided by the establishment of 
a trust capable of using new methods of public land manage-
ment that may prove cost-effective and environmentally sensi-
tive.”72 Specifically, Congress established a diverse, multiparty 
governing board for the land and its natural resources and, in 
effect, mandated that it be managed collaboratively.73 Given the 
initial success of the Valles Caldera Trust, Congress again called 
collaboration into play three years later in the Healthy For-
ests Restoration Act of 2003.74 This shows that Congress has 
confidence in the various stakeholders’ ability to “reduce wildfire 
risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk 
Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, priori-
tizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects.”75 
movIng ToWards governmenT-InITIaTed 
collaBoraTIve land and naTural  
resource managemenT
Following this trend toward governmental involvement, 
public land management agencies themselves now routinely 
invite or encourage collaboration among various stakeholders. 
To illustrate this type of collaboration, consider the ongoing 
process to develop a new planning rule for the Forest Service. 
The National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), which governs 
land and resource management in the national forests, requires 
the Agency to develop plans for all national forests and grass-
lands.76 The Forest Service adopted the first set of rules to guide 
the development of these plans in 1979.77 Although the planning 
rules were revised in 1982, all four subsequent attempts to revise 
the rules have each failed.78 
In 2009, at the direction of the Obama administration, 
the Forest Service launched yet another effort to revise and 
update the planning rules.79 Collaboration has emerged as a 
hallmark of this new process. According to the official Forest 
Service website, the agency “is committed to developing a new 
planning rule that endures over time. We believe a transparent 
and participatory method is the best way to accomplish this. 
We’ll be working hard to gather input collaboratively throughout 
the development of a new planning rule.”80 
This rulemaking approach is an example of how govern-
ment agencies now frequently use collaboration. In this case, 
it is being used to develop administrative rules, but agencies 
also increasingly use collaboration to develop policy proposals, 
management plans, and site-specific work plans.81 The govern-
ment’s use of collaboration is not limited to natural resources 
and environmental policy, and is increasingly invoked at every 
level—local, state, and federal—to formulate (via the legislative 
branch) and implement (via the executive branch) public policy.82 
However, the transition of place-specific collaborative 
results into legislation remains problematic. One observer has 
noted, for example, “if replicated more broadly, the place-based 
approach to forest management could further disaggregate the 
National Forest system.”83 This concern was also echoed by 
Undersecretary of Agriculture Harris Sherman when he testi-
fied on Senator Tester’s pending bill, noting that place-specific 
collaboration “establishes a potentially harmful precedent 
because it may lead to multiple site-specific legislative efforts 
transferring much needed resources from other units of the 
National Forest System where priority work must also be 
accomplished.”84 Here again, the difficulty may be viewed as 
a manifestation of the old problem of the few and the many. 
The perspective of a more broadly representative, but genuinely 
deliberative, public could be brought to bear on some of these 
conflicts, which could expand the range of public involve-
ment without necessarily losing the problem solving impetus 
that has led to the collaborative solution in the first place. 
Integration of the enactment into legislation of place-based col-
laborative management into legislation, then, is both promising 
and problematic. 
The one thing that contributes most significantly to the 
steady expansion of collaborative problem solving is the fact 
that, in so many circumstances, it works. And in fact, it works 
better than other available democratic mechanisms.85 In evo-
lutionary terms, this is a straightforward example of natural 
selection: what works well survives and thrives.86 Collaboration 
has gained a foothold in certain niches of our political ecology 
because it brings a kind of selective advantage to those settings. 
conclusIon
Although these government-sponsored efforts are a wel-
come addition to the ecology of democracy, they represent 
a qualitatively different kind of collaboration than the type of 
citizeninitiated collaboration illustrated by the Beaverhead– 
Deerlodge Partnership or the Blackfoot Challenge. Our experi-
ence has convinced us that, at least in the public lands arena, 
collaboration would never have been widely employed by agen-
cies, let alone mandated by legislative bodies, had it not initially 
emerged in a completely organic, indirect way, and if it had not 
proven its viability on the challenging political landscape that 
produced it. It is this organic, citizen-initiated form of collabora-
tion that we mean when we speak of “collaborative democracy.” 
Encouraging as the government adoption of collaborative 
methods may be, it also raises questions about how readily col-
laboration can be transposed into settings that vary substantially 
from those in which it emerged. To extend the ecological meta-
phor a step further, creating collaborative approaches to public 
land and resource issues by the use of legislation or administra-
tive practice can be viewed as the equivalent of domesticating 
50 SuStainable Development law & policy
animals or plants that originally emerged and evolved in the 
wild. Useful and often lovable as these domesticated species 
may be, it nevertheless remains true that a dog is not a wolf, 
nor is a cat a tiger. Thus, while we promote and encourage 
collaboration in a number of constrained institutional settings, 
the need to preserve space and if possible, native habitat, means 
that collaborative democracy must continue to flourish and 
evolve in its own organic, undirected way.87
Recall, for example, the Blackfoot Challenge, the land-
owner-based group in Montana that helps to coordinate the 
management of the Blackfoot River, its tributaries, and adjacent 
public and private lands.88 The Challenge was organized locally, 
but known nationally as a model for preserving the rural character, 
ecological health, and natural beauty of its watershed.89 It sup-
ports environmentally responsible resource stewardship through 
cooperation of private and public interests.90 These interested par-
ties all share a common vision of how the Challenge operates in 
the Blackfoot watershed, and all believe that success is most likely 
to result from building trust by working together. 
The Blackfoot Challenge, however, is merely part of a 
grander scheme. It is a good example of how place-based collab-
orative efforts often “nest” within one another as the watershed 
lies within the much larger Crown of the Continent.91 During the 
past eight years, a number of independent and complementary 
initiatives (including the Blackfoot Challenge) have emerged to 
promote conservation and community stewardship in this remark-
able landscape.92 These initiatives present the prospect of grander 
collaboration between individual collaborative coalitions. 
The enticing possibility is that this nesting of networked, 
collaborative initiatives will evolve into new forms of gover-
nance. This is best described by Meg Wheatley and Deborah 
Frieze in “Using Emergence to Take Social Innovations to 
Scale,” as a common phase in the process of emergence char-
acterized by “the sudden appearance of a system that has real 
power and influence.”93 Further, Wheatley and Frieze explain 
how “[p]ioneering efforts that hovered at the periphery suddenly 
become the norm.”94 
This emerging system has profound implications for 
regional entrepreneurs. By better understanding the emergent 
properties of nested, place-based collaborative efforts in a locale 
like the Crown of the Continent, individuals and organizations 
will be better poised to mobilize political power and facilitate 
lasting change. Coincidentally, they can also develop and test 
new forms of governance, thinking regionally and acting at 
whatever spatial scale makes sense. 
These, then, are some of the governance implications that 
seem to be manifesting in conjunction with the ongoing emer-
gence of collaboration (especially place-based collaboration) as 
a democratic form. While it may be impossible to predict with 
any precision what exact forms of democratic governance might 
actually emerge, it seems clear that the better we understand 
the dynamics driving these exciting and promising develop-
ments, the better positioned we will be to encourage those most 
likely to advance both the cause of democracy and protection of 
America’s natural resources. 
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adoption of the forthcoming Basin Plan and eventual compliance 
with its standards.42 The MDBA faces the challenge of redirecting 
policy toward a future of sustainable water use that recognizes the 
vulnerability of the communities that will be affected most.43 As 
the Guide’s proposals are integrated into the forthcoming Basin 
Plan, the MDBA must show MDB communities how their input 
has been incorporated and how the central government’s policy 
decisions have the communities’ interests at heart.44 As proposed 
by the Guide, the Basin Plan, and its implementation, must provide 
a viable framework for balancing these considerations in order to 
ensure future water resource security, economic stability, and nec-
essary environmental rehabilitation.45
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the development of an island-wide master plan has been in the 
works for many years, but has been repeatedly delayed.21 This 
legacy of poor planning has fostered the island’s chronic sprawl, 
causing increased consumption of land even as population growth 
has slowed.22 By drafting and enacting a long-range master plan 
focused on resolving the island’s inefficient land use patterns and 
prioritizing natural resource conservation, policymakers have 
an opportunity to reverse this trend. Accompanied by transpar-
ency, public participation and gubernatorial accountability, the 
approval of a comprehensive master plan could represent the best 
hope of protecting finite natural resources and promoting sustain-
able economic development on one of the world’s most densely 
populated islands.23
weak PlaNNiNg Process frustrates ProtectioN of Puerto rico’s 
threateNed coastliNe 
by Mark Borak
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member-nations to establish the organization’s binding powers. The 
permanent-observer nations should argue that the impacts of fossil 
fuel development are of global concern and affect all nations.31 
Therefore, proper safety and environmental standards are needed 
to ensure stable and sustainable development of the Arctic’s natu-
ral resources, a goal to which the AC is already committed. 
The permanent-observer nations should also seek more influ-
ence on the affairs of the AC in relation to fossil fuel develop-
ment. Without usurping the position of the member-nations, the 
permanent-observer nations should demand some limited voting 
rights when the AC wishes to enact binding resolutions. Providing 
the permanent-observer nations with voting rights would allow 
more countries to voice their priorities and concerns, which may 
force the AC member-nations to consider the implications of their 
fossil fuel development plans on the global community. 
If the AC member-states wish to take advantage of the ben-
efits of climate change in the Arctic, they should do so in a manner 
that also honors their Ottawa commitments and the AEPS. The 
international community, then, should pressure the AC to make 
changes to its structure and provide effective oversight of fossil 
fuel extraction in the Arctic. In turn, the AC should respond by 
making the Ottawa Declaration binding and enforceable upon 
member-nations, allocating voting power to the permanent-
observer nations, and effectuating the needed regulations. 
the arctic couNcil: gatekeePer or doormat to the world’s Next 
maJor resource Battle?  
by Oded Cedar
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